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Abstract 
This thesis aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) 
framework to protect civilians against mass atrocities. To test the efficacy and 
workability of the emerging norm and its added value to the current legal and normative 
framework in relation with the protection of civilians, the thesis investigates the ways 
in which R2P was applied or should have applied in practice to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’s conflict. Despite considerable efforts made to address the 
situation of civilians embroiled in armed conflict, the international legal and normative 
framework has shown itself to be inadequate due to the changing nature of conflicts 
and the lack of implementation of existing legal instruments. This has led to the 
situation in which civilians are continuously facing mass atrocities. While R2P sought 
to strengthen international responses to conflicts characterized by the commission of 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide, it is notable that 
the emerging norm has yet to be invoked in the DRC conflict. However, through an 
assessment of the application of the R2P to the conflict, the study finds that the 
international community’s initiative to address the conflict situation in eastern DRC 
came at a time when the need to find a common solution as to how to develop the 
R2P framework within the United Nations system became crucial. Nevertheless, the 
international response to the crisis did not prevent mass killing and the abuse of 
civilians, particularly the widespread sexual violence against women and young girls 
and the use of children as child soldiers.  This thesis argues that the current United 
Nations strategy designed to address such a situation needs to be revised. It 
concludes with several suggestions and recommendations on how to improve the 
international responses to conflicts characterized by atrocity crimes in order to turn 
R2P framework into a reality on the ground. 
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Chapter 1:  Purpose and Structure of the Thesis 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
The evolution of R2P has been hailed as a significant step in the protection of civilians 
against mass atrocities.1 At the 2005 World Summit, the  heads of states and 
governments  declared that  individual states have  the responsibility  to protect their 
population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, 
and from incitement to these crimes; that there is a collective responsibility to assist 
states in meeting their obligations; and that member states are prepared to respond in 
a timely and decisive manner when a state manifestly fails to provide such protection 
to their populations2. 
Two Nobel Prize winners, Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu, supported R2P noting 
that the norm is ‘the most significant development in the defense of human rights since 
                                                          
1 See for example Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, 
Massachusetts  Brooking Institution . Press, 2008;  
Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘RTP: From idea to Norm—and Action?’ in  Global Responsibility to 
Protect Journal,vol.1, no. 1, 2009, pp. 22-53; Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The 
Responsibility to protect in a Unipolar Era’, 35 Security Dialogue,  vol. 35, no.2, 2004,  pp.135-153; Alex J. 
Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect-Five Years On’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 24 no 2(2010) pp 143-
169; Jennifer M. Welsh and Maria Banda, ‘International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or 
Expanding States’ Responsibilities?’ Global Responsibility to Protect, vol 2, No. 3,  2010 , pp. 213-231; Carsten 
Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm’, The American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 101, no. 1,  2007, pp. 99-120; Edward C. Luck, Building a Norm: The Responsibility to 
protect, Mass Atrocity Crimes: Preventing Future Outrages, Washington D.C:  Robert I. Rotberg, 2010 pp, 108-
115; 2005 World Summit Document, UN A/ RES/ 60/1 Oct. 2005; UN Secretary-General, High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, A/59/565, Dec. 2, 2004; UN 
Secretary-General, In larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All, A/59/2005, 
Mar. 21, 2005; UN Secretary-General,  Implementing the Responsibility to protect, A/63/677, Jan. 12, 2009; UN 
Secretary-General,  Early Warning Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect, A/64/864, Jul. 14, 2010, UN 
Secretary-General, The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect, A/65/877, Jun. 27, 2011. 
2 UN GA Res. 60/1, ‘World Summit Outcome’, UN Doc. A/60/1,  Oct. 24, 2005 at paras pp. 138-40. 
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the codification of those rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust’3.  
Even though R2P is impacting on political discourses and generating pressure4 to 
apply the existing legal obligations to prevent and to halt mass atrocities, the norm has 
not been enshrined in a legal instrument whose applicability is subject to both 
theoretical discussions and practical application. According to the 2001 International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), R2P implies the state’s 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity, and the obligation of the United Nations to act where a 
state proves to be unable or unwilling to discharge its duty or when the state itself is 
the perpetrator5, all these are happening in the DRC conflict while the R2P norm is in 
place. 
 
This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the discourse and applicability of 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by exploring its effectiveness as an international norm 
to address mass atrocities. In order to ascertain the efficacy and workability of the R2P 
principles and its added value to the current legal and normative framework in relation 
with the protection of civilians, the study investigates whether the doctrine was applied 
or should apply in practice to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s conflict which is 
characterized by the commission of mass atrocities against the civilian populations. 
                                                          
3 See Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler, The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in 
our Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
4 See for example J. Bellamy, 'The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On,’ Ethics and International Affairs, 
vol. 24, no. 2, Summer 2010, pp. 143–69; Eduard C. Luck, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains and 
Early Promise?’ Ethics and International Affairs vol. 24, No. 4, Winter 2010. 
5 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and States 
Sovereignty, Ottawa: IDRC,  2001. 
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Thus, by analysing the DRC conflict, this thesis assesses whether the international 
community’s strategies to address conflicts characterized by  commission of mass 
atrocities have changed since the adoption of the R2P in 2005. 
 
1.1 Purpose of the research 
 
Although the R2P concept is now widely accepted as an international norm to address 
mass atrocity crimes, its implementation still presents several challenges. Edward 
Luck, Special Advisor to Secretary-General on R2P, in Remarks to the General 
Assembly on R2P, has expressed the need for more research in this area. As he 
comments: ‘we are pleased to see wide academic interest in ‘Responsibility to Protect’, 
because we believe that rigorous scholarship can be an important ally in our common 
quest for better means of preventing the commission of mass atrocities. There is much 
that we do not know. We need carefully documented case studies, particularly about 
good/best practices in different points of the World’ .6 This thesis is a natural extension 
of that process; to find a way to better respond to the kind of conflict situations for 
which the R2P doctrine was designed to address. Although there is emerging literature 
on different aspects of R2P since its introduction in 20017, the issues of 
implementation of R2P have mainly been studied in the field of international relations 
and politics.8 This dissertation specifically aims at making a contribution to the existing 
                                                          
6 UN, Edward C. Luck, ‘Remarks to the General Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect’, New York, 23 July, 
2009. 
7 For more details see International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/628, accessed on 16/10/2013. 
8 See Forexample Alex Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds, New 
York,  Routledge, 2011; Ramesh Thakur, The Responsibility to protect: Laws and the Use of Force in 
International Politics,London, Routledge, 2011; Robert. I. Rotberg, Mass Atrocity Crimes, Preventing Future 
Outrages, Washington, DC: World peace Foundation, 2010. 
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literature focussing on the development of R2P within the international legal framework 
in relation to the protection of civilians.  
Furthermore, most of the case studies on the subject matter were based on conflicts 
with high media coverage throughout the World such as the conflict in Darfur9, Libya10, 
Kenya11 and Côte d’Ivoire, in which reported and documented potential massacres 
have drawn attention to the moral and legal duty to protect. Yet, very little work has 
been conducted on the application of R2P to continual conflicts which began before 
the development of the new norm. Therefore, an analysis and exploration of the 
conflict in the DRC, particularly in  the eastern region which has lasted more than a 
decade involving several foreign armed groups and the presence of the United Nations 
peacekeeping mission under a Chapter VII mandate to protect civilians since 199912, 
contributes to the idea that research should be undertaken to generate a workable 
framework which could compel states to adequately respond to long lasting conflicts 
characterized by continued commission of mass atrocity crimes. 
Moreover, while a considerable amount of literature exists on R2P and protection of 
civilians, there has been limited use of victim and survivor insights as a source of 
                                                          
9 See Walter Lotze, Interventionist Norm development in International Society: The Responsibility to Protect A 
Norm Too Far? PhD Thesis Submitted at the University of St. Andrews in 2011. 
10 See for example J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect—Five Years On’, Ethics and International Affairs, 
vol. 24, no. 2, Summer 2010. 
11 Ibid. For more details on the conflict see Human Rights Watch, Ballots to Bullet: Organized Political Violence 
and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance, March 16, 2008; Kenya Human Rights Commission, On the Brink of the 
Precipice: a Human Rights Account of the Post-Election Violence in Kenya, 2008. 
12 See for example John F. Clark, The African Stakes of the Congo War, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004;  
Michael Nest, François Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic 
Dimensions of War and Peace Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006;  
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, ‘Civil War, Peacekeeping, and the Great Lakes Region,’ in Ricardo René Laremont 
(ed.), The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002; 
Dennis M. Tull, The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Postcolonial Africa: A Case Study from North Kivu (DR 
Congo), Hamburg, Germany; Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 2004; Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth 
and Reality, London, New York: Zed Books, 2007. 
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knowledge about mass atrocity crimes and  the impact of the new norm on the 
individual’s daily life.  
In addition, since R2P was designed to prevent or to respond promptly to conflicts 
characterized by mass atrocity crimes against the civilian population, in practice, such 
a principle seems perfectly adaptable to specific and urgent  situations. Thus exploring 
whether the Security Council has referred to the new norm or whether its response  to 
the DRC conflict was only based on the traditional protection of civilans (POC) 
framework will provide deeper insight into how R2P is developing toward a legal 
binding norm and whether international community’s responses to humanitarian 
tragedies have improved since the adoption of R2P. 
1.2 Methodology 
 
This study was undertaken using two methods:  secondary source-based research 
and interviews. The secondary source-based research included a review of reports 
provided by the United Nations, governments, International Criminal Court, internal 
and external reports of NGOs, academic studies related to the topic and other forms 
of documentation. These secondary sources were supplemented by primary 
information gained from interviews which were carried out between 2010 and 2013. 
During this time, the author conducted interviews in several areas with concentrated 
meetings in Geneva, The Hague and Paris and in the field in Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. Interviews were conducted with eighty 
victims and survivors who have experienced mass atrocities as consequences of 
armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
 Participants were approached and recruited  through rehabilitation centers run by 
NGOs, Hospitals, Good Samaritans and local associations of the victims, such as 
6 
 
Foundation Femme Plus, Action collective pour la Santé et Devélopement 
Communautaire, SOS Femmes Violées, SOS SIDA, Women For Women, and Haki 
na Amani. Through existing contacts with these organizations during the author’s 
previous research in 2007-2008 on Protection of Women and Children in Armed 
Conflicts, in each organization, the subjects (victims/survivors) were identified and 
asked to participate in the research after a meeting session where the research issues 
as the subject were discussed.   
In order to explore the added value of the new norm (R2P) and its impact on the daily 
life of the civilian population who are at risk or are facing mass atrocities, 
victims/survivors were asked about their experience and opinion on mass atrocities. 
The primary emphasis in the interviews was on victims’/survivors’ knowledge of tactics 
and strategies which are  used by the perpetrators and their characteristics; and 
victims/survivors perception of what should be done to prevent or to halt mass 
atrocities. Participants were therefore asked questions about the attack and the 
alleged perpetrators, the perceived role of the DRC government, and their 
expectations of the international community actions. A semi-structured interview 
protocol was chosen with open answers to allow the victims to express their opinion 
in detail and in depth as most of them have only a limited knowledge of the subject.13 
During the interviews, great care was taken to avoid potential risks to participants, 
trauma and anonymity issues. Bearing in mind that interviewing victims of atrocity 
crimes is a sensitive and challenging task, as there could be a risk of reliving traumatic 
experiences when men and women who have witnessed barbarities of war recount 
their personal histories, interviews were conducted in safe conditions. Thus, all the 
                                                          
13 See Annex. 
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interviews were prepared and conducted with the assistance of psycho-therapists from 
the NGOs who work with survivors to ensure that emotional flare-ups are contained.  
All participants took part in the interviews voluntarily without any compensation and a 
consent form was signed before the interview. The proposal for this project was 
approved and ethical permission was granted by the Dublin City University Research 
Ethics Committee. Interviewing victims and survivors was crucial in this study as such 
data on the characteristics of the crimes and the perpetrators allows an evaluation of 
whether civilians were systematically and deliberately targeted and whether the 
attacks were widespread.14 It further allows one to identify the strategies and tactics 
used by the perpetrators and to explore how these elements can help policy makers 
to take concrete measures that directly affect the victims of mass atrocities. The 
research also draws on statements made during the interviews by government 
officials, military officials, armed groups officials, staff of international agencies, local 
Non-governmental organisations and other policy makers involved in national and 
international response to conflicts in eastern DRC.  During the interviews, the issues 
of confidentiality and anonymity were taken into account to ensure the security of any 
sensitive information that had been supplied for the purpose of the research. Thus, 
face-to-face interview was used as a method to reassure participants about 
confidentiality and none of the interviews could be recorded. Written assurance about 
confidentiality and anonymity was also provided to each participant in a plain language 
statement and informed consent process.15 Due to the presence of some sensitive 
data in this research, some statements made during the interview are attributed to an 
anonymous source and participants are not named or identified by their real names in 
                                                          
14 Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court adopted on 17 July 1998, any deliberate, 
systematic or widespread attack against a civilian population is considered a crime against humanity as well as 
a war crime. Rome Statute, Article 8.2 b, xxii. 
15 See Annex. 
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my recording and documentation. Furthermore, given the political sensitivities related 
to the eastern DRC conflict, some places where the interviews have taken place are 
not mentioned. 
In summation, by looking at both policymakers’ and victims’/survivors’ perpectives, this 
thesis explores whether there is a correlation between R2P discourses and what is 
happening in DRC in terms of protection of civilians as victims or potential victims of 
mass atrocities. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
Following Chapter 1, which is an introductory chapter, chapter 2 reviews the history 
and development of protection of non-combatants. It discusses the evolution and 
development of non-combatant immunity from the earliest instances. It then charts the 
emergence of states’ duty to intervene to end inhuman practices and demonstrates 
that the principle of non-combatant immunity has both religious and secular roots. 
This is followed by a discussion of the efforts made during the early 20th century to 
protect the civilian population through legal instruments. The chapter concludes with 
an analysis of the protection of civilians in the United Nations (UN) Charter. Two 
important themes focused on throughout this chapter are, first, the development of the 
norms of warfare, because the origin of the protection of civilians  is usually connected 
to the evolution of the norms that developed  over centuries, to limit the effects of war; 
and second, a state’s right to use force for humanitarian purposes, as this issue has 
been and continues to be controversial in both international law and international 
relations.  
Chapter 3 investigates how the issue of tension between the principle of state 
sovereignty and the duty to intervene to halt mass violation of human rights has been 
9 
 
dealt within the UN framework. It begins with an analysis of the status of humanitarian 
intervention in international law. This is followed by a review of state practice on the 
issue of intervention for humanitarian purposes and an examination of the Security 
Council response to these interventions. The chapter concludes with an analysis of 
the development of R2P as a new norm of international conduct while responding to 
conflicts where mass atrocity crimes are committed. 
The fourth chapter focusses on the legal obligations to protect civilians from mass 
atrocities as enshrined in international law. It emphasizes that states have both an 
individual and a collective duty to prevent and to protect their populations from harm. 
After a brief introductory look at how genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity were recognized as international crimes under international law, it focuses 
on states’ obligations with respect to protecting civilians against atrocity crimes. It 
looks firstly at the rules that are found in international humanitarian law and human 
rights treaties, and then at those that arise from the 1948 Genocide Convention and 
international customary law. The chapter concludes with an analysis of international 
justice mechanisms to protect civilians from mass atrocities and an overview of the 
rights afforded to victims of serious violation of human rights. 
On the basis of the findings generated, Part II of the thesis begins with an introduction 
to the case study in Chapter 5. This chapter examines the DRC as a state in which a 
continuing conflict characterized by mass atrocities against the civilian population has 
lasted for more than a decade to see the practical application of R2P framework with 
regard to such conflicts.  The DRC has been the epicentre of a continuing conflict for 
almost two decades; the struggle for power and access to resources between 
Congolese and foreign armed groups has kept the region in a state of conflict. Armed 
groups and the Congolese security forces continue to commit violations of 
10 
 
international human rights and humanitarian law. In order to fully appreciate whether 
the DRC conflict is a situation which calls for R2P framework, the history of the DRC 
conflict is examined in this chapter, together with the effects of the conflict on the 
civilian population as well as the DRC response to the conflict.  
Chapter 6 explores the international community response to the recent spate of 
violence which has raged in the eastern region of the DRC since 2008 and analyses 
how the R2P framework should have been applied to this conflict. 
The thesis concludes with an analysis of the international normative and legal 
framework in relation to the protection of civilians from mass atrocities and a 
discussion of how this framework has been unsuccessful in protecting civilians in 
eastern DRC. A number of recommendations regarding the need for the 
implementation of R2P framework in order to strengthen the current legal framework 
are also proffered in this chapter, along with proposals for future research.           
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Chapter 2: Historical Development of Protection of Non- Combatant  
‘The battle for civilian immunity is perpetual 
and should be waged everywhere that the 
norm is challenged. There is simply no room 
for complacency’16(A. Bellamy) 
2.0 Introduction 
 
In order to address the fundamental question of this thesis–the potential of R2P to 
strengthen the existing legal and normative framework with regard to protection of 
civilians from mass atrocities–an exploration into the history and development of the 
protection of civilians from atrocities is undertaken in this chapter. The origin of the 
protection of civilians is usually connected to the evolution of the norms of war that 
developed over centuries to limit the effects of war on civilians and other non-
combatants. As pointed out by Chris Jochnick and Roger Normand, ‘for thousands of 
years, attempts have been made to regulate the conduct of hostilities searching how 
to limit the suffering of non-combatants often referred to as unarmed civilians during 
conflict.’17  
This chapter will explore some aspects of  the history and  the roots of the evolution 
of key measures governing the protection of civilians from harm prior to the emergence 
of the R2P doctrine. The chapter is divided into four parts. Section 1 of this discussion 
provides a brief overview of how civilians have been targeted in armed conflict. Section 
2 explores how the idea of non-combatants’ immunity emerged from the Antiquity, 
                                                          
16  Quoted in Alex J. Bellamy, Massacre and Morality: Mass Atrocities in the Age of Civilians Imminuty, Oxford: 
Oxford Univeristy Press, 2012, p. 14. 
17 See Chris Jochnick and Roger Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Law of War’,   
Harvard International Law Journal, winter ,vol 35 no. 49, Winter, 1994  See also H.J. Muller, Freedom in the 
Ancient World, 1961, pp.58-59 Harper & Bros , New Jersey ;  James T. Shotwell, The Long Way to Freedom, 
Indian- apolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc, 1960. 
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Medieval period and throughout the Catholic Church laws.  This section examines the 
early attempts to spare civilians from the effects of hostilities throughout the Christian 
tradition and the medieval periods. Section 3 describes the development of the idea 
of non-combatant immunity by early modern theorists such as Grotius and Vitoria18 
and, lastly, Section 4 focuses on protection of civilians under UN Charter. 
 
2.1 Brief historical background of targeting civilians in armed 
conflict 
 
The targeting of the civilian population during warfare is not a new phenomenon. War 
has always involved large-scale destruction and suffering of non-combatants.19  From 
the early Middle Ages, it has been observed that in many conflicts belligerents do not 
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants when fighting their enemy. The 
Sack of Jerusalem and other cities in the Crusades saw the slaughtering of the 
inhabitants; men, women and children, without any distinction. As one chronicler 
comments: 
Some of our men cut off the heads of our enemies; others shot them with 
arrows, so that they fell from the towers; others tortured them longer by 
casting them into flames. Piles of heads, hands, and feet were to be seen 
in the streets of the city. It was necessary to pick one's way over the bodies 
of men and horses. But these were small matters compared to what 
happened at the temple of Solomon ...If I tell the truth, it will exceed your 
powers of belief… men rode in blood ...Indeed, it was a just and splendid 
                                                          
18 See Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, English trans. By Kelsey in Scott (ed.), The Classics of 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925, Book III and Vattel, Droit des Gens, English trans. Of 
the ed. of 1758 in Scott (ed.), Classics of International Law, Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 
1916, Book III. 
19 See Alex J. Bellamy, Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in Age of Civilian Immunity, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
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judgment of God, that his place should be filled with the blood of the 
unbelievers, when it had suffered so long from their blasphemies.20 
 
In fact, unarmed civilians were always targeted and affected by warfare. Civilians could 
become casualties of war by being caught in the middle of a battle. But the lack of 
discipline of troops was also a cause of their suffering in wartime. Unfortunately, the 
setting up of national armies, with well equipped, regularly paid and disciplined soldiers 
has not been a quick process. The sources of military history are full of stories 
recounting soldiers’ misconduct and abuses due to lack of control. In 1669, for 
instance, a famous French gazette reports recounted the rape of a Turkish woman by 
Hussars attacking her wedding ceremony in Hungary and the suicide of her husband 
who had witnessed the scene.21 Nearly 20 years later, direct sources recount how at 
the capitulation of the Lipovà fortress during the great Ottoman war following the siege 
of Vienna (1683), unruly Austrian soldiers viciously attacked and looted surrendering 
unarmed Turkish soldiers and their families despite being ordered by their 
commanders to leave the city.22  Even before this period, the problem of ill-disciplined 
troops and gangs dominated large areas of Medieval Europe. In the first early Middle 
Ages, the military power of sovereigns was mainly based on lower vassals who were 
supposed to mobilize troops in case of aggression. Thus, mainly reduced to local 
fights, medieval warfare was rarely in need of big, well-organized armies. The Hundred 
Years War, however, altered this pattern; the war continued over a long period of time 
                                                          
20 See Morris Bishop, The Middle Ages, New York,  American Heritage Inc, quoting the twelfth century 
Chronicler Raymond of Agiles, 1968. 
21 Charles Robinet de Saint-Jean, « Lettre du 12 janvier 1669 », in Les Continuateurs de Loret, 1668-1669, éd. 
Baron Nathan-James-Edouard de Rothschild et Emile Picot, 1881-1883, Paris, D. Morgand et C. Fatout éditeurs, 
pp. 423-424 : « Mais l’Epousée, en ce conflit,/La chère Fleur d’Hymen perdit,/A la barbe de son pauvre 
Homme,/Lequel s’en alla pendre, en somme,/Par un furieux crève-cœur…» 
22 See Osman Aga de Temesvar, Prisonnier des infidèles. Un soldat ottoman dans l’empire des Habsbourg, 
Frederic Hitzel éd., Arles : Sindbad, 1998, p.39. 
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with great conflict between the two main kingdoms of European Christendom, England 
and France. Consequently, deploying larger numbers of troops in a more controllable 
way than deploying groups of quick tempered noblemen mounted on armored horses, 
became an important goal for belligerents23. The hiring of men as, in most cases, 
infantry soldiers became common in order to launch or resist invasion waves. 
However, as maintenance costs of such troops were too high, the soldiers only served 
during battle time and were then dismissed24. 
 In fact, despite this amelioration, the soldiers were still bearing arms without any 
regulation or discipline. They looted the countryside for years, calling themselves ‘free 
companies’, ‘Ecorcheurs’, or ‘Routiers’ until the kings or rich landlords decided to send 
platoons of heavy cavalry to defeat them.25  Nevertheless, the Hundred Years War 
was marked by the involvement of the civilian population in hostilities. Thus, the 
targeting of non-combatants became a legitimate and pressing military strategy 
involving planned devastation and terrible massacres.  
                                                          
23 The French knights’ lack of discipline is supposed to have been among the reasons that lead to the main 
defeats against the English. According to Marilyn Livingstone and Morgen Witzel, in Crécy for example : ‘The 
grands seigneurs, eager for battle, began to hurry towards the enemy without thought of the march order, 
each determined to get to grips with the enemy as soon as possible. Analysing events afterwards, the 
chronicler Jean le Bel concluded that the French army was ruled that day by pride and envy rather than 
military discipline, and it is hard to disagree with him’ (The Road to Crécy :The English Invasion of France, 1346, 
Pearson Harlow: Education Limited, 2005, p. 282). Evoking this battle as well as the one fought in Poitiers in his 
Reign of Chivalry, Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2005, (first ed. 1980, David and Charles Newton Abbot), 
pp.32-33, Richard W. Barber concludes that the chivalric sense for personal glory was at the basis of this lack of 
discipline (p.34): ‘In essence, The English victories were due to the fact that they made best possible use of 
their resources, while the French squandered theirs. Yet the French had the reputation of being the best 
knights in Europe. The paradox points to a fundamental failure in knightly training. Discipline played a 
relatively minor part in the knight’s ideals, while individual glory was the essence of existence. The French 
army was a group of individuals, while the English knights subordinated their chivalric ideals to military needs’. 
24 ‘The majority of troops in service to either the French or the English crown were employed on short-term 
contracts, indentures and lettres de retenue, and therefore lost their source of income at the end of a military 
campaign.’ Craig Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p.24. 
25 Michael Howard, War in European History, Oxford, London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p.18. 
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In the early fifteenth century, attacking civilians became an explicit part of military 
strategy. Jacques Heers, for example, in reference to ‘Gast’26  points out that French 
armies under the command of the King’s son were using this strategy to rid France of 
the last English garrisons that settled in the middle of the country around the 1430’s. 
By devastating the countryside, ravaging the meadows and the harvest and burning 
farms, the main goal was to prevent the enemy from getting supplies and hence 
enforce departure. Unfortunately, victims of such attacks were primarily the rural 
population who starved to death if not killed during the raids.27 Apparently this form of 
warfare was common, as Heers demonstrates, in that similar actions were launched 
by either the  English or their allies, the Burgundians.28  
Also in the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years War (1618-48) showed how religious 
conflict coupled with the development of European warfare allowed participants to 
justify massive assaults on civilians, whose religious identity became their death-
defining label. Nevertheless, to see the past or ancient times as more cruel than our 
modern era would be erroneous. In nineteenth and twentieth century wars, the 
widespread killing, systematic rape and suffering of hundreds of millions of civilians 
needs no introduction. Bellamy in Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age 
of Civilians Immunity demonstrates concisely how over the last two hundred years, 
government and other groups have managed to slaughter civilians while ignoring the 
                                                          
26 Gast is an old medieval French term which designates a tactic used by the armies during the Hundred Years 
War and which could be translated today under the expression of ‘scorched earth policy’. 
27 See Jacques Heers, Louis XI, p. 293. 
  Ibid. The Hundred Years War is famous for the Black Prince’s chevauchées which occurred mainly during the 
first part of the war. As M. Bennett states: ‘The chevauchée is explained in terms of ‘Fabian tactics’, which is to 
say: policy of defeating an opponent without the risks of battle. But the chevauchée (literally a ‘ride’) was a 
raiding strategy, inflicting economic damage and so weakening an enemy’s political and moral authority in the 
ravaged region.’ ‘The Development of Battle Tactics in the Hundred Years War’, in Arms, armies and 
Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, Anne Curry and Michael Hughes (eds.), Woodbridge: The Boydell 
Press, 1999, (first ed. 1994),  p. 3. 
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embedding norm of civilian’s immunity from attack.29 Surveying the intentional killing 
of civilians since the nineteenth century, he pointed out the fact that the norm of civilian 
immunity has been regularly challenged by the widespread killing of civilians. He 
further comments: 
A mass killing has been portrayed as, variously, a rational tool employed to 
accomplish radical social transformations or eliminate perceived enemies, 
a useful strategy for defeating certain types of insurgencies, a means by 
which governments unable to prevail over their enemies with conventional 
military means might succeed.30 
The systematic and widespread killing of civilians in Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, DRC, Syria and many other parts of the World continues the long 
history of conflicts characterized by the commission of mass atrocities against the 
civilian population.  
 2.2 Early attempts to protect civilians from mass atrocities 
 
2.2.1 Civilian immunity in ancient societies 
While the origin of the principle of non-combatant immunity is usually traced to the 
Middle Ages, attempts to protect innocent civilians during conflicts can also be 
identified in ancient civilizations31.  Indeed in ancient Greek city-states and old 
Republican Rome, citizens were at the center of the preoccupation of states, in other 
words, states had an obligation to provide justice and peace to the population or 
community. Thus, liberty was constantly identified with the protection of the laws. This 
                                                          
29 See Alex J. Bellamy, Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in Age of Civilian Immunity, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 
30 Ibid. 
31 See for example Walter D. Reed, ‘International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to its Concepts, 
Historical Background and Recent Developments’ Revista Juridica de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, , vol. 49, 
1980 pp. 279-285. 
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can be illustrated by Cicero’s  belief that a People is definable as one ‘bound by an 
agreed body of law and shared interests, and Law itself as the bond of civil society’.32  
Though ancient societies were characterized by a certain ethnocentrism – Greeks 
versus ‘Barbaros’ or Roman citizen versus non-Roman citizens –,33  the concern for 
the state led them to develop  what can now be considered a concept of justice in the 
practice of war. This emergence of the concept of justice in war was seen as a means 
to defend the political structures and to protect it against outside attacks. Cicero 
defends this conception, arguing that there was no acceptable reason for war outside 
of just vengeance, self-defense or the honor of the state.34 He further argued that for 
a war to be considered as legitimate or just, it has to be publicly declared by a 
competent authority and effort has to be made in order to minimize the potential of a 
conflict to culminate into civil war.35 
In accordance with Aristotle,36 Cicero emphasized that a war has to be limited strictly 
to what is necessary for peace. According to him, war should only be fought to protect 
the safety or for revenge in cases of dishonour calling for military discipline and rule of 
law in combat.37 Thus, having recourse to war is justifiable when the aim is to defend 
the honor of the state as well as of peace and justice. While this can be seen as an 
early attempt to spare innocent civilians from the effects of war, Cicero’s statement ‘in 
times of war, the laws fall silent’ has led some writers to conclude that at this time, 
                                                          
32 Elaine Fantham, ‘Liberty and the People in Republican Rome’, Transactions of the American Philological 
Association (1974) Vol. 135, No. 2, Autumn, 2005, p. 215. 
33 For more details on that point see Benjamin Isaac, ‘Proto-Racism in Greco-Roman Antiquity’, World 
Archeology, Vol. 38, No. 1, Race, Racism and Archeology, March, 2006, pp. 32-46. 
34 Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006, pp. 18-20. See also Alan 
Watson, International Law and Archaic Rome, Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993, 
p.29. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See Aristotle (E. Barker (ed.), The Politics, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
37 Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, op. cit. 
18 
 
unlike the jus ad bellum, the jus in bello was not the major concern.38 Nevertheless, 
Christian authors such as St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas rejected the idea of 
revenge, advocating for leniency towards the enemy, emphasizing that defense and 
restoration of peace should be the only reasons for going to war.39 While Cicero’s just 
society is ruled by natural law and reason, the Christian concept of justice is pervaded 
by a virtue of  love, even for one’s enemies.  
2.2.2 Christian Just War Doctrine and civilian immunity: St Augustine and St 
Thomas Aquinas 
 
Recourse to war has always been a subject of controversy among Christians who find 
themselves in a dilemma; that of  reconciling the respect of a human being with the 
necessity to restore peace. There was something of a contradiction between the 
Christian ethic and its practice. Christian teaching was promoting pacifism, whilst 
some Christians were serving as soldiers or fighters in the Roman army. The main 
question was whether it was just for a Christian to participate in war. As Tertullian’s 
De Corona40 pointed out:  
Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, when the Lord 
proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword? And shall 
the son of peace take part in the battle when it does not become him even 
to sue at law? And shall he apply the chain, and the prison, and the torture, 
and the punishment, who is not the avenger even of his own wrongs? 
…There is no agreement between the divine and the human sacrament, 
the standard of Christ and the standard of the devil, the camp of light and 
the camp of darkness. One soul cannot be due to two masters—God and 
                                                          
38 See for example Noelle Higgins, Regulating the Use of Force in Wars of National Liberation - The Need for a 
New Regime, (PhD Thesis 2007) p.11. 
39 See Joachim von Elbe, ‘The Evolution of the Concept of the Just war in International Law’, American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 33, 1939, p.665-688. 
40 Tertullian was a convert to Christianity who became a Presbyterian and the founder of Latin Christian 
literature. 
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Caesar...how will a Christian man war, nay, how will he serve even in 
peace, without a sword, which the Lord hath taken away?...The Lord...in 
disarming Peter, unbelted every soldier.41 
This quest for harmony catalysed the ‘just war’ doctrine which attempted to justify the 
use of force for peaceful purpose. By adopting the position according to which 
recourse to war could be justified in certain circumstances, the Church opened a 
serious debate concerning war and divine justification. One of the explanations was 
that one may go to war only to vindicate justice or to restore peace. This idea was first 
initiated by St Augustine in the fifth century, whose writings were used by St Thomas 
Aquinas in the thirteenth century to develop the Just War Theory.42 
The Catholic Church’s teaching on just war was first developed by St Augustine who 
is one of the benchmark figures of the literature on Just War43. His position concerning 
war derived from the Holy Bible which advocates the merciful treatment of the enemies 
and the sixth commandment44 which forbids taking human life. His understanding of 
war was connected with John the Baptist’s recommendation asking soldiers not to 
terrorize people and to never search happiness in war but always to use war as a 
means to reach peace.45 For St Augustine, the only exception to this rule is the moral 
obligation that every human being should defend the weak such as, children, women, 
etc. Consequently, when peace and security seem to be jeopardized, Christian leaders 
have an obligation to protect their peoples, especially the weak, using all available 
                                                          
41 De Corona 11 ANF 3.99 quoted in Philip Schaff, Latin Christianity: Its Founder – Tertullian.  
42 Saint Augustine, City of God, vol. VI, Book xix, translated by W.C. Greene, Great Britain, William Heinemann 
Ltd., 1969. 
43 See for example William R. Stevenson, Christian Love and Just war, US:  Macon-Geogia, Mercer University 
Press, 1987. 
44  See Exodus 20:13; Deuteronomy 5:17. 
45 Augustine, letter 189 to Boniface, and against Faustus the Manichaen, in Augustine: Political Writings, ed. 
and trans. M. Tkaez and D. Kries, Indianapolis: Hackett, pp.218-29. 
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means, including war.46 According to him, a war is justified only if is waged by 
legitimate authority, to respond to the injustice of the aggressor and for peaceful 
purpose47.  
 St Augustine’s thoughts have significantly contributed to the debate of what makes 
warfare justifiable. However, since his main concern was to address the justness of 
waging war, he did not specifically address the issue of making a distinction between 
innocents and combatants. Thus, some writers such as Richard Hartigan48 believe 
that there was a lack of determination and consistency on this question since his view 
was mostly connected with the matter of the evil of war rather than the protection of 
non-combatants.  For example,  on spoliation of Egyptians and the wars of the 
Israelites, he did not criticize the use of violence in the Israelites’ war of liberation led 
by Moses, rather he focused mostly on motivation and justification, trying to explain 
what the evil of war is.49 As Langan comments:  
I would argue, crucial to our understanding of Augustine’s approach to the 
just war that he is really interested in the preservation of a moral order which 
is fundamentally a right internal order of dispositions and desires and in 
which the question of whether action is violent or not fundamental; The 
restoration of that order constitutes a sufficient justification for resort to 
violence. 
Nevertheless, his just war doctrine was the departure point of the idea of a legitimate 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. St Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century 
                                                          
46 Saint Augustine, City of God, vol. VI, Book xix, translated by W.C. Greene, Great Britain William Heinemann 
Ltd., 1969. 
47Ibid.  
48 Richard Hartigan has argued (1968, 203) that ‘Augustine presented no clear-cut argument for the 
protection of the innocent, especially for the civilian innocent or noncombatant, in time of war’. This has also 
been pointed out by John Langan. 
49 See John Langan, ‘The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory’, The Journal of Religious Ethics, Vol. 12, 
No. 1, Spring, 1984, p. 21. 
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in his Summa Theologiae50 revised St Augustine’s version of just war. He described 
three conditions under which a war could be waged justly: The first is the authority of 
the sovereign who has the duty of preserving the common good; second, the recourse 
to hostilities is allowed if it is for a just cause; finally, a war may be waged justly if 
initiated with a pure intention on the part of the belligerents. Reiterating St Augustine 
about criteria justifying war, St Thomas Aquinas praised not only justice but also the 
virtue of charity in war. As he noted ‘True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars 
that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement or cruelty, but with the object of 
securing peace and punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good’.51  It is interesting 
to note that while St Thomas Aquinas supports Augustine’s concept, reiterating the 
three valid reasons for going to war, he also emphasized the idea that an authority has 
a duty to protect his people. Unlike St Augustine, St Thomas Aquinas’ position on the 
distinction between civilian and combatant was without ambiguities.  He for example 
clearly mentioned that the killing of innocents was not permissible unless in case of 
self-defense. As he stated:  ‘ It is permissible to kill in self-defense because of the 
principle of double effect: one is responsible for what one intends to bring about, not 
what happens as a result of unintended, even foreseeable actions. One should never 
intend to kill innocents, but if innocents die as a result of some action that one did not 
intend, that is morally permissible’.52Therefore, according to the Christian tradition, 
recourse to war is justifiable only in two cases: to defend innocents and in self-defense 
and noncombatant civilians must not be slaughtered intentionally. It should be noted 
however that the Church’s just war doctrine dealt primarily with the conduct of the just 
                                                          
50 See Thomas Aquinas, edited by A.P. d’Entrèves, translated by J.G. Dawson, Selected Political Writings, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948, p. 159.   
51 Ibid. 
52 See Herbert Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, 3rd ed., London: Epworth Press, Wyvern Books, 
1962, p.27. 
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war, Jus ad bellum (just cause, right authority and proper intention), and only few 
references was made with regard to jus in bello including the obligations of warriors to 
non-combatants. Nevertheless, along with the evolution of theories on the regulation 
of warfare, by Christian writers, the Medieval era saw the emergence of the idea of 
non-combatants’ immunity in various actions, commonly referred to as ‘Peace of God’ 
movement.53 
2. 2. 3 Middle Ages warfare practice and protection of civilians 
 
The years following the death of Charlemagne54 sanctioned the beginning of an inner 
destabilization of Western Europe. Certainly, the division of the Empire between his 
three sons did contribute to the weakening of the political structures established by the 
old emperor. Modern historians evoke the rising military power of small landlords 
surrounded by men-at-arms willing to seize the richness of their rivals. Among them 
stands the Church which was regularly targeted by warlords of the Early Middle 
Ages.55 ‘The castle, place of refuge, is also sometimes a resort of thieves and the land 
around it is transformed in an economic exploitation area’.56 From here we can date 
the origins of the regulation of military operation by the Church. This military strength 
had to be controlled by and integrated into Christian ideology. 
The establishment of rules by religious philosophers of that time represents the 
materialization of efforts to hinder the Early Middle Ages military anarchy. Originating 
                                                          
53 See James Turner Johnson, ‘Maintaining the Protection of Non-Combatants’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 
37, no. 4, 2000, pp 421-448. 
54 Charlemagne was the Emperor of the whole of Western Europe after the collapse of the Roman Empire. 
55 Jean Flori, Le Temps des chevaliers, Editions Tallandier, 1999, 18 : « les potentats locaux, les seigneurs, 
entourés de leur sbires en armes (les milites qu’on nommera bientôt Chevaliers) contestent d’anciennes 
donations, spolient les terres des églises, les pillent à l’occasion, menacent terrorisent, incendient, enlèvent 
contre rançon, font peser sur les populations et les églises qu’ils sont sensés protéger des exactions diverses. » 
See also Flori’s Croisades et chevalerie : XI-XIIe siècles, Bibliothèque du Moyen-Âge, De Boeck Université, 
Bruxelles, 1998, p. 8-9. 
56 Jean Flori, Le Temps des chevaliers, 18. 
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in southern France, the Peace of God movement’s main goal was to redirect war only 
towards the professionals of soldiery by instilling some discrimination between real 
warriors and non-combatants.57 This saw the development of categories of persons 
who were to be protected from the effects of warfare. For instance, persons associated 
with the church were protected from looting and violence by armed groups.58 The 
religious councils tried to obtain the respect of these rules by using extreme sanctions 
against the offenders, such as excommunication.  
In fact, the Church developed categories of persons who were immune from the effects 
of war. For example Clerics, Monks and friars had special protection through canonical 
doctrine. Later on, the distinction between combatants and non-combatants as 
principle was firmly recognized in canon law which is the law of the Roman Catholic 
Church.  However, the immunities seems to be mainly based on the protection of the 
institutions of the Church. As stated by Johnson, the main motivation of protection at 
that time was more connected with protection of the institutions of the Catholic Church 
than the humanitarian consideration.59 
2. 2.4 Chivalry tradition and protection of civilians 
 
The idea of distinguishing between categories of persons and their treatment in 
warfare was progressively integrated by the code of chivalry under the influence of the 
Church.60 Quoting Jean Flori: ‘The Church attempted, under Feudalism and when 
state power was in decline, to assign to kings and princes, then to landlords and 
knights altogether, what was at the origins, the monarch’s main duty : protect the 
                                                          
57 Ibid., 19. 
58 See Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1981, 
p.127. 
59 Ibid. 
60 See Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, op. cit. at p.132. 
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country and its inhabitants, particularly the churches and weak populations.’61 In fact, 
the idea of non-combatant immunity was clearly mentioned in the framework of 
chivalric code.  Therefore, knights could only fight other knights and could not use 
arms against women, children, the elderly, the ill, infirm, or people who were mentally 
deficient. Thus, the rules were drawn on the basis of distinction between enemy and 
innocents. For example, one of the rules provided that ‘only people who actually take 
part in war are to be treated as combatants; others, regardless of status, are non-
combatants’. Contrary to the innocents, the enemies were those carrying arms. With 
those principles, the chivalric ideal was one of the first steps toward a protection of 
people who were not taking part in the hostilities.62 
It has been argued however that, the idea of distinguishing combatants and non-
combatant was based on the fact that those protected persons were excluded from 
combat because they were not strong enough to fight. Some writers believe that the 
principle was mostly based on the socio-economic conditions of medieval warfare. In 
this regard, Johnson comments: 
In the Middle Ages, again, knightly protection of non-combatants derived 
from two considerations: the desire to gain honor in combat and the need 
to protect the economic base of the knight of his feudal lord. The former 
tended to protect those persons not under arms, while the latter tended to 
keep both land and peasantry safe from attacking and looting. The latter 
consideration is exactly the same as that of the eighteenth century 
sovereign’s wars: to keep the economy that sustained the sovereign as 
undisturbed by the war as possible. If the focus of the former reason is 
shifted slightly away from the desire for honor in combat, a corollary 
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appears: the need to employ force available against the enemy most likely 
to do one harm. The principle of economy of force is thus inseparably linked 
to the desire for honor: both require the knight to use his arms against other 
men in arms, not against the populace of a territory generally. Efficiency in 
use of available force and keeping intact the economic base of lands 
possessed or coveted-two considerations central to the limited war idea as 
it emerges in the eighteenth century- thus appear already in the Middle 
Ages as factors leading the knightly class to grant noncombatants a 
measure of immunity from the destructiveness of war.63 
Nevertheless, the chivalric tradition was one of the first steps to codify the protection 
of people who were not taking part in the hostilities.64 As Stroble comments: 
The notion of non-combatant immunity seems to have its source not in 
religious or moral sensitivity but in a code of chivalry from the Middle Ages. 
Knights were professional soldiers; ‘there was no glory in armed combat 
with a nonknight’. Besides, ‘noncombatant serfs, peasants, artisans, and 
merchants were the source of wealth of members of the knightly class’. It 
was cowardly to attack an enemy through his non-combatant subjects 
rather than directly, and knights had a vested interest in protecting and 
supporting the non-combatants who were the source of their own wealth.65 
 
2.3. The Early Modern Theorists and protection of civilians 
 
While Christian writers and the Church as an Institution have made a significant 
contribution to the notion of Just War during the Medieval period, the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries saw the emergence of secular writers who began to explore the 
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idea of Just War and its place in international environment.66  In fact, at this time the 
Church gradually lost its moral weight in Europe and its power to limit the effect of war 
diminished as national states took up the question of sovereignty. The peace treaty, 
the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648 between the Holy Roman Emperor and the 
King of France and their respective allies, which ended the Thirty Years War had 
strongly entrenched the idea of secularization of Just War. This secularization 
facilitated the introduction of the concept of war into the framework of international 
law.67 With the rise of the European nation-states came the consideration of just war 
since the priority was the maintenance of order among nations by peaceful means. 
Thus, the law of nature replaces the religious idea of charity in war as international 
lawyers progressively began to consider the question of justice in war. Nevertheless, 
there was a continuity in the tradition of just war from canon law to secular law of 
nations.68 Aquinas’s philosophy was the basis for later formulations by scholars and 
jurists. The most important of early legal theorists in this period are: Francisco 
Suarez,69 Francisco de Vitoria,70 Hugo Grotius,71 Samuel Pufendorf,72 Christian 
Wolff73 and Emmerich de Vattel.74 The contribution of those founders of modern 
International Law was of great significance in that they introduced the notion of 
                                                          
66 See Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001, p. 62. 
‘As the notion of war and indeed the idea of a Just War progressively began to come inside the remit of the 
first great thinkers in the area of international law, the Just War theory began to become ‘absorbed into the 
mainstream of international law. As Jochnick and Normand comment: The laws of war remained tied to 
religious particularism until the Enlightment, when a prominent group of jurists and theologians, the 
‘publicists’, helped shift the source of legal authority from God to reason.’ Noelle Higgins, Regulating the use of 
Force in Wars of National Liberation - The Need for a New Regime, A Study of the South Moluccas and Aceh, 
p.15. 
68 See J.R. Hale’s Judgment in New Cambridge Modern History, I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1957, p.291. 
69 Suarez (1548-1627) 
70 Francisco de Vitoria (1580-1546) 
71 Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) 
72 Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) 
73 Christian Wolff (1679-1754) 
74 Emmeric de Vattel (1714-1767) 
27 
 
justness of war and the law of nature emphasizing that the cause of a belligerent had 
no impact on the duty to observe the law of war.75 Hugo Grotius76 and Vitoria have 
considerably contributed to the development of the law of warfare, including the 
development of non-combatant immunity in this period.77 In fact the origins of the 
modern principle of non-combatant immunity  is generally attributed to Francisco de 
Vitoria who remarkably maintained that war against the South American Indians 
peoples was not justifiable unless there was a just cause.78  
In his famous De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libis Tres, Grotius rejects the idea that law of war 
was a divine law. For him, the law of war was based on Natural Law. He emphasizes 
the need to distinguish between combatant and non-combatant observing that the 
latter should be spared as much as possible.79 Grotius, who was scarred by the horrors 
that he witnessed in various wars of religion, emphasized the prevention of the death 
of innocent people even by accident.80   He stated: ‘I observed a lack of restraint in 
relation to war, such as even barbarous races would be ashamed of ... in accordance 
with a general decree, frenzy had openly been let loose for the committing of all 
crimes’.81 Similar lines of thought are apparent in the writings of others legal theorists. 
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Rousseau for example, in his Contrat Social,82 developed the theory that war is a 
matter of a nation’s against another. He emphasized the idea that individuals are not 
part of that consent and consequently, they should be protected from the effects of 
war. This was a great contribution on setting the basis for the principle of non-
combatant immunity.83 Rousseau wrote: 
War is constituted by a relation between things, not between persons… War 
then is a relation not between man and man, but between State and State, 
in war individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, not even as 
citizens, but only as soldiers, not as members of their country, but as its 
defenders.84 .  
However, despite the development of Just War theory by theologians and 
philosophers, no valid legal rule regulating the use of force and non-combatant 
immunity existed in the Early Modern period. 
 
2.4 Genesis of legal protection of non-combatants  
 
2.4.1 From Lieber Code to Hague Conferences 
 
The Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 
conceived by Dr. Francis Lieber in 1863 is considered to be a crucial step in the 
development of positive legal efforts to  control the methods and means of warfare.85 
The lack of regulation of the conduct of hostilities and cruel devastation during the 
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American Civil War compelled President Abraham Lincoln to consider the issue of 
humanitarian consideration in armed conflict. Although the rules contained in the 
Lieber Code were only binding upon the US Union soldiers, it had a great influence 
worldwide and has served as a basis for the law of war.86 Lieber’s consideration of 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants is significant, particularly that the 
distinction must be made between civilians and combatant before an attack can be 
carried out. The rule is clearly underlined in Article 155 which states that: 
 All enemies in regular war are divided into two general classes—that is to 
say, into combatants and non-combatants, or unarmed citizens of the 
hostile government. The military commander of the legitimate government, 
in a war of rebellion, distinguish between the loyal citizen in the revolted 
portion of the country and the disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizens may 
further be classified into those citizens known to sympathize with the 
rebellion without aiding it, and those who, without taking up arms, give 
positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy without being bodily forced 
thereto.87 
Article 22 guarantees the protection of civilians and their property stating that:  
As civilization has advance during the last centuries, so has likewise 
steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the 
private individual belonging to a hostile country itself, with its men in arms. 
The principle has been more and more acknowledge that unarmed citizen 
is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies 
of war will admit.88  
Concerning precautionary measures that should be taken to spare innocents from 
harm in the conduct of war, Article 19 outlines that: ‘Commanders, whenever 
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admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so that the non-
combatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed before the 
bombardment commences…’89 This was certainly the foundation of the establishment 
of balance between military necessity and human dignity. Furthermore, Article 44 
states that: ‘All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all 
destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage 
or sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding maiming, or 
killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other 
severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.’90 However 
despite having great influence abroad following the Civil War, the Lieber Code has 
generally been viewed as having had almost no effect on the conduct of the 
combatants during Civil War itself. 
Nevertheless, The Lieber Code is considered as the cornerstone of codification of the 
laws and customs of war.91 This attempt to gather the laws of war into one document 
strongly influenced the 1874 Brussels Conference and the Hague Conventions on land 
warfare of 1899 and 1907. A set of provisions of the Lieber Code were annexed to the 
Hague Convention of 1899, making it a part of international law.92 Since the aim of the 
code was an attempt to incorporate an humanitarian aspect in the conduct of war, 
there is no doubt that it has inspired the drafters of the laws regulating the conduct of 
hostilities and  has had an important  impact on the rules regarding the protection of 
civilians  and special protection granted to women and children.  
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Significant steps in the development of principles of humanity in warfare can be also 
attributed to Henry Dunant, citizen of Geneva, who in his ‘A Memory of Solferino’ had 
alerted  readers to the appalling suffering that he had witnessed in the murderous 
battle of Solferino in 1859 between the French and the Italians.93 This culminated in 
the creation of the International Committee for Aid to the Wounded whose  role was to 
find a way of improving conditions of warfare and which later became the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. Shortly afterwards, the first Geneva Convention of 1864 
for the Amelioration for the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field was 
adopted. Notwithstanding that the 1864 Convention was designed to protect wounded 
soldiers, it was also significant in terms of protection of civilians since it gave birth to 
the principles that would come to guide legal protection for persons playing no part in 
hostilities.94 This treaty was followed by the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration which was 
an attempt to formally forbid belligerents from targeting civilians in their military 
operations.95 This period was crucial for the development of principles of humanity in 
warfare. As Bellamy comments: ‘The period between 1860s and the outbreak of the 
First World war was something of a ‘golden era’ for international treaty- making on the 
subject’.96 However, these treaties did not specifically address the protection of 
civilians.  
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2.4.2 The Martens Clause 
 
The Martens Clause is regarded as the first major international agreement regulating 
the protection of civilians form the effects of hostilities.97 Proposed by Fyodor Martens, 
the legal adviser of the Russian Tsar, the so-called Martens was originally designed 
to remedy the failure of delegates at the Peace Conference to agree on the issue of 
protection of the population of occupied territories. The Clause read that: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under 
the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they 
result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws 
of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.98  
The clause was incorporated into the preamble of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907 designed to restrict tactics and technologies and consequently, to protect 
civilians against the effects of hostilities.99 Under the Hague Regulations, civilians were 
protected  not directly but to a certain extent. For example Article 46 of the Hague 
Convention of 1899 reads: ‘Family honor and rights, individual lives and private 
property, as well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected. Private 
property cannot be confiscated’. Furthermore, unless surprise was necessary, warning 
was required before bombardment and sieges of defended cities and towns so that 
civilians could evacuate. Also, scientific, cultural, religious and educational objects 
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were not to be attacked, therefore precaution was needed in bombarding defended 
towns.100   
Cassese observes that the Martens Clause has the merit of being the first instrument 
which proclaimed the existence of principles resulting from the laws of humanity and 
the dictates of public conscience. He argues that the clause has been frequently relied 
upon in international dealings such as treaties and courts decisions and in this case it 
should be incontestably considered as one of the ‘legal myths ‘of the international 
community which has had a considerable impact on international law, in particular the 
law of armed conflict.101 It is to be noted however that only some basic provisions in 
these instruments provided protection to civilians. However, the ravages and horrors 
of the Second World War led to the need to establish a specific legal framework in 
order to improve the situation of civilians affected by armed conflict.102 
2.4.3 Post-Second World War legal development of protection of civilians 
 
As noted above, since the earlier conventions on the law of warfare dealt primarily with 
the issues of combatants, civilians were not particularly targeted.  In fact, attention was 
mostly given to wounded, sick, shipwrecked and captured combatants rather than to 
the civilians who wre caught up in hostilities.103  Therefore, the question of civilians in 
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hostilities was reopened in the 1949 Diplomatic Conference of Geneva which seeks 
to protect civilians in times of war.104 The development of warfare technology  and 
devastation which had resulted from the First World War, followed by the more 
sophisticated methods of warfare in the Second World War, led to a common 
sentiment that the situation of civilians who were exposed to the effects of hostilities 
should be improved. In this context, the distinction between combatant and non-
combatant became a matter of major international concern. There was an urge to 
make new law for the protection of civilians. This can be illustrated by a statement 
made by the Greek Professor Michel Pesmazoglu, one of the delegates to the 
Diplomatic Conference.  Emphasizing the need for an international agreement for a 
more specific protection of civilians in war time, he stated:   
 War has been transformed into butchery and belligerents strike army and 
civilian population alike without any distinction between the two. However, 
all abuses lead to a reaction… International conscience demands the 
condemnation of all these barbarous proceedings. The world is amazed 
and stunned before these rivers of blood, these hillocks of bones, these 
mountain of ruins…A new crusade is being gathered together against these 
abuses…. We are conscious of the will of all those whose lives, either as 
hostages, deportees, or on the field of battle, were scarified to the madness 
of men who believed that the protection of human beings was merely a 
figment of the brains of intellectuals…All these martyrs do not demand 
revenge but they cry out that their sacrifice shall not have been in vain. They 
ask to be the last victims of these theories according to which man exists 
only for the State and not the State for the happiness of its citizen.105 
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Thus, specific legal protection of persons who do not, or no longer, take part in 
hostilities appeared with the adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949106 
and was later reinforced in the two Additional Protocols of 1977.107  However, the 
adoption of the fourth 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the protection of the civilian 
population and the 1977 additional protocols to the four Geneva Conventions was a 
particular advancement since it introduced the most specific humanitarian protection 
to civilians.108 This marked the establishment of the principle of civilian immunity as an 
international legal norm.  
 The period following World War II was also notable for the development of legal norms 
and standards in terms of prosecuting and punishing crimes having an international 
dimension. This can be illustrated by the following statement: 
The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak 
and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason of his being. When he 
violates this sacred trust, he not only profanes his entire cult but threatens 
the fabric of international society.109 
In response to the horrors of the Holocaust in Europe and the Japanese crimes 
perpetrated during World War II, the allied powers110 sought to prosecute and to 
punish the major war criminals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against 
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peace and conspiracy.111 The International Military Tribunal (IMT) known as the 
‘Nuremberg Tribunal’ and The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE)112 were established to prosecute individuals for those crimes.113 The setting 
up of these international tribunals was of great importance as until that time states had 
a monopoly over criminal jurisdiction concerning international crimes.114 This will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 4. 
 It is important to note that along with the development of the idea of sparing civilians 
from harm, there was also the evolution of the idea that states have the obligation to 
protect their populations and foreign states have a legitimacy to intervene in a 
sovereign state for motives of humanity. A great deal of literature exists115 on legal 
assessments of this concept and its practice, particularly in the nineteenth century as 
demonstrated in the following discussion. 
2.5 Evolution of international protection - humanitarian intervention 
 
2.5.1 History and evolution of military intervention for humanitarian purposes 
 
The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is not new.116  The practice of using force in 
a foreign state for the purpose of protecting life can be traced back to ancient times. 
For example in the Greek city-state system and in the Roman Empire, intervention in 
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the interest of humanity was common. The concept of humanitarian intervention  can 
also be identified in Aquinas’ reflections which emphasized the right of a state to 
intervene in the internal affairs of another when it mistreats its subjects, and was later 
developed by early legal philosophers  like Vitoria and Grotius.117  For example, on the 
discussion raised by Vitoria about the justness of Spanish war against the Indians who 
were practicing cannibalism and human sacrifice, Grotius raised the principle of 
humanity which legitimises undertaking war to protect the population from wrong 
arguing that ‘sovereign have a right to punish acts that excessively violate the law of 
nature or of nations in regard to any person whatsoever’.118 Consequently, for him, 
intervention is lawful when responding to a breach of the rights of humanity.  
Many other solidarity theorists of international society such as Vattel, Francisco 
Suarez and Alberico Gentili followed this line of thought emphasizing that humanitarian 
intervention was in conformity with natural law. As Vattel states: ‘if the prince, attacking 
the fundamental laws, gives his people legitimate reason to resist him, if tyranny 
becomes so unbearable as to cause the Nation to rise, any foreign power is entitled 
to help an oppressed people that has requested assistance’.119 Accordingly, there is 
a right to use force against a tyrant who mistreats their people and states have the 
obligation to help citizens of other states.120 However, the principle of humanitarian 
intervention as it is recognized today is generally traced back to the nineteenth century 
as illustrated by various instances of state intervention in internal affairs in the name 
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of humanity.121 During this time, there was considerable acceptance of the theory that 
a state or group of states has the right to intervene in the name of the principle of 
humanity when another state is involved in egregious breaches of the rights of its 
citizens.122This ascendancy of humanitarian intervention is obvious in Arntz’s 
statement: 
When a government, even acting within the limits of its rights of sovereignty, 
violates the rights of humanity, either by measures contrary to the interests 
of other states, or by excessive injustices or brutality which seriously injure 
our morals and civilizations, the right of intervention is legitimate. For, 
however worthy of respect the rights of sovereignty and independence of 
states may be, there is something even more worthy of respect, namely the 
law of humanity, or of human society, that must be violated. In the same 
way as within state freedom of the individual is and must be restricted by 
the law and the morals of society, the individual freedom of the states must 
be limited by the law of human society.123 
 
Therefore, the joint intervention of Great Britain, France and Russia in Greece in 1827 
is cited by many writers as the earliest case of humanitarian intervention.124 Indeed, 
to justify the intervention, intervening states invoked the protection of Christian 
minorities who were subject to Ottoman Empire oppression claiming that they were 
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motivated by the sentiment of humanity as stated in the London Treaty125.  Intervention 
in response to humanitarian tragedy fuelled several other interventions in the 
nineteenth century. The French invasion of Syria in 1860 to stop the slaughter 
perpetrated by the Ottoman troops is also cited as one of the earliest instance of 
humanitarian intervention. Chesterman considers that this was a possible instance of 
humanitarian intervention due to the fact that acting states had not any gainful 
interests. As he comments: ‘despite its occurrence within the context of French 
colonialism in the region, the occupying force did arrive under the mandate of five 
European Powers and departed when that mandate concluded…The humanitarian 
concerns of the Powers –albeit only for the well-being of fellow Christians—appear to 
have been genuine.’126  
Russia’s incursion into the former Yugoslavia in 1877 with support from a number of 
other European states was also founded on abuse perpetrated by the Ottoman 
Empire.127 These cases are good examples of humanitarian intervention as 
interveners invoked either the protection of a minority who were being persecuted or 
the rescue of their citizens abroad. As Bettati neatly summarizes with regard to the 
French invasion of Syria in 1860: 
 La caractéristique principale de cette forme d’ingérence purement altruiste 
réside dans sa motivation désintéressée que l’on trouve exprimé par le 
protocole adopté à la Conférence de de Paris le 03 Août 1860. Aux termes 
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de ce texte, les puissances ‘n’entendent pas poursuivre dans  l’exécution 
de leurs engagements aucun avantage territorial, aucune influence 
exclusive, ni aucune concession touchant le commerce de leurs sujets.128  
Nevertheless, the concept of humanitarian intervention was suspicious in the eyes of 
legal theorists. Some writers do not accept the idea that these interventions were 
purely motivated by the concept of humanity, arguing that the interveners have failed 
to prove that their interventions were conducted exclusively for the concern of human 
rights of the population in the relevant country.  As Kochler rightly comments:  
This early doctrine of ‘limited sovereignty’ claimed to be inspired by purely 
humanitarian motives, while in reality the European powers of the time had 
their own ‘imperial’ agenda vis-à-vis Ottoman Empire. Far from qualifying 
as disinterested actio popularis, humanitarian intervention in its actual 
practice in the nineteenth century was dictated by the geopolitical interests 
of the then European powers. Those powers, in the course of their own 
colonial rule, violated each and every humanitarian principle they 
proclaimed to uphold and resolved to enforce vis-à-vis the Sublime Porte. 
While respect for the rights of the Christian minorities was emphasized for 
the territories under Turkish rule, and the acts of sovereignty of the Turkish 
Sultan were effectively put under foreign control in the name of ‘humanity’, 
the European colonial powers accepted no such standards of humanity in 
their treatment of the population they considered as ‘barbarian’ at the 
time.129 
 
Similarly, Brownlie rejects the idea that state practice in the nineteenth century was a 
humanitarian intervention arguing that there was no reference to a legal justification 
for intervention.130 In fact, although the intervening powers declared themselves as 
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guardians of humanity, they failed to provide a legal basis to their interventions. Given 
that it is no surprise that while military intervention in the name of humanity has been 
part of the evolution of international society, its justness has been and remains 
contentious in both law and international relations. As Abiew points out ‘the classical 
concept of the right of Humanitarian Intervention can be traced back to ancient times, 
but opinion of scholars, politicians, diplomats, and state practice still disagree whether 
the right exists, and if it exists, what its precise normative scope is’. Given that, the 
beginning of the 20th century was particularly marked by debates and discussions over 
the principle of humanitarian intervention.   
2.5.2. Humanitarian intervention in the twentieth century 
 
In the past, in the name of sovereignty, states were the only masters of the treatment 
of their citizens and individuals were believed not to be subject of international law.131 
However, the catastrophe of the First World War which saw the collapse of the old 
European order of the nineteenth century brought about significant change in 
international public opinion on the destructive effects of war.132 In this context, 
notwithstanding that the major purpose of the League of Nations in the aftermath of 
the war was to prevent state’s recourse to the use of force through international 
cooperation,133 the Covenant of the League of Nations briefly referred to the protection 
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of individuals. For example the Covenant of the League of the Nations set various 
principles which sought to prohibit human rights abuses.134  
The most relevant provision in relation to the protection of individuals is Article 23, 
which required members of the League to secure and maintain fair and human 
conditions of labour for men, women and children and secure just treatment of the 
native inhabitants of territories under their control.135 It is obvious therefore that there 
was at least an attempt to recognize individuals as objects of international law. As 
Gomez and Koen de Feyter state regarding the contributions form the League of 
Nations to the development of legal protection of individuals, ‘In any case, the most 
important factor in the creation of conditions which made a progressive 
internationalisation of human rights possible was the foundation of the League of 
Nations, an international organisations which performed a task which was crucial in 
the generalisation of the protection of the rights of the person’.136 
 It is important to note that, inspired by the League of Nations initiative, some 
organizations began to raise the issue of international protection of the rights and 
freedom of human beings. 137It is in this context that the Institute of International Law, 
in a meeting held in New York on the 12th of October 1929, adopted the Declaration 
of the International Rights of Man which in Article 1 provides that ‘It is the duty of every 
State to recognize for every individual the equal right to life, liberty and property and 
to accord to everyone on its territory the full and complete protection of the law without 
                                                          
134 League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 April 1919, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html, accessed 21 October 2013. 
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distinction of nationality, sex, race, language or religion’.138 It can be argued that this 
was a significant step in terms of the protection of individuals. 
 However, it was not until the horrors of the Second World War that the international 
community became aware of the need to consider the individual as a full object of 
international law.139 As Henkin observed: ‘The war against Hitler identified violations 
of human rights as a major threat to international peace, and they were linked in the 
rhetoric of the war and in plans for the peace. Human rights were prominent in the 
constitutions of the new nations that began to emerge in the post-war years’.140 It is 
undeniable that the cruelty of the Nazi regime has made the allied countries conscious 
of the fact that protection of human rights should be one of the major objectives of the 
allies, as illustrated in the following declaration made by the allied countries in the 
United Nations Declaration: ‘Complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend 
life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and 
justice’.141 In consequence, the obligation to take precautionary measures to protect 
individuals and the consequences for those who violated the duty of protection 
became a matter for the whole community.  In this context, in 1945, the leaders of the 
world’s nations have decided to include in the preamble of the UN Charter their 
determination to protect human rights.   
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2.6. The UN Charter and protection of civilians from mass atrocities 
 
Maintaining peace and security and promoting respect for human rights is one of the 
fundamental purposes of the United Nations. 142 Despite the fact that a declaration of 
human rights was not incorporated in the UN Charter, in its preamble, the Charter lays 
out the aims of the Organization which include saving succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of law can be maintained and to promote better standards of life.143 
Thus, important references to human rights were included in the Charter which in 
Articles 1(2), 1(3), 13(1), 55 and 56 lay down the UN commitment to protect human 
rights. In order to meet these challenges, since its creation in 1945, the United Nations 
has been developing the means and standards for human rights protection. Thus, 
different mechanisms were established by the United Nations to make sure that states 
fulfil their duty to protect individuals from mass violations of human rights.144 Thus, the 
concretization of human rights and their protection was the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights adopted by the General assembly on 10 December 1948.  Although the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was not recognized as creating legal 
obligations when it was adopted, it nonetheless constitutes a milestone of international 
human rights protection. Its adoption was a benchmark for the creation of a legal 
framework for international human rights which apply in both times of war and peace. 
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However, while this seems to paint a fairly clear picture of the United Nations’ duty to 
promote and to protect human rights, this concept often conflicts with the fundamental 
principles of state sovereignty enshrined in Article 2(7) and non-intervention in internal 
affairs enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.  In this regard, it is clear that the 
Charter does not address the dilemma posed by the responsibility to react in face of 
massive violation of human rights and the principle of state sovereignty. 
2.6.1 The prohibition of the use of force and principle of non-intervention 
 
The principle of non-intervention, at the heart of international relations since the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648 which initiated a new concept of state sovereignty,145was firmly 
established in the UN Charter as a fundamental legal principle of the United Nations. 
Since, the overwhelming objective of the creation of the UN in 1945 was to regulate 
jus ad bellum and to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’, the 
Charter clearly provides that states shall not intervene in the internal matter of a state.  
 Therefore, the prohibition of the use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter was certainly a means to achieve that aim. This provision states: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.146  
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This principle was described by Bruno Simma as ‘the corner stone of peace in the 
Charter, the heart of the United Nations Charter or the basic rule of contemporary 
public international law’.147  Nonetheless, there is an exception to this rule. The Charter 
allows recourse to armed force in inter-state relations only in two situations; the first is 
the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51148 and the 
second is when the Security Council authorizes the use of force to maintain or restore 
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter.  Any other threat or 
use of force beyond the two exceptions must be regarded as a violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations.  
The prohibition of the use of force was further emphasized by the UN General 
Assembly in the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States which states that: 
No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or 
attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, 
economic and cultural elements, are condemned.149 
Similarly, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of treaties provides that prohibition 
to recourse to force as enunciated in Article 2 (4) constitutes a jus cogens meaning 
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that the principle is accepted and recognized by the international community of states 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.150  
It is undeniable that the Charter has upheld the Westphalia principle which provides 
the right of sovereign states to act freely within their borders since the sovereign 
equality of states was proclaimed  as one of the major principles of the UN. Based on 
this understanding, the Charter confirms that no state or group of states has the right 
to intervene, directly or indirectly for any reason whatever, in internal or external affairs 
of any other state. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter reads: 
Nothing contained in the UN Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.151  
Given that, if no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of 
another state for any reason whatsoever the question is then as follows: can one 
conclude that the use of force to address humanitarian concerns such as genocide 
and other mass atrocities is prohibited since the Charter does not expressly recognize 
the right to use force for the protection of the populations from humanitarian crisis? 
The International Court of Justice, in its 1986 judgment concerning military and 
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paramilitary activities in Nicaragua,152 reaffirmed the legal prohibition on recourse to 
force under both treaty and customary international law emphasizing that intervention 
could not be consistent with international law. In this case the court declared the 
intervention illegal and a violation of Nicaragua’s territorial sovereignty maintaining that 
the use of force does not constitute an appropriate method to monitor or to ensure the 
respect for human rights. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the UN Charter does not 
recognize the right to use force in face of serious violations of human right as an 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force,  under Chapter VII of the Charter, the 
Security Council is entitled to take action in situations where international peace and 
security are at risk.  
2.6.2 The role of the Security Council 
 
Since under the Charter the UN Security Council has primary responsibility for 
maintenance of international peace and security, 153 it is required to take necessary 
measures to restore international peace and security.  Article 39 outlines that: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security. 
The Charter further under Chapter VII permits the Security Council to impose several 
measures, such as non-forceful measures under article 41 and air, sea or land action 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security pursuant to Article 42 
which states:  
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Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in article 
41154 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate; it may take 
such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or 
to restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of members of the United Nations. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the core purposes of the United Nations is to promote 
and to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction of race, sex, language or religion.155  This commitment is expressed  
in Article 55 which states: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
the United Nations shall promote: universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion.156 
Although the UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, in the situation of humanitarian emergencies 
inside a sovereign state, the United Nations may consider that this constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security.157 Accordingly, if the Security Council determines 
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that large-scale violations of human rights are a threat to international peace and 
security, it has the power to authorize military response.  
It should be noted however that for decades, tensions between the principle of state 
sovereignty and the duty to intervene to halt mass violation of human rights have been 
palpable in international society. Some countries, particulary in the western world, 
stress the enforcement powers laid down by chapter VII of the UN Charter while others 
maintain that state sovereignty always trumps, even in humanitarian emergencies.158 
However, since the end of the Cold War, due to the proliferation of intraste conflicts in 
different parts of the world marked by the deliberate targeting of the civilian population, 
human security has become an issue of international concern.159 Thus, over the last 
two decades, the UN has been increasingly involved  in a number of conflicts to halt 
or to prevent mass atrocities.160 Today the duty to intervene in the face of mass 
atrocities has gained international acceptance and state practice supports the view 
that the duty to protect is well accepted in theory. The international community practice 
has, however, illustrated that the responsibility to protect is not easily implemented. 
This is the subject of Chapter 3. 
 
2.7 Chapter conclusions 
 
The preceding discussion has attempted to demonstrate that throughout history, there 
has been a desire to spare civilians from harm.  It has emphasized that the idea of the 
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protection of the civilian population has deep historical roots which can be traced from  
earlier centuries.   
With the emergence of nation-states in Europe, the doctrine of just war began to 
change. It became linked with the sovereignty of states and faced the paradox of wars 
between Christian states, each side being convinced of the justice of its cause. This 
situation tended to modify the approach to the just war. Thus, the emphasis in legal 
doctrine moved from the application of force to suppress wrongdoers to a concern to 
maintain the order by peaceful means. Nevertheless, natural law theorists emphasized 
the legitimacy of using force against those who violate the laws of humanity. 
The history of the protection of civilians therefore illustrates that despite the 
considerable attention given to preventing civilians from harm throughout history, 
civilians have increasingly become the predominant victims of armed conflict. The 
targeting of civilian populations has emerged, whether it is as a strategic mechanism 
to obtain further war objectives or as a war objective itself. Nevertheless, against this 
rising targeting of civilians is the development of  the international protection principles 
including R2P. The increase in conflicts characterized by grave violations of human 
rights on a massive scale has led to the issue of whether international law permits 
states and the international community to react to such cases, including the use of 
force where governments fail to protect their own people. This issue has become a 
central theme in the United Nations agenda. It has become apparent from this that  a 
new debate is needed in relation to what can be done to help people who are facing 
mass atrocities, including the need for a strong and relevant UN strategy to address 
challenges in modern conflicts. 
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However, despite current developments and the antiquity of the idea that its the state’s 
duty to intervene to end inhuman practices, the legality of intervention to halt massive 
violations of human rights has been and continues to be controversial in both 
international law and international relations, as discussed in the following chapters of 
this thesis.  
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Chapter 3:  Protection of Civilians and the UN Framework 
 
 
The UN Charter was issued in the name of the 
peoples, not the government of the United 
Nations. The Charter protects the sovereign of 
peoples. It was never meant as a license for 
governments to trample on human rights and 
human dignity. Sovereignty implies 
responsibility not just power.161 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
Although the Charter bans unauthorized military intervention in a sovereign state, the 
principle of state sovereignty enshrined in article 2(7) of the Charter does not means 
that states are free to treat their own population as they wish. Indeed, states are legally 
obliged to respect the human rights of their citizens. However, the correct response of 
the international community in case of massive human rights abuses within a state 
has always been a subject of controversy. Although the legality of military action for 
protecting populations at risk has fuelled academic and political debates for centuries, 
there was no agreed framework to address situations of gross violations of human 
rights within a sovereign state. Nevertheless, state practices in the post-Charter as 
well as the Security Council has shown that no state holds an unlimited power to do 
what it wants to its own people. Indeed, the traditional principle of sovereignty was 
challenged by the end of the Cold War which was marked by the emergence of 
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balance between states and people as the source of legitimacy and authority. The 
development of intrastate conflict and civil war in the 1990s, characterized by 
perpetration of violence against civilians on a massive scale, generated the issue of 
coercive action against a state to protect people within its borders from suffering grave 
harm. However, it was not until the shock from the inadequate UN response to the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the failure to prevent ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica 
in 1995 that debate about intervention for human protection purposes was brought to 
a very public head and became an issue of international agenda. 
Thus, the Responsibility to Protect report issued by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001162 marked an important moment 
as the international community finally took steps to lay the foundations of an 
operational framework when faced with situations of catastrophic human rights 
violations within states. This was a point of departure from a process that led to the 
endorsement of the R2P as a new international norm to address humanitarian 
tragedies in September 2005 by the Heads of State and Government. Since then, it is 
widely accepted that states have both individual and collective responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  
This chapter aims to analyze the United Nations strategies in face of massive 
violations of human rights. In order to fully understand the UN framework on protection 
of civilians from atrocity crimes, an overview of how the principle of humanitarian 
intervention was accepted within states and Security Council practice is undertaken in 
section 1. Section 2 discusses the development of human rights protection under the 
Security Council agenda on situations of armed conflict. Section 3 considers the 
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emergence of R2P as a possible response to prevent mass atrocities while respecting 
the principle of state sovereignty. The fourth section discusses the evolution of R2P 
within the UN agenda. Section 5 analyses the status of R2P within international legal 
framework. The operationalization of R2P is discussed in Section 6 and, finally, 
Section 7 looks at the applicability of R2P. 
3.1 Analysis of acceptance of intervention for humanitarian 
purposes  
 
The concept of humanitarian intervention which is generally referred to as a trans-
boundary use of military force in order to halt or avert gross human suffering on large-
scale has been a key subject of discussion in recent decades.163 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, there has been a normative shift, not only within scholars but also in 
states practice as well as within the Security Council. One of the major problems raised 
is whether a military intervention in a sovereign state to stop human suffering is 
compatible with the principle of non-intervention. The central question is whether 
international law permits states to intervene militarily to prevent or to stop gross 
violations of human rights.  Legal views expressed on this point differ considerably.164 
One part of the doctrine consider that the UN Charter allows the use of force to prevent 
or to halt the most serious international crimes, such as genocide, since Article 2(4) 
prohibits the use of force only against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.165 Téson 
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for example disagrees with the idea that humanitarian intervention is prohibited by 
article 2(4) of the Charter. As he states: 
Since a humanitarian intervention seeks neither a territorial change nor a 
challenge to the political independence of the state involved and is not only 
not inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations but is rather in 
conformity with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter, it 
is a distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4).166 
This approach assumes that in case of widespread violations of human rights, military 
intervention may be the only way to prevent the continuing slaughter of innocents, 
arguing that the prohibition of crime of genocide and crimes against humanity is a 
peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted.167  
Other scholars, however, maintain that since there is no formal provisions for 
intervention on humanitarian grounds in the language of the UN Charter, any recourse 
to force except under the two strictly prescribed circumstances is prohibited under 
international law. Wolf for example opposes the idea of intervention for humanitarian 
purposes arguing that there is in the UN Charter framework a clear intent to assure 
that there would be no exception to the prohibition to recourse to force other than for 
self-defense.168 Oscar Schachter goes even further in demonstrating that it is 
impossible to reconcile humanitarian intervention with the UN’s jus ad bellum arguing 
that ‘the idea that wars waged in a good cause such democracy and human rights 
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would not involve a violation of territorial integrity or political independence demands 
an Orwellian construction of those terms’.169  
Legal realists, however, consider that where the Security Council has failed to react in 
face of massive violations of human rights, then humanitarian intervention is legal 
since it is undertaken within the purposes of the United Nations.170 According to this 
view, even an unauthorized humanitarian intervention is legal; however, the legal 
status depends on the Security Council’s inaction to halt massive human rights 
violations.  
It is important to note that controversy over the legality of use of force for humanitarian 
purposes and the debate of whether humanitarian intervention can be legal without 
the Security Council’s authorization has acquired greater importance in the wake of 
military interventions in Kosovo when NATO leaders decided to invade Yugoslavia 
outside the UN Charter framework.171 In addition to the legality of the concept under 
international law, the issue at the heart of the debate was whether humanitarian 
intervention can be justified outside of the international legal framework where there 
is a mass violation of human rights? This operation was criticized as unacceptable and  
lacking legal justification. As Brown comments: ‘Military action to aid the Kosovar 
Albanians was the right thing to do, but it is unacceptable that no clear legal justification 
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for that operation has been offered’.172 While state practices can be invoked to justify 
military intervention for humanitarian purposes,173 the doctrine shows that without 
clear legal standards, the practice of humanitarian intervention could have an adverse 
impact on international relations. Thus, for the opponents to the right of humanitarian 
intervention, aggressive states may use humanitarian exception as a pretext to launch 
war for other motives.174  
3.1.1 State practice during the Cold War: A customary law? 
Although the practice of states during the nineteenth century with regard to 
humanitarian intervention remains controversial, a certain body of the doctrine 
considers that the principle has been accepted to the extent that it can be argued that 
it has gained international custom status. Those who take this view argue that state 
practice in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had certainly established 
humanitarian intervention as a customary right.175 Indeed, their arguments are 
founded on the idea that intervention in response to humanitarian tragedy has fuelled 
several interventions in the nineteenth century and that this practice has survived the 
creation of the United Nations.176  As noted in chapter 2, the joint intervention of Great 
Britain, France and Russia in Greece in 1827, the French invasion of Syria in 1860 to 
stop the slaughter perpetrated by the Ottoman troops, and Russia’s incursion into the 
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former Yugoslavia in 1877 with support from a number of European states were cited 
as the earliest instances of humanitarian intervention.177 Some scholars, however, 
reject the idea that these interventions were humanitarian interventions arguing that 
there was no reference to a legal justification for intervention.178 For them it is clear 
that state practice in the nineteenth century did not establish a customary right of 
humanitarian intervention.179 
However, although the practice of state in the nineteenth century did not permit to 
establish humanitarian intervention as a norm in customary international law, one may 
point to a number of state interventions during the Cold War era to maintain that the 
principle was gaining acceptance as a norm in customary international law.  Brownlie 
for example maintains that the concept was already accepted, asserting that the 
twentieth century was marked by a wide acceptance of the right of humanitarian 
intervention within a non-intervention doctrine.180 It can be therefore argued that 
humanitarian intervention has been sufficiently accepted in cases of mass violation of 
human rights. For example, the 1971 Indian intervention to end civil war in East 
Pakistan, the 1978 Vietnam intervention in Cambodia which put an end to the 
genocidal rule of Khmer Rouge, and the 1979 Tanzanian intervention to overthrow Idi 
Amin in Uganda were widely accepted despite the fact that intervening states had no 
mandate to act as they did181.  
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It is important to note that despite the fact that the three military interventions aimed 
at stopping extreme violations of human rights, the intervening states chose to justify 
their actions by self-defense instead of invoking a customary right of humanitarian 
intervention.182 Indeed, none of the intervening states chose to justify their intervention 
on a humanitarian basis. In the case of the Indian intervention in Vietnam, while the 
unilateral intervention could have been justified on humanitarian grounds, India 
decided to cite self-defense as the reason for its intervention.  Indeed, India’s decision 
to send its troops into Pakistan was taken after massacres, systematic torture, mass 
rape, assassination and arbitrary executions perpetrated by Pakistan’s army had been 
reported, and the United Nations Security Council blockage to declare the situation in 
Pakistan as a threat to international peace and security.  In its military intervention, 
India succeeded in stopping the systematic killings of civilians. Similarly, in 1978 
Cambodia was invaded by Vietnam which succeeded in driving out the Khmer Rouge 
who were perpetrating crimes against humanity causing a death of almost three million 
Cambodians.  As to the Tanzania invasion of Uganda, intervention followed the 
slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent Ugandans under the Idi Amin regime. 
In fact, the tyrannical regime was marked by serious violations of human rights; the 
intervention halted the systematic killing of people from certain tribal and ethnic groups 
and led to the overthrow of Idi Amin Dada. However, Tanzania’s ostensible justification 
of its invasion was self-defense in response to the occupation and annexation of the 
Kagera salient.183  
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Commentators believe that India, Tanzania and Vietnam have failed to make those 
cases to develop customary rule of international law on humanitarian intervention.184 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the motives of intervention were not purely 
humanitarian, these interventions could have been labelled humanitarian interventions 
as they were responses to humanitarian tragedies. In light of those cases, Kofi Annan 
comments: 
What justified their action in the eyes of the world was the internal character 
of the regimes they acted against. And history has by and large ratified that 
verdict. Few would now deny that in those cases intervention was a lesser 
evil than allowing massacre and extreme oppression to continue. Yet at the 
time, in all three cases, the international community was divided and 
disturbed. Why? Because these interventions were unilateral.185 
It is nevertheless a fact that disagreement continues about the status and legality of 
intervention for humanitarian purposes. Some scholars for example point out the fact 
that the right of humanitarian intervention has been applied in a selective manner 
arguing that ‘this alleged right lacks the two recognized attributes of a binding 
international norm: general observance and widespread acceptance that it is lawful’.186 
Others, however, reject this argument, maintaining that the fact that the principle of 
humanitarian intervention is a permissive rather than a mandatory norm make it an 
element of selectivity in its exercise.187 The core challenge was to reconcile 
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humanitarian intervention with the principle of sovereignty as well as the rules set forth 
in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.188 As Murphy observes:  
A central challenge for the next century rests in reconciling existing 
construction on the use of armed forces with the increasing desire to protect 
civilians and combatants from widespread and severe deprivations of 
human rights that arise from internal conflicts due to civil war or to the 
persecution of groups by autocratic governments. Should states allowed to 
intervene in the affairs of other states to prevent deprivation of human 
rights, an act commonly referred to as ‘humanitarian intervention’?189 
 
3.1.2 The Security Council and military intervention to save human lives 
 
Since the 1990s, the Security Council has developed a normative and operational 
practice which includes authorizing under Chapter VII of the Charter the UN 
peacekeeping missions or regional organizations to use military force to provide 
protection to particular categories of persons in armed conflicts including civilians, 
children and women.190 The United Nations resolution 940 adopted on 31 July 1994191 
– which authorized a United States-led multinational force and recognized that mass 
violation of human rights were a threat to international peace and security – was an 
important step. In fact, the Council recognized that in some circumstances, saving 
human lives might override the principle of sovereignty. 
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Looking at the recent Security Council practice, it can be argued that humanitarian 
exception to the Charter’s general prohibition of intervention in internal matters of 
sovereign states may be gaining acceptance, as illustrated in some writings192 
subsequent to ECOWAS interventions in Liberia193 and Sierra Leone.194 In fact, the 
ECOWAS intervention in Liberia had been taken beyond the United Nation framework 
without Security Council authorization. Rather than condemning this action as a 
dangerous precedent, the UN praised ECOWAS’s intervention in Security Council 
resolution 788.195 In this resolution, the Security Council explicitly expressed its 
approval of the initiative undertaken by ECOWAS, recognizing that the deterioration 
of the situation in Liberia constituted a threat to international peace and security.196 It 
is however important to note that while the Council welcomed the ECOWAS effort to 
restore peace and security and stability in Liberia and called upon the sub-regional 
organization to continue in assisting the peaceful implementation action, it did not 
expressly legitimate the use of force.197 
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Furthermore, in its resolution 866,198 the Security Council decided to establish the 
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in cooperation with ECOMOG. 
In this resolution, the Security Council recognized that the deployment of UNOMIL 
constituted a significant contribution of the United Nations to the effective 
implementation of the peace agreement undertaken by ECOWAS in Liberia. Given the 
fact that the Security Council had never criticized the use of force by ECOMOG, it can 
be argued that ECOWAS’s intervention without the Security Council authorization was 
fully approved by the United Nations. As the then United Nations Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued: ‘the situation in Liberia represented a good example of 
systematic cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, as 
envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter’.199 This case highlights that the theory based 
on the primacy of the role of the United Nations Security Council under the provisions 
of the Charter as the only body to authorize the use of force is not strictly followed 
even by the Security Council itself. 
This sequence had been rarely followed and, given the situation on the ground, the 
Security Council found itself in situations when the intervention could be considered 
an exception. As was the case in Liberia; the situation was chaotic and the conflict has 
been characterized by the involvement of thousands of children in fighting. Child 
soldiers under the age of 15 were estimated at 6,000 by Amnesty International. 
Furthermore, civilian populations were frequently targeted, as demonstrated by the 
Lutheran church massacre in which almost 6,000 civilians were murdered, and the 
Harbel massacre in which many civilians were slaughtered in extreme violence.200  
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However, while it can be argued that humanitarian intervention has gained acceptance 
in international relations, it is clear that unilateral humanitarian intervention continues 
to be controversial. Nevertheless, one may conclude that the prevailing idea of 
humanitarian intervention is that there exists at least a moral duty to safeguard human 
rights when a state is unwilling or unable to protect the lives of its citizens. As Hozlgrefe 
aptly observes: ‘The justice of humanitarian intervention thus seems to turn on how 
one answers the following question: What should the breadth and weight of one’s 
moral concern be? Should it extend beyond one’s family, friends, and fellow citizens? 
Should it extend to those nameless strangers in distant lands facing genocide, 
massacre, or enslavement? Should the needs of these strangers weigh as much as 
the needs of family, friends, and fellow citizens?’.201 However, unsurprisingly the 
challenge remains to find a balance between the moral duty to safeguard lives and the 
principle of state sovereignty. As Henkin writes:  
Unilateral intervention, even for what the intervening state deems to be 
important humanitarian ends, is and should remain unlawful. But the 
principles of law, and the interpretations of the Charter, that prohibit 
unilateral humanitarian intervention do not reflect a conclusion that the 
sovereignty of the target state stands higher in the scale of values of 
contemporary international society than the human rights of its inhabitants 
to be protected from genocide and massive crimes against humanity. The 
law that prohibits unilateral humanitarian intervention rather reflects the 
judgment of the community that the justification for humanitarian 
intervention is often ambiguous, involving uncertainties of fact and motive, 
and difficult questions of degree and balancing of need and costs. The law 
against unilateral intervention may reflect, above all, the moral-political 
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conclusion that no individual state can be trusted with authority to judge and 
determine wisely.202 
 
Yet, as noted above, there is considerable controversy over the legality of 
unauthorized humanitarian intervention. However, there is a wide acceptance that the 
UN Security Council can authorize humanitarian interventions. Indeed in the 1990s 
the United Nations was involved in different conflicts such as Former Yugoslavia,203 
Somalia204, Rwanda205 and the Democratic Republic of Congo.206 This was an 
important development in the evolution of the duty to protect civilians from mass 
atrocities since the issue of intervention for human protection purposes became one 
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of the central themes of international debates.207 Nevertheless, advocates of state 
sovereignty and a strict principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state were rigorously opposed to those supporting the right of humanitarian 
intervention in cases of humanitarian crisis.208 As Evans comments:‘External military 
intervention for humanitarian protection purposes has been controversial both when it 
has happened –as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – and when it 
has failed to happen, as in Rwanda.’209 It should be noted that the post-Cold War era, 
which was marked by the escalation of intrastate conflicts, has been crucial in 
developing the UN protection framework as the international community was faced 
with humanitarian tragedies, including genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass killing, war 
crimes and crime against humanity.210  
3.2 Normative and operational developments of protection  
 
The issue of how the international community could better respond to widespread and 
systematic abuses of human rights, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, have been raised following the most tragic failures of the United Nations in 
Rwanda and Srebrenica. Indeed in Rwanda the United Nations did little while 
approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered by Hutu 
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militias.211 The UN’s failure to avert mass atrocity crimes against the civilian population 
was further highlighted by its peacekeeping mission in Bosnia which was unable to 
provide protection to the population in the safe zone.212 The shock that accompanied 
these two failures led to the debate over the effectiveness of the fundamental 
principles and the United Nations framework to provide protection to the civilian 
population in conflict zones. The varying responses of the United Nations to these 
conflicts led to the reaffirmation of the need to undertake new strategies in face of 
mass atrocities. The issue raised was whether states and the international community 
should be exclusively focussed on the security of states rather than to the safety of its 
people,213 and how to reconcile the international community’s responsibility to react to 
massive violations of human rights and the inviolable principle of state sovereignty.214 
This dilemma has captured the attention of the United Nations, political leaders and 
scholars. Given that, there were calls for clearer policies for the protection of the 
civilian population. 
3.2.1 The 1999 UN Secretary-General report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict 
 
The roadmap of the Security Council action to improve legal protection of people 
civilians was first laid out in the 1999 Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict.215 In this Report, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized that 
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protection of civilians is fundamental to the mandate of the United Nations. The report 
points out the destructive effect of conflict on civilians stating that:  
Despite the adoption of the various conventions on international 
humanitarian and human rights law over the past 50 years, hardly a day 
goes by where we are not presented with evidence of the intimidation, 
brutalization, torture and killing of helpless civilians in situations of armed 
conflict. Whether it is mutilations in Sierra Leone, genocide in Rwanda, 
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans or disappearances in Latin America, the 
parties to conflicts have acted with deliberate indifference to those 
conventions. Rebel factions, opposition fighters and Government forces 
continue to target innocent civilian with alarming frequency.216 
 
The report further highlights the connection between systematic and widespread 
violations of the rights of civilians and the breakdown of international peace and 
security. Moreover, in order to adequately address  any forms of widespread and 
systematic armed violence against civilians, the Report proposed a very wide array of 
responses including political and diplomatic measures as well as peacekeeping or 
enforcement measures under Chapters VI, VII or VIII of the Charter.217 This states: 
It is now generally recognized that the maintenance of international peace 
and security requires action by the Security Council at all stages of a conflict 
or potential conflict. Whenever possible, action must be taken to address 
the root causes of conflict and to prevent disputes from escalating into 
violence. Where, for whatever reason, these preventive approaches cannot 
be effectively implemented or have failed, the main thrust of policy must be 
to minimize the consequences of the violence for civilian populations and 
to seek to bring hostilities to a close. In the aftermath of war, all efforts must 
be directed at peacekeeping and peace-building, including reconciliation 
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amongst groups pulled apart by the conflict, and the administration of 
justice to those who have violated international humanitarian or human 
rights law.218 
 
It is important to note that in this report, the Secretary-General repeatedly attributes 
responsibility to state members and to the international community as a whole. He 
also points out the weaknesses of UN mechanisms when confronted with mass 
atrocities against civilians. A few months later, in his report to the General-Assembly 
on the fall of Srebrenica, the Secretary-General explicitly invokes the international 
community responsibility stating that: 
The international community as a whole must accept its share of 
responsibility for allowing this tragic course of events by its refusal to use 
force in the early stages of war… we tried to keep the peace and apply the 
rules of peacekeeping when there was no peace to keep. Knowing that any 
other course of action would jeopardize the lives of troops, we tried to create 
–or imagine- an environment in which the tenets of peacekeeping- 
agreement between the parties, deployment by consent, and impartiality- 
could be upheld. We tried to stabilize the situation on the ground through 
ceasefire agreements, which brought us close to the Serbs, who controlled 
the larger proportion of land. We tried to eschew the use of force except in 
self-defense, which brought us into conflict with the defenders of the safe 
areas, whose safety depended on our use of force.219 
Since then, protection of civilians has been an issue to be dealt with by the Security 
Council as observed in a series of resolutions on protection of civilians.220 In its first 
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Resolution 1265 (1999) on the issue of protection of civilians, the Security Council 
expressed it willingness to respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are 
being targeted.221 In this resolution, the Security Council also acknowledged that 
deliberate targeting of civilians and serious violations of international humanitarian and 
human rights law in situations of armed conflict could constitute a threat to international 
peace and security.222 Once again, as in the case of Haiti in 1994, the Security Council 
clearly invoked the link between protection of civilians and potential threat to 
international peace and security.223  
The link between systematic and widespread violations of international humanitarian 
and human rights law and threat to international peace and security was further 
reiterated in resolution 1296 (2000).224 This explicitly noted that: ‘deliberate targeting 
of civilian populations or other protected persons and the committing of systematic, 
flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law 
in situations of armed conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and 
security’.225 In addition, the Security Council affirmed ‘its readiness to consider such 
situations, and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps’.  
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It is important to note, however, that while the Security Council agreed on using military 
operations under Chapter VII to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence,226 it also affirmed the importance of preventive measures  that may 
be undertaken by the United Nations such as dispute resolution, preventive military 
and civilian deployment, et cetera. Indeed, since 1999 the mandates of the Peace 
Operations progressively included the protection of civilians and authorization to use 
force under Chapter VII of the Charter. For example, in a resolution adopted 
unanimously on the establishment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNASMIL), the 
Security Council underlined that ‘in the discharge of its mandate, UNASMIL may take 
the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel 
and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence’.227 This resolution is significant with 
regards to the Security Council’s willingness to explicitly mandate a Peace Operation 
to provide protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. In relation 
to this, a recent study on UN peacekeeping missions to protect civilians jointly 
commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) has found that over the 
last few decades, the UN peacekeeping mandates have changed as the Council has 
shifted peacekeeping beyond its traditional role of monitoring the implementation of 
peace agreements and that by 2009 the majority of 100,000 peacekeepers deployed 
worldwide were mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence.228  
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However, despite the extension of Security Council scope and the inclusion of civilian 
protection in peace operations mandate, there was no clear determination regarding 
the Security Council’s own responsibility to protect civilians. The language used in its 
resolutions in relation to protection of civilians in armed conflict was more apparent to 
intention rather than to responsibility. As Breakey points out:  
The Security Council is straightforward regarding its own responsibility for 
the maintenance of peace and security, and imputes responsibilities to 
states to police and prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and the 
like. Notwithstanding these imputations, SC language regarding its own 
protection agenda is often ‘concern’, ‘willingness’ and ‘intentions’ rather 
than obligation.229 
 
In addition to the confusion about the Security Council’s intent regarding its protection 
agenda, it is interesting to note that there was also a lack of policy guidance and 
operational mechanisms in relation to the physical protection of civilians. It is in this 
context that the Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations and asked Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of 
Algeria, to chair the panel.230 The challenge of the panel was to look more closely how 
the United Nations could do better in the future in the area of international peace and 
security.   
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3.2.2 The Brahimi Report 
 
 Issued in August 2000, the report made a number of recommendations designed to 
improve the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping missions and their capability to 
protect civilians.231 The panel’s conclusion was that there was an urgent necessity to 
improve the ways that the UN addresses situations of conflict. The panel further 
highlighted the relevant obligations of the UN troops when faced with violence, 
emphasizing that ‘when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, 
they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the 
ability and determination to defeat them’. 
One of the central tenets of the report was that UN peacekeeping operations should 
move away from its traditional role of monitoring the implementation of peace 
agreements to become robust. In other words, the report recommends that the 
mandate of peacekeeping missions should put greater spotlight on the capacity to 
promote and to protect human rights.232 Without doubt, the Brahimi Report has greatly 
contributed to the development of the UN protection framework. As the Secretary-
General Ban Ki-Moon comments: 
Thanks to the reform proposed by the Panel, UN Peacekeeping has been 
able to grow, incorporate the lessons learned from those experiences, and 
continue to serve as a cost-effective and flexible tool – a flagship United 
Nations activity, a mission of hope for people caught in armed conflict.233 
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One of the remarkable aspects of the post-Brahimi Report is the increasing roles of 
regional and sub-regional organizations within the UN peace and security framework. 
For example, following the release of the report in 2001 a Rapid Expert Assistance 
Team (REACT) was created within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) to support timely deployment of police. Similarly, NATO decided to 
establish a NATO Response Force (NRF).234 This was an important step in that the 
post-2000 peacekeeping missions were characterized by the increasing involvement 
of regional organization in UN peacekeeping missions.235    
3.3 Towards a responsibility to protect 
 
One of the things that arose from the inaction of the Security Council and the United 
Nations in Rwanda and Srebrenica tragedies is that the world acknowledged the 
urgent need to review the collective security under the United Nations system. In this 
context, the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his Millennium Report, 
issued the challenge to find consensus on the matter of humanitarian intervention and 
to identify possible remedies to prevent massive violations of human rights. He 
explicitly invoked the issue of legal and policy dilemmas of humanitarian intervention, 
focusing on the relationship between sovereignty and principles of humanity.236 He 
stated: 
 [I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica ---to 
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gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept 
of our common humanity.237 
The Government of Canada responded to this challenge by announcing the creation 
of an independent commission constituted by eminent scholars and practitioners from 
all around the world, charged to initiate a study on the issue of non-interference 
regarding the principle of state sovereignty and the responsibility of international 
community to respond to massive human rights violations. Named the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Responsibility (ICISS), the commission was co-
chaired by Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, and Mohamed 
Sahnoun, Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General. The 10 additional members 
of the commission were distinguished people from diverse national and professional 
backgrounds, bringing a wide range of expertise and perspective to the debate.238 
 In December 2001, the commission issued a report entitled ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
which set a new and operational framework to address mass atrocities.239 In this 
report, the commission identified a responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and 
responsibility to rebuild. Furthermore, it concluded that the principle of non-intervention 
should yield to the duty to protect when civilians are threatened with killings, genocide 
or ethnic cleansing on a large scale, stating that: 
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Sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from 
avoiding catastrophe - from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but 
that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be 
borne by the broader community of states.240  
This was a point of departure for a process that led to the endorsement of the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)241 as a new international norm to address 
humanitarian tragedies. In September 2005, the Heads of State and Government 
unanimously adopted the ‘responsibility to protect’ and since then it is widely accepted 
that states have both individual and collective responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This was 
certainly a significant step in terms of protection of civilians as the international 
community showed its determination in finding new ways of solving the perpetual 
tension between state sovereignty and human rights protection.242  
3.4 The ICISS Report (R2P framework) 
The Outcome of the ICISS report was that it attempted to shift the emphasis away 
from the rights of states to intervene towards the rights of population at risk of mass 
atrocities. It therefore underlines that both individual states and the international 
community as a whole do indeed have a legal and moral responsibility to intervene in 
the face of mass atrocities. Thus, the premise of R2P is based on two central 
principles. The first is that a duty to protect lies first and foremost with the sovereign 
states themselves as sovereignty implies responsibility. Consequently, each individual 
sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
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crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.243 The message here was that 
state sovereignty implies state responsibility for the protection of the population. The 
second element of R2P is that the international community’s role should be to help 
states to fulfil their duty to protect civilians from gross and systematic violations of 
human rights and to bear responsibility when the state proves unable or unwilling to 
discharge its duty or when the state itself is the perpetrator.244 The report further 
outlines possible responses to avoid mass atrocities while respecting the principle of 
state sovereignty enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. In this context, it 
identifies three elements of the R2P which are; responsibilities to prevent, to react and 
to rebuild, emphasizing that prevention is a core dimension of the protection 
framework and that military intervention is to be used as a last resort to protect the 
population at risk. The ICISS report is significant with regard to the academic and 
political view on human security because it shifts debate away from the controversial 
humanitarian intervention. In the 2011 Libya case, for example, all commentators 
agreed that the main issue in the debate within the United Nations was not whether 
the international community should intervene to protect the population from mass 
atrocities but how to best protect the Libyan population.245 
3.4.1 Shift away from sovereignty as control: States’ R2P 
 
The ICISS Report provides that state sovereignty implies twofold responsibility: first, 
a state is internally responsible to protect its citizen; second, is externally responsible 
to the international community through the United Nations.246 The report further 
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maintains  that state sovereignty implies the obligation to guarantee the equal 
protection of the civilian population from harm, emphasizing that the power of the state 
must yield to a principle of extreme urgency, the need for a minimum protection of 
human rights.  Thus, the report had put an emphasis on the re-characterization of state 
sovereignty, and it is now commonly accepted that sovereignty implies the duty to 
respect the dignity and rights of all the people within a state.247 However, it is important 
to note that the notion of sovereignty as responsibility did not arise in the ICISS Report. 
The concept was first developed by Francis Deng, the former UN’s Special 
Representative on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and Roberta Cohen in the 
context of internally displaced people.248 The idea was also invoked by the then UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the Agenda for Peace,249 and later by Kofi 
Annan. His principal challenge was how to persuade governments to improve 
protection for IDPs. From there, the idea of sovereignty as responsibility was taken 
into account by the international community to fit this purpose.250 The starting point 
was the recognition that the primary responsibility for protecting and assisting IDPs lay 
with the host government and when a state is unable to fulfil its responsibilities, it 
should invite and welcome international assistance.251 Such assistance helped the 
state by enabling it to discharge its sovereign responsibilities and take its place as a 
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legitimate member of international society.252 The debate raised the issue of what 
should be the international community response when a state refused to request 
assistance or itself committed genocide and mass atrocities, claiming a sovereign right 
to non-interference enshrined in Articles 2 (4) and 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter.  
As mentioned above, Kofi Annan’s challenge to international society to develop a way 
of reconciling the principle of sovereignty and fundamental human rights aimed to 
answer this problem. Referencing sovereignty as responsibility, Kofi Annan 
emphasized that sovereignty includes the obligation of all governments to protect their 
citizens, and that the goal of international action should be the protection of civilians 
from gross and systematic abuse when a state is unable or unwilling to end harm or 
is itself the perpetrator.253 In this regard, he completely adheres to the idea that in the 
case of mass atrocities against the civilian population, the international community has 
the right to intervene in internal matters of a sovereign state if necessary, and militarily 
if absolutely necessary, as is illustrated in this statement: 
If states bent on criminal behavior know that frontiers are not the absolute 
defense, if they know that the Security Council will take action to halt crimes 
against humanity, and then they will not embark on such a course of action 
in expectation of sovereign impunity.254 
Explaining that humanitarian intervention constitutes a principle challenge to the 
Security Council and the United Nations as a whole in the next century, the Secretary-
General underlined that in the context of Rwanda and Kosovo, ‘the Member States of 
the United Nations should have been able to find common ground in upholding the 
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principles of the Charter’.255 He further emphasizes that ‘The Charter is a living 
document whose high principles still define the aspirations of peoples everywhere for 
lives of peace, dignity and development’ and  that ‘nothing in the Charter precludes a 
recognition that there are rights beyond borders’.256 
Similarly, in the OAU summit in 1998, President Nelson Mandela of South Africa 
embraced this view maintaining that: ‘Africa has a right and a duty to intervene to root 
out tyranny…we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national 
sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene when 
behind those sovereign boundaries, people are being slaughtered to protect 
tyranny’.257  
There is no doubt that in re-characterizing sovereignty, the R2P framework has 
challenged the traditional international relations structures. As Evans and Sahnoun 
observe, ‘the protection of civilians against atrocity crimes has become a priority for 
international engagement arguing that ‘even the strongest supporters of state 
sovereignty will admit today that no state holds unlimited power to do what it wants to 
its own peoples’258. 
 
Can this be considered as the end of the Westphalia concept of sovereignty? Are 
states really ready to move towards sovereignty as accountable responsibility? Only 
time will tell. No matter how long it takes, the most important point is that from now on 
the principle of sovereignty cannot be used as a shield behind which abuse could be 
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inflicted on populations with impunity.259As Kofi Annan comments: ‘it cannot be right, 
when the international community is faced with genocide or massive human rights 
abuses, for the United Nations to stand by and let them unfold to the end, with 
disastrous consequences for many thousands of innocent people.’260  
It is obvious that the painful historical lessons learnt from the genocide in Rwanda, the 
mass killing in Srebrenica and other failure of the UN have moved the international 
community towards the evolution of protection of both legal standards and political 
imperatives. It is therefore clear that in suggesting that sovereignty as control must 
give way to sovereignty as responsibility in order to ensure respect for human rights, 
the central idea of the ICISS was that sovereignty includes the obligation of all 
governments to protect their citizens, and that the goal of international action should 
be the protection of civilians from gross and systematic abuse when the state is unable 
or unwilling to end harm or is itself the perpetrator.  However, despite that, the issue 
of the use of force for human protection purposes did not cease to be controversial in 
both political and academic debate. In relation to this, Evans and Sahnoun note that 
‘the debate about intervention for human protection purposes has not gone away. And 
it will not go away so long as human nature remains as fallible as it is and internal 
conflict and states failures stay as prevalent as they are’.261 
3.4.2 Collective R2P to halt human suffering 
One of the most controversial aspects of R2P is military intervention for human 
protection.  In this respect, the commission emphasized that military intervention can 
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only be employed if all non-military and feasible diplomatic options have been 
explored.262 However, to avoid the abuse of the recourse to force for humanitarian 
purpose, the commission suggests a guideline of six requirements to be met to serve 
as a guide to examine whether a situation is appropriate for military intervention. Those 
include: just cause, right intention, right authority, last resort, proportional measures 
and reasonable prospect of success.263 Some commentators such as Neff, however, 
observed that those conditions are not novel as they are a pure reflection of those 
elaborated upon by the Christian theological tradition of just war.  Focarelli admits that 
these principles are perfectly reasonable but they may cause a problem in 
interpretation. In this regard, he argues that the same principle may practically lead to 
very different solutions given the situation of today’s world in which homogeneity is not 
as it was in Medieval Christian Europe.264 
However, the most important issue here is that military intervention should be only 
limited to the most serious and irreparable situations and the question of intervention 
should arise only when preventive and peaceful measures have failed or prove to be 
insufficient to halt mass atrocities.265 Thus, the report suggests that military 
intervention should be considered only when civilians are faced with the threat of 
serious harm. This includes:  
large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, 
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or 
inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
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actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts 
of terror or rape.266  
Obviously, military intervention is only justifiable in two extreme and grave situations: 
large scale killings with genocidal intent or not, and large scale ethnic cleansing. One 
may argue that in setting the bar so high, the commission’s purpose was to make sure 
that military intervention is used only in extreme cases. However, while the report 
provides a guideline for the international intervention, it has failed to draw a clear 
framework of military intervention. As Berry comments ‘the Commission report was 
careful in its formulation of the essential conditions for the international intervention of 
any kind, conditions which are not quantifiable but provide essential benchmarks for 
political decision makers’.267  Thus, even the advocates of R2P recognize that there is 
a grey area that needs to be clarified.  As Evans and Sahnoun note: ‘[…] we do not 
quantify what is ‘large scale’ but make clear our belief that military action can be 
legitimate as an anticipatory measure in response to clear evidence of likely large-
scale killing or ethnic cleansing’.268  
In addition to the ambiguities surrounding the military intervention framework, some 
commentators deplore the fact that other massive violations of human rights which do 
not amount to large-scale killing or ethnic cleansing are not taken into account.269 For 
example following the natural disaster in Burma in 2008 which caused a humanitarian 
emergency and the refusal of Burmese authorities to accept international assistance, 
the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner called for the application of 
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responsibility to protect, stating that the United Nations should take forcible action 
against the Burmese government in order to provide humanitarian assistance to 
victims.270 This suggestion was rejected by governments given the motive that the 
case does not warrant the application of the R2P doctrine as outlined in the 2005 
World Summit Outcome Document.271  
It should be noted, however, that while Kouchner seemingly adheres to the idea that 
the Burmese situation was not an R2P case, he believes that the Security Council 
should have forced the delivery of humanitarian assistance in such situations.272 There 
is no surprise since, as will be demonstrated later in this work, the adoption of R2P in 
2005 has limited its scope to four crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and ethnic cleansing. The restriction of R2P to be applied only to four 
crimes was reiterated by the UN Secretary-General who maintained that the extension 
of the concept to others calamities ‘would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch 
the concept beyond recognition as operational utility’.273 While the scope of the 
concept should be kept narrow, he said, the most important thing here is to provide 
adequate response to the crisis. In relation to this, Evans comments:  
If R2P is to be about protecting everybody from everything, it will end up 
protecting nobody from anything. The whole point of embracing the new 
language of ‘the responsibility to protect’ is that it is capable of generating 
an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscience-shocking cases 
in a way that ‘right to intervene’ language simply could not. We need to 
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preserve the focus and bite of ‘R2P’ as a rallying cry in the face of mass 
atrocities.274 
3.4.3 Right authority for military action under R2P 
 
Since military intervention is one of the most sensitive issues of R2P, the ICISS Report 
provides that the Security Council constitutes the sole arbiter of military intervention. 
In this regard, the report explicitly emphasizes that Security Council authorization 
should be sought prior to military intervention.275 In relation to the legitimacy and 
legality of these criteria under international law framework, Evans comments that the 
intention of the ICISS was to maximize the possibility of achieving council consensus 
concerning when it is or is not appropriate to go to war; maximize international support 
for whatever it decides; and minimize the possibility of individual member states 
bypassing or ignoring it.276  
Therefore, any intervention should be permitted by the UN Security Council and the 
legitimacy of such action depends on a prior authorization of the United Nations, in 
particular its Security Council. Concerning this procedure, the commission states: 
Security Council authorization must in all cases be sought prior to any 
military intervention action being carried out.Those calling for an 
intervention must formally request such authorization, or have the Council 
raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it 
under Article 99 of the UN Charter…The Security Council should deal 
promptly with any request for authority to intervene where allegations of 
large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing are; it should in this 
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context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that 
might support a military intervention.277 
 
It is clear from this that where there is evidence of large-scale loss of life or ethnic 
cleansing, the Security Council has an obligation to deal promptly with the matter. The 
report proceeds with giving reasons why the UN Security Council is the central body 
which can provide international legitimacy to a military intervention. The Report states: 
Article 42 authorizes the Security Council, in the event that non-military 
measures prove ‘to decide upon military measures’ as may be necessary 
‘to maintain or restore international peace and security’. Although these 
powers were interpreted narrowly during the Cold War, since then the 
Security Council has almost invariably been universally accepted as 
conferring international legality on an action.278  
 
However, the commission recognizes that it would not be easy to get the Security 
Council to vote to authorize military intervention, taking into account these five criteria 
of legitimacy. There is no doubt that the United Nations Security Council had shown 
in the past the lack of authority to enforce its legal capacity to deal with international 
peace and security independently of the dictate of the major powers.279 This 
dissonance has led to an ambiguous situation which left room for some states to act 
outside the UN Framework as Chandler outlines: 
A series of ambiguous resolutions and conflicting interpretations have 
arisen over the extent and duration of the authority conferred by the 
Security Council. These were most notable in the operations against Iraq 
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throughout the 1990s and in the Kosovo war in 1999. The weakening of the 
formal requirements may have undermined the substantive provisions of 
the Charter’s collective security system and contributed to facilitating 
actions in advance of Council authorization, or indeed without it.280   
As previously mentioned, NATO intervention in Kosovo, for example, was a 
signal that in case of extreme situations and when a rapid intervention is needed, 
a moral responsibility to stop humanitarian crises could in some circumstances 
take advantage over the ‘right authority’ principle. Unfortunately, this challenge 
was not taken into account by the commission. Indeed, despite the fact that the 
Security Council has often failed  to stop human catastrophe because of the 
sacrosanct veto power of the five permanent members (P5), the commission 
confirmed that the Security Council remains the only authority to authorize 
military intervention. It should be noted, however, that the commission had 
expressely underligned the fact that the work of the Security Council is 
permanently threatened by the veto power which can paralyse its actions, 
especially when a quick and decisive action is needed to stop mass violation of 
human rights. According to the report, ‘it is unconscionable that one veto can 
override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern’.281 It is 
clear that the use of veto-power by the P5 members over R2P can be a particular 
problem in the face of large-scale loss of life. On this point, Thakur comments: 
The legitimacy of the Security Council as the authoritative validator of 
international security action suffers from a quadruple legitimacy deficit: 
performance, representational, procedural and accountability. Its 
performance legitimacy suffers from two strikes: an uneven and a selective 
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record. It is unrepresentative from almost any point of view. Its procedural 
legitimacy is suspect on grounds of a lack of democratization and 
transparency in decision-making. And it is not answerable to the General 
Assembly, the World Court, the nations or the peoples of the world.282 
In this regard, the commission proposes an alternative option when the Security 
Council fails to deal with the issue of intervention in a reasonable time; this includes 
having recourse to the General Assembly which in Emergency Special Session can 
authorize the intervention pursuant to the Uniting for Peace procedure under which a 
two-third majority of the General Assembly can authorize a military intervention.283 
Bearing in mind the past failures of the United Nations Security Council to intervene 
due to the veto-power of its permanent members, the commission suggests that if 
there is majority support for a military intervention,   the permanent members of the 
Security Council, when their national interests are not claimed to be involved, should 
abstain from using their veto-power to block resolutions authorizing military 
intervention to stop or to avert mass violation of human rights.284 It seems that this 
recommendation was not appreciated by the permanent members who were not 
willing to renounce to their veto-power. However, the commission has failed to respond 
to the dilemma when human beings are slaughtered while the Security Council is 
paralyzed and unwilling to intervene.  Some scholars285 have made criticisms about 
the omission of the possibility of unilateral military intervention by states in case of 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. As one 
commentator points out: 
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The United Nations system is a paradoxical system which recognizes the 
protection and fulfillment of human rights as fundamental values, but whose 
institutional machinery allows that such fundamental values may be 
frustrated by the prohibition of force and respect for sovereignty, without 
providing any other alternative.286 
3.4.4 Prevention of mass atrocities: principal dimension of R2P  
While acknowledging that military intervention may in some situations be necessary 
to address conflicts characterized by atrocity crimes, R2P provides that using force 
should be considered as a last resort after all preventive and other coercive measures 
have failed. 287 In other words, R2P recommends the right for prevention and not the 
right for intervention.  The ICISS Report provides that ‘prevention is the single most 
important dimension of the responsibility to protect’.288 In the 2005 World Summit, the 
heads of states unanimously recognized that each individual state has the 
responsibility to prevent atrocity crimes including their incitement through appropriate 
and necessary means.289 The Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in his 2009 report on 
implementing R2P emphasized that state responsibility to prevent mass atrocities 
constitutes the bedrock of the doctrine290. The report further emphasizes that the 
international community should remind states of their obligations to prevent and punish 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing and that such 
acts could be referred to the ICC under the Rome Statute291.    
Under the R2P framework, preventing conflicts from escalating and endangering 
civilian populations requires: early warning, a preventive action toolbox and political 
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will. The ICISS Report suggests that reports from UN agencies for human rights and 
from highly respected and impartial non-governmental organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) should be considered in order to 
avoid abuse about the threat of or possible commission of atrocities, and in order to 
obtain credible evidence about the threat of or possible commission of atrocities 
amounting to genocide and other atrocity crimes.  
The importance of the prevention dimension of R2P has constantly been emphasized 
in the General Assembly debates on implementation of R2P.292 As Welsh observes: 
‘after 2005 the General Assembly has become a focal point for discussion about 
implementation of R2P…more specifically the General Assembly has hosted debates 
about the potential to improve United Nations early warning capacity for mass atrocity 
crimes and the creation of a Joint Office on the prevention of genocide and the R2P’.293  
It is clear from these debates that prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing should be a key priority of both governments and 
international community. As reflected in statements made by many governments 
calling for the increasing of support by the international community for regional 
institutions, especially those which have existing instruments relevant to the 
implementation of R2P such as early-warning mechanisms, development and human 
rights programs, and capacity-building in the areas of conflict prevention.294   
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There is no doubt that relevant preventive mechanisms are a key issue in 
implementing R2P. As demonstrated earlier in this work, the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
is a good example of how failure in this area can be devastating. As Jacqueline 
Murekatete, victim and survivor of the Rwandan genocide has stated, ‘in that 100 days 
more and more women were raped, men were killed and children thrown into trees. 
There was simply no political will in 1994 to stop what was going on in Rwanda and 
there were no mechanisms that were in place to prevent the genocide or end it once 
it has begun’.295 Certainly, by creating the position of Special Adviser of the Secretary-
General on the Prevention of Genocide, the UN Secretary-General has provided 
significant support to prevention prior to the development of the crisis. In fact, the 
mandate of the Special Adviser includes to act as a liaison mechanism of early warning 
signals within the United Nations system; to collect information on massive and serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; to make practical 
recommendations on preventing and halting genocide and atrocity crimes.296 This 
decision was welcomed by world leaders and human rights activists as a strong signal 
when the world was commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, 
during which it had witnessed the limitations of the United Nations bureaucracies in 
conflict prevention. 
Despite the emphasis that prevention is the major aspect of the R2P, there is 
nevertheless a widespread perception that military intervention is an essential 
measure in response to atrocity crimes. As Bellamy comments: ‘Sadly, preventive 
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efforts will not always succeed. That is why the international community must be 
prepared to take timely and decisive action, using all the measures placed at its 
disposal by Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter, when it is needed to protect 
populations from the four crimes.297. 
It is quite clear that the commission’s intention was essentially to solve the legal and 
polical dilemmas of humanitarian intervention. The commission therefore tried to 
distinguish the concept of responsibility to protect from humanitarian intervention, 
emphasizing that the relation of the doctrine of R2P to military intervention and the 
way to address the dilemma of intervention is quite different from humanitarian 
intervention. Thus, the commission demonstrated that R2P focuses more on the needs 
of those who need support rather than the interests of the interveners.298In other 
words, the R2P is a tool to protect the civilian population from mass violations of 
human rights. 
In fact, while the term humanitarian intervention usually echoes a ‘right to intervene’ in 
the territory of a sovereign state, using the words ‘responsibility to protect’ appears 
more acceptable for those who are strictly opposed to any external intervention in a 
sovereign state. In fact, the latter is more viewed as referring to the population which 
needs protection rather than the state’s right to intervene.299 
 
 
                                                          
297 Alex Bellamy, Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect, New York, 5 September 2012, 
available at  http://protectiongateway.com/2012/09/06/informal-interactive-dialogue-on-the-responsibility-
to-protect-alex-bellamy-remarks/  
298 ICISS Report, para 1.40. 
299 G. Evans and M. Sahnoun, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no.6, Nov-Dec, 2002, pp. 
99-110. 
94 
 
3.5 Development of R2P within the UN framework  
  
3.5.1 The High Level Panel Report  
 
The R2P doctrine became a central theme in 2003, when the United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the United Nations High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change.300 The emerging norm was endorsed in the panel’s 
report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.301 The panel recommended 
the acceptance of R2P as a norm exercisable in the event of genocide and other 
atrocity crimes or serious violations of international humanitarian law.302 The High-
Level Panel endorsed the emerging norm stating that: 
The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated 
attention not on the immunities of sovereign Governments but their 
responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international 
community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the ‘right to 
intervene’ of any State, but the ‘responsibility to protect’ of every State when 
it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe - mass murder and 
rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate 
starvation and exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance that 
while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect 
their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or 
unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider 
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international community - with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, 
response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies… We 
endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing 
military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide or other large-
scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or 
unwilling to prevent.303 
The Panel intended to make the R2P concept a central part of the UN reform in 
which the Security Council should play a key role highlighting that beyond its 
authority, the Security Council has a duty to take action in case of humanitarian 
catastrophes.304 It is clear that the High-Level Panel was guided by the ambition 
that R2P will help to improve and to strengthen the collective security system 
under the UN Charter. Certainly there was a need to reinforce the UN system 
after the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies which has severely 
undermined the image of the organization as well as hindered R2P discussion.305 
Nevertheless, the US-led invasion of Iraq has permitted the R2P advocates to 
intensify the debate over R2P and encouraged the dynamic behind it.306The 
panel’s report later served as a basis for the Secretary-General report in 2005. 
3.5.2 The Secretary-General Report: In Larger Freedom 
 
In Larger Freedom report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at the 
opening of the 2005 World Summit session, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
strongly agreed with the approach outlined by the High-Level Panel and recommended 
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the international community to embrace the emerging norm.307 It is interesting to note 
that the Secretary-General practically used the R2P language of the High-Level Panel 
which demonstrates his determination to truly subscribe to the moral duty of ending 
mass atrocity crimes. He for example stated that ‘the time has come for governments 
to be held to account, both to their citizens and to each other, for respect of the dignity 
of the individual’.308 He further emphasized that strategies based on protection of 
human rights are vital for both moral standing and the practical effectiveness of the 
UN actions. The Secretary-General’s decision to discuss the R2P in the ‘freedom to 
live in dignity’ section rather than in the ‘use of force’ section was perceived as a clear 
signal of moving away from the right to intervene and towards an emphasis on human 
rights protection.309 There is no doubt that there was a wish on behalf of the Secretary-
General to use the new norm as a strategy to bring all nations to a strong commitment 
to promote human rights, development and security.  As he comments: 
Human rights are fundamental to the poor as to rich, and their protection is 
as important to the security and prosperity of the development world as it is 
to that of the developing world. It would be a mistake to treat human rights 
as though there were a trade-off to be made between human rights and 
such goals as security or development. We only weaken our hand in fighting 
the horrors of extreme poverty or terrorism if, in our efforts to do so, we 
deny the very human rights that these scourges take away from citizens310. 
  
 
                                                          
307 UNGA In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All – Report of the 
Secretary-General  (21 March 2005) A/59/2005 available at: www.un.org/largerfreedom  
308 Ibid. 
309 See for example Carlo Focarelli, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: 
Too Many Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Oxford University Press, 
2008; Alex Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2009,  p. 76. 
310 A/59/2005, para. 40. 
97 
 
3.5. 3 The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit 
 
In the 2005 World Summit of Heads of State and Government, the General Assembly 
solemnly endorsed the R2P norm and affirmed  the collective responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity311.  
The policy adopted was that: 
Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early 
capacity. 
 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, to 
help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including chapter VII, on a case-
by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
are manifestly failing to protect their population from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the 
General Assembly to continue consideration of responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
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against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the 
Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as 
necessary and appropriate to helping States build capacity to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and assisting those which are under stress before crises 
and conflicts break out.312 
 
The inclusion of R2P in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document is widely 
considered to be one of the most promising steps in establishing R2P since there was 
a clear commitment on the part of world leaders. In relation with the summit, Evans 
comments that this was a ‘really big step forward in terms of formal acceptance of 
R2P’.313 Similarly, Bellamy observes that the summit has marked the transformation 
of R2P from an idea to a principle.314 In his 2009 Report,315 the Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-Moon affirmed that the acceptance of the R2P by the assembled Heads of States 
and Government constitutes the bedrock of the doctrine. He also however noted that 
while the 2005 Summit was one of the largest gathering of Heads of States and 
Government in history, ‘there were intense and contentious deliberations on a number 
of issues, including on the responsibility to protect’.  
Given that, it can therefore be argued that this commitment about preventing mass 
atrocity crimes has provided a basis for the recognition of the duty to intervene in a 
sovereign state to protect potential victims. However, it should be noted that while 
states recognize that R2P is not an adversary of sovereignty but an ally, they remain 
reluctant about the international community prospect to use force. This is illustrated by 
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the fact that reaching a consensus on adoption of R2P was not an easy task.316 Some 
concessions had to be made as on one hand, in the high-level plenary meeting a small 
number of states including Algeria, Belarus, China, Cuba, Egypt, the Russian 
Federation, India, Iran, Jamaica, Libya, Pakistan, and Venezuela were opposed to the 
inclusion of R2P in the World Summit Outcome Document, and on the other hand, the 
United States had expressed reservations about restricting military intervention in 
situations of mass atrocities to the Security Council authorization. Cuba for example 
maintained that: ‘It would be suicidal to endorse the so-called “right to intervention” 
which had been invoked recently in circumstances of a unipolar global order, 
characterized by an economic and military dictatorship by a super-power seeking to 
impose its own model of society.’317 The United States was also vigorously opposed 
to the idea that the international community has a legal obligation to intervene in 
accordance with the emerging norm. Thus, the US intention was that in the face of 
atrocities, action should be taken on a case-by-case basis.318  The United States 
delegation called for R2P to be considered as a moral principle rather than a legal 
norm. In a letter dated 30 August 2005, the US ambassador John. R. Bolton 
commented: ‘ [we]The United States would not accept that either the United Nations 
as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual states, have an obligation to intervene 
under international law…Accordingly, we should avoid  language that focuses on the 
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obligation or responsibility of international community and instead assert that we are 
prepared to take action’319   
 
However, it should be noted that despite controversies over intervention-sovereignty 
in the General Assembly, the unanimous endorsement of the doctrine by the whole 
international community constitutes a considerable achievement with regard to human 
protection.320 In accepting and endorsing the emerging norm, World leaders recognize 
that they bear at least moral duty to protect the civilian population from mass atrocities. 
It should be noted however that, five years before the World Summit, the African Union 
in its Constitutive Act had already agreed upon the duty to intervene in the face of 
atrocity crimes through diplomatic and peaceful means and recourse to force as a last 
resort. Article 4 (h) of the African Act provides that it is:  
The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision 
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.321   
 
This highlights once again the acceptance of the duty to protect by both bigger powers 
and the South. Some commentators such as Alston and MacDonald see the early 
victory of the R2P in the 2005 endorsement stating that:  
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The Canadian diplomats and intellectuals and others behind this concept, 
such as former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, can be very 
proud. Few ‘norm entrepreneurs’ have been able to see one of their ideas, 
created out of whole cloth, be ‘reaffirmed’- as if it was a long-standing 
principle- by no less a body than the Security Council within a span of five 
years.322 
 
However, the question here is whether this can really be considered as a victory or 
whether the enthusiasm is justifiable. Indeed the doctrine was endorsed by both 
powerful states and the Non-Aligned Movement but it is still not clear whether the 
doctrine is a legal concept or a political one. The conception of scholars differs from 
that of policymakers, and even scholars amongst themselves are yet to reach a 
consensus about the R2P doctrine. Different interpretations are given to the doctrine 
depending on the expectations and self-interest of each one. As noted earlier, 
President Bush for example, to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003 raised the duty to 
protect Iraqi people from tyrannical rule or to bring democracy.323  This was considered 
by the advocates of the emerging norm as a misuse of R2P as the initial reasons of 
the war was the presumed possession of weapons of mass destruction or the capacity 
to make them.  
 As Evans pointed out: 
The biggest inhibitor of all the ready acceptance of R2P as an operating 
principle has been the misuse of that principle in the context of the war on 
Iraq…the genocidal massacres of the Kurds using chemical weapons in the 
1980s and of the Shiites in the early 1990s—to both of which the West had 
                                                          
322 Philip Alston and Euan MacDonald, Human Rights, Intervention, and the Use of Force, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p.276. 
323 Ibid. p.277; See also Jack Straw, ‘We are in Iraq to Bring about Democracy’, Speech by Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw, Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 28 September 2005. 
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turned a blind eye at the time, but no matter—were surely proof, it was 
suggested, that this was a suitable case for R2P treatment and of the most 
coercive kind.324 
 
No doubt the 2003 invasion of Iraq has raised the issue of preventive military 
intervention. In this regard, Evans agreed with Slaughter and Feisntein325who called 
for better preventive strategies to build a new edifice upon the foundations of R2P. He, 
however, had reservations about their argument that military intervention could be 
used preventively, even when the attack is not imminent.326  We hope that the real 
meaning of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ will not be misrepresented and that statesmen 
will understand that the new doctrine is not the right of powerful states to use their 
weight using military intervention but a common responsibility of all states to protect 
their population. As asserted Gareth Evans ‘the core theme is not intervention but 
protection’.327   
3.6 R2P as an international binding norm 
 
While R2P was qualified by the High-Level Panel Report as an emerging norm, some 
authors believe that this was a premature and misleading qualification. Stahn for 
example argued that ‘some of the features of the concept are actually well embedded 
in contemporary international law, while others are so innovative that it may be 
premature to speak of a crystallizing practice’. 328
                                                          
324 Gareth Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’, op.cit. 
325 Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Duty to Protect’, Foreign Affairs.vol. 83,2004, pp136 - 137, see 
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326 Gareth Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’. 
327 Ibid.  
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There is no doubt that states’ responsibility to protect the civilian population from mass 
atrocity crimes is clearly established in the existing norms. Therefore, although states 
are members of international community and extra-territorial responsibility to protect 
is much less clear, collective duty to assist and encourage states to fulfill their R2P 
and to react in cases where a state has manifestly failed in its R2P collective exist in 
international law. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, the principles of 
R2P are deeply grounded in human rights law, especially the Genocide Convention,329 
international humanitarian law,330 international criminal law and the UN Charter. 
Bellamy believes that even though collective positive duty to protect exists, it is 
challenged by the problem of indeterminacy. He goes on to comment that: ‘The 
indeterminacy of what R2P requires of external actors weakens its compliance-pull, 
and hence its ability to encourage states to find consensus and commit additional 
resources to the protection of civilians’331. As demonstrated above, since the 
endorsement of R2P, many conflicts characterized by mass atrocities have taken 
place and uncertainties and disagreements about effective response illustrates how 
indeterminacy can severely obstruct R2P.  Nevertheless, there is a general consensus 
that R2P is an appropriate norm in the face of mass atrocities. Given that, we can 
consider that R2P is now regarded as generating a legal binding obligation under the 
classic source of law set forth in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice International convention, international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law and general principle of law. 
This provision provides:  
                                                          
329 I.C.J, ‘The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro)’, judgement of February 26, 2997, paras. 428-38 
330 Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
331 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect---Five Years On’. 
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1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law332 
 
In this context, it can be legitimately  questioned whether R2P does not fall within 
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 38 (1) of the ICJ Statute.  Can R2P be considered 
as an international convention as it is contained in the Outcome Document? There is 
no doubt that the language used by the heads of states and government in paragraphs 
138 and 139 of the Outcome Document made the commitment appear more voluntary 
than mandatory. 333 For example, they state that: 
[…] we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis in cooperation with relevant 
regional organization. 
 
Under the UN Charter, resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are not 
recognized as authoritative sources of international law.334 However it is important to 
recall that despite the declaratory and advisory nature of its resolutions, the General 
Assembly has played a major role in various international legal principles such as the 
                                                          
332 ICJ Statute art. 38. 
333 See The Outcome Document. 
334 See UN Charter arts. 10-14. 
105 
 
right of all people to self-determination335, Women’s rights336 and many other sensitive 
issues.337  In this context, it is clear that notwithstanding that the 2005 adoption of R2P 
did not create a new legal rule, it can be argued that by reiterating existing international 
instruments, the General Assembly has certainly established a legal foundation of R2P 
in the future. As Burke-White comments: ‘In terms of the process of law creation, the 
Outcome Document may serve as an example of opinion juris338 for certain elements 
of Responsibility to Protect that go beyond the existing rule of law’339.  There is no 
doubt that the legal perspective of the R2P needs to be further developed in its process 
towards a legal binding norm, which would fully compel  states to exercise an 
extraterritorial duty to protect civilians from mass atrocities. Nevertheless, one 
important issue is that while R2P remains a political norm, it has a big impact on 
Security Council debate and state practice as illustrated in the above discussion. 
However, given the lack of sufficient state practice, it is clear that the new norm has 
not reached the status as a customary rule.  
 
 
 
                                                          
335 See for example the 1960 Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 1960; the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, General Assembly 
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3.7 Operationalizing R2P: From rhetoric to reality 
 
Since the emergence of R2P, there has been intense debate over how to put the 
theory into practice. The adoption of resolutions 1674340 and 1706341 illustrates the 
emphasis on turning words into deeds by the United Nations Security Council. This 
was the first reference to the new doctrine.  In its resolution 1674 adopted on 28 April 
2006, dealing with the protection of civilian populations in armed conflict, the Security 
Council  reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document regarding the 
responsibility to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. Similarly, in its Resolution 1706 adopted on 31 August 2006 in connection 
with the situation in Sudan and the establishment of a United Nations – African Union 
hybrid peacekeeping mission in Darfur, the Security Council made explicit reference 
to the R2P  by reaffirming  paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document and 
recalling the previous Resolution 1674. It should be noted however that the 
reaffirmation of the R2P provisions came after six months of strong debate within the 
Security Council since some members were vehemently opposed to the idea of 
implementing R2P, arguing that it was premature for the council to endorse the new 
principle342. According to Bellamy, this experience has made some of the council’s 
R2P advocates hesitant to use R2P language in order to avoid the possible call for 
reviewing the 2005 agreement.343 However, R2P advocates persisted in calling for the 
implementation of the new principle. The Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has also 
                                                          
340 UNSC Res 1674, 28 April 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1674 UNSC Res 1706, 31 August 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1706. 
341 UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706 
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expressed his concern on the matter, emphasizing the need to find a way to implement 
R2P in a consistent manner. He comments: 
[…] no community, society, or culture publicly and officially condones 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity as 
acceptable behaviour. On this principle, Member States are united. 
Although there have been lively debates about how best to implement the 
responsibility to protect, no Member State has argued against trying to curb 
abuses of such magnitude or against developing partnerships at the 
national, regional  and global levels to achieve this.344 
Since then, the Security Council has referred to R2P in five other resolutions which 
include:  Resolutions1970345 and 1973346 in connection with the situation in 
Libya;Resolution 1975347 in connection with the situation in Côte d’Ivoire; Resolution 
1996 in connection with the situation in South Sudan; Resolution 2014348 in connection 
with the situation in Yemen. This was certainly a further step in implementing R2P 
despite the fact that  explicit reference to R2P was only made in the preamble of the 
1973 Security Council Resolution authorizing intervention in Libya to protect the 
civilian population.  For R2P advocates such as Gareth Evans, Alex Bellamy, Tom 
Weiss and Jennifer Welsh, Resolutions 1970 and 1973 constitute a triumph of R2P. 
They argued that the full R2P framework was utilized as when manifestly Libyan 
authority failed to protect the civilian population and the regime was threatening its 
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own population with massacres, the responsibility shifted to the international 
community and both the UN and the regional organizations used the full scope of 
measures: negotiations, diplomatic pressure, sanctions and the use of force.349 There 
is no doubt that resolution 1973 was a significant step for R2P despite the 
controversies which followed its implementation.  
3.8 R2P: From rhetoric to practice 
 
3.8.1 Kenya 
 
While the international community response to the crisis in Darfur has raised concerns 
about the role played by R2P in addressing mass atrocities, the diplomatic response 
to the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, in which more than one thousand people 
were killed and more than 300,000 fled their homes,350 is generally considered to be 
a good example of R2P in practice.351 In the early days of the ethnic-related violence, 
the Secretary General Ban Ki Moon352and his special adviser on the prevention of 
genocide Francis Deng,353referred to the conflict as an R2P case. Many other 
politicians and scholars called for the international response on the basis of R2P. 
French Foreign Minister at that time, Bernard Kouchner, for example, called on the 
Security Council to help the Kenyan population and to take action in the name of 
                                                          
349 In this regard, Evans comments: ‘These two resolutions amounted to a textbook example of RtoP working 
sequentially, exactly as intended in the 2005 UN resolution, with the Security Council taking ‘collective action, 
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R2P.354 While R2P was not explicitly referenced in the international community agenda 
to address the conflict, the mediation process led by the former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan that helped to halt mass atrocities was qualified as the successful 
application of R2P.355 The early engagement of addressing the conflict is significant in 
that regional and international response to stop mass atrocities was markedly different 
from the past.   
This was a clear signal that the international community was well prepared and able 
to address humanitarian catastrophes and to avoid another situation like that in 
Rwanda. There is no doubt that the connection between mass atrocities committed on 
the civilian population in Kenya and the 1994 Rwandan genocide has played a key 
role, as Kofi Annan recognizes: ‘When I got on the ground and saw the ethnic nature 
killings and the conflict that the responsibility to protect, and the Rwandan and the 
Yugoslavian stories came to my mind’.356 It should be understood however that some 
commentators believe that R2P did not play a key role in the 2007 post-election conflict 
in Kenya since the AU-led mediation was within the traditional peace and security 
agenda.357 Nonetheless, there was not a serious problem to reach consensus to 
address mass atrocities in Kenya since it was not a question of military intervention. 
As Bellamy correctly comments ‘Consensus on Kenya was possible because 
engagement was limited to diplomacy and had host-state consent. There is little 
                                                          
354 Statement made by Bernard Kouchner on Violence in Kenya, January 31, 2008, available 
athttp://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/136-latest-news/1488-06-
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355  See Gareth Evans, ‘Response to Reviews by Michael Barnett, Chris Brown and Robert Jackson’, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, vol. 2, no. 3,  2010,  pp 320-327 
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The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time, p .292. 
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evidence to suggest that the council would have been prepared to adopt a more robust 
stance had one been required, with African members especially insisting that AU play 
the primary role’.358Neverthless, it can be argued that the Kenyan conflict was a real 
test case for the implementation of R2P in its preventive aspect.   
3.8.2 Libya 
 
NATO intervention in Libya has provided an interesting window through which to test 
the applicability and the efficacy of R2P to protect the civilian population from mass 
atrocity crimes. First, the international community response to the massacre was made 
at time when the risk of massacre appeared to be imminent.  Second, the main goal 
of intervention which constitutes protecting civilians in Benghazi from massacre was 
achieved in few days. This illustrates once again that the potential of R2P to save lives 
relies heavily on the political will of the P5.  As one analyst reminds us, ‘the Libyan 
vote passed only because non-Western Russia and China withheld their Security 
Council vetoes: all but unimaginable until recently. Both countries are now getting cold 
feet, claiming misuse of the resolution’s elastic language’.359 
It is however important to note that under the R2P framework, if a military intervention 
is taken, in order to avoid a post-intervention crisis, the international community has a 
responsibility to provide full assistance in building a durable peace, promoting good 
governance and sustainable development.360  Disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of armed forces and local population should be the priority in the 
aftermath of a military intervention in order to ensure the safety of the civilian 
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359 See http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/3478-
rtop-news-open-debate-on-protection-of-civilians-libya-denial-of-humanitarian-access-continues-icc-issues-
warrant-for-arrest-of-qaddafi-other-rtop-situations, accessed on 14 November 2013. 
ICISS Report, para. 5.1. 
111 
 
population.361 However, while post-intervention assistance is one of the most 
important aspects of R2P, this has not always been the priority of the interveners.  In 
relation to this, the ICISS commissioners observe that: 
Too often in the past the responsibility to rebuild has been insufficiently 
recognized, the exit of the interveners has been poorly managed, the 
commitment to help with reconstruction has been inadequate, and 
countries have found themselves at the end of the day still wrestling with 
the underlying problems that produced the original intervention action362. 
 
The NATO intervention in Libya has shown that yet again the international community 
was unable to manage the post-intervention situation. Indeed, once military 
intervention was completed and Gaddafi defeated, the priority was other than 
humanitarian. Undoubtedly, national interests were the main post-crisis concern.363  
Unfortunately, the failure to provide assistance to the new government after the 
intervention has undermined the success of the international community intervention 
in the name of the R2P. Nevertheless, a clear and effective post-intervention strategy 
has been proposed in the ICISS report:  
To avoid a return to conflict while laying a solid foundation for development, 
emphasis must be placed on critical priorities such as encouraging 
reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human rights, fostering 
political inclusiveness and providing national unity; ensuring the safe, 
smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced 
persons; reintegrating ex-combatants and other into productive society 
curtailing the availability of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and 
international resources for reconstruction and economic recovery. Each 
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priority is linked to every other and success will require a concerted and 
coordinated effort on all front.364 
 
While NATO intervention was considered as legitimate, ambiguities surrounding it 
have become a matter of concern.  With regard to this, in the aftermath of the 
intervention, Brazil has initiated a new concept called ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ 
as a complement to R2P.  The idea here was to build a mechanism for more control 
and transparency during and after intervention.365 However, some of the aspects of 
the strategy adopted during the intervention raise ethical issues. For example, one can 
question whether providing ammunitions to local rebels was legal or even beneficial 
for the future of R2P. Nevertheless, NATO intervention in Libya was certainly a good 
example of the United Nations Security Council’s capacity to take timely and decisive 
action to protect the civilian population from mass atrocities. Given, that one can 
legitimately support the view expressed by various scholars that the Libyan case has 
greatly contributed to the consolidation of R2P as an international norm to prevent 
mass atrocities. 
 
3.8.3 Mali 
 
The recent French intervention in Mali was also labelled by some commentators as an 
R2P case. Following the coup that deposed Malian president Amadou Toumani Touré, 
the situation deteriorated in the northern part of the country where rebels and Islamist 
militants were committing acts or rape, looting and killing the civilian population.  In 
this context, ECOWAS called for military intervention under Chapter VII of the UN 
                                                          
364 ICISS Report at para. 5.6. 
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Charter arguing that there was ‘flagrant violations of human rights’.366 In this regard, 
the Security Council unanimously adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
Resolution 2056, submitted by France, in which it supported the effort of ECOWAS 
and the African Union to resolve the crisis in Mali.367 However, it is notable that in this 
case, the talk focussed more on the threat of terrorism than the issue of protection of 
civilians from mass atrocities.  France, for example, deplored the fact that the Islamist 
fighters linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) and who are responsible 
for the kidnapping and the death of several French nationals in the region of Sahel, 
have managed important territorial gain.368 Nevertheless, the fact that a number of 
states, France in particular, have recognized that there was a collective duty to halt 
massive human rights violations  in Northern Mali lends support to the belief that R2P 
is well grounded as an international norm to address mass atrocities.  
3.8.4 Syria 
The lack of consensus in the UN Security Council as to how to react to mass atrocity 
crimes in Syria has raised obvious questions about the effectiveness of the 
Responsibility to Protect doctrine.369 While the Security Council’s timely and decisive 
response has saved the lives of thousands of civilians in Benghazi, the inability to halt 
mass atrocities in Syria illustrates that unfortunately R2P is much easier to theorize 
than to practice. However, it is crucial to note that the Syria case differs significantly 
from Lybia in many important respects. Whereas Gaddafi was openly calling for the 
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widespread  killing of its population, Bashar Al-Assad claims to protect its population 
from terrorism threats. Many authors believe that Gaddafi’s use of alarming rhetoric 
against civilians in Benghazi has largely contributed to  its isolation. In fact, what 
proved crucial to the intervention in Lybia was the wide consensus against the actions 
of the Gaddafi’s regime.370 While Syria’s regime continues to receive  support from 
countries such as Russia, China, Iran  and some Arab countries,  during the Lybian 
crisis,  all regional organizations including the  League of Arab States, the  Gulf 
Cooperation Council, the Organization of the Islamic Council and African Union 
unanimously condemned the actions of Gadaffi vis-à-vis its population and  called 
upon the UN Security Council to establish a no-fly zone over Libya.371 Moreover, the 
Syria’s geostrategic location in the region is also playing a key role in the paralysis of 
the international community response to the crisis. As Morris neatly comments: 
Given the complex array of strategic, religious and political factors that bear 
on Syria and its immediate neighbours, and the direct interests in the 
country of China and, more especially, Russia, divisions over how best to 
react to the violence emanating from Damascus were always destined to 
be deeper than those over Libya. 372 
Given that, one may legitimately argue successful implementation of R2P in conflicts 
such as Syria, characterized by the perpetration of mass atrocities against the civilian 
population will always depend on strategic factors including  external political influence 
and regional actors as long as the norm remains political rather than legal.   
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3.9 Conclusion 
 
Despite controversy surrounding the use of force for humanitarian purposes, since the 
emergence of R2P there is an international consensus that never again should the 
international community stand by in the face of mass violation of human rights and 
that sovereignty cannot be used as a shield behind which abuse could be inflicted on 
populations. There is a significant move on behalf of the international community 
towards the evolution of protection of both legal standards and political imperatives. 
However, despite the solemn endorsement and wide acceptance of the R2P norm as 
a veritable tool to be used in order to protect civilians who are at risk of gross and 
systematic violation of human rights, its implementation raises many challenges. 
As mentioned earlier, recent tragic conflicts in Ivory Coast, Libya, Sudan and Syria 
have forced the international community to bring up the issues of R2P and have tested 
the potential of the new norm with regard to the protection of civilians. While the 
international community’s responses to these crisis has revealed that R2P is a key 
international tool to address mass atrocities,  this has also highlighted two major 
aspects that affect the implementation of R2P; firstly, the lack of clarity of the Security 
Council’s resolutions and poor management, and secondly, the dependence of the 
new norm on the political will of states.   
The international community’s inability to win a consensus around the Syrian conflict 
demonstrates the gap between the rhetorical promise of ‘never again’ in the face of 
mass atrocities and the reality in applying R2P. However, since the adoption of the 
doctrine in 2005 in the World Summit and its incorporation into the Outcome 
Document, the new norm has come a long way and there has been a firm 
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determination on behalf of states to comply with their duty to protect the civilian 
population. Furthermore, states’ legal obligations to protect civilians from mass 
atrocities is already enshrined in international law. Accordingly, states have both an 
individual and a collective duty to prevent and to protect their populations from harm. 
This is the focus of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Protection of Civilians from Mass Atrocities by 
International Law 
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
While the drafting of the UN Charter was a revolutionary step in the international 
protection of human rights and civilians in general, there has been an increase of 
human rights violations which has affected civilian populations, particularly in conflict 
environments due to the changing nature and victims of armed conflict. There were 
several challenges deriving from the use of state and non-state violence and 
widespread deprivations of human dignity of every order. As outlined in the previous 
chapters, attempts to protect individuals from mass atrocities have been made over a 
long period of time.373 However, it was not until the ravages and horrors of the Second 
World War that the international community considered the establishment of a specific 
legal framework to improve the situation of civilians affected by armed conflict, both in 
inter–state and civil wars374. This embedded the protection of individuals in the existing 
body of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law and other 
bodies of international law.375 
In this context, it is clear that the R2P principles articulated in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document which emphasizes that each individual state has the duty to 
protect its population from mass atrocities; specifically, genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
                                                          
373 See for example James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and 
Historical Inquiry, Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1981.  
374 See ICRC, ‘Civilians Protected Under International Humanitarian law’, see also Helen Durham and Timothy 
L.H. McCormack, ‘The Changing Face of Conflict and the Efficacy of International Humanitarian Law’, 1999. 
375 For further details on the goals of international humanitarian law and international human rights law see 
OHCHR,  ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’, HR/PUB/11/01 United Nations 
Publication, 2011. 
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cleansing376 and crimes again humanity, came to reinforce this legal framework 
building on existing international law.377  
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the legal obligations to protect civilians from mass 
atrocities as enshrined in international law following the establishment of the United 
Nations and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for both Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals which contributed significantly to the development of international law 
and practice in the protection and prosecution of atrocity crimes of war, genocide and 
crimes against humanity.   
After a brief introduction about how genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
were recognized as international crimes under international law, the discussion in this 
chapter  focuses on states’ obligations with respect to protecting civilians against  
crimes of atrocity. It looks firstly at the rules that are found in international humanitarian 
law and human rights treaties, and then at those that arise from the 1948 Genocide 
Convention and international customary law.  
4.1 Defining war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in 
international law 
 
4.1.1 War crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide after the Second World 
War  
 
The end of the Second World War led to the establishment of the International 
Military Tribunal to prosecute Nazis and other individuals involved in atrocity 
crimes before and during the war. The establishment of IMT provided an 
                                                          
In 2007, the ICJ held that the term ethnic cleansing has no legal significance of its own and that in its view, it 
could be subordinated to genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. International Court of Justice, Case 
Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, paras. 187-90. 
377 World Summit Outcome Document, paras. 138 and 139. 
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important foundation that crystalized a modern body of international law, which 
defined and prosecuted war crimes, crimes against humanity and laid the 
foundation for defining and prosecuting the crime of genocide which came in 
1948 with the adoption of the international convention against genocide.  
The increase in targeting of civilians in hostilities led to the adoption of the fourth 
Geneva Convention and additional specific protocols which emphasized the 
protection of civilians in wartime.  Fundamental to this development has been the 
creation of the two international tribunals which prosecute mass atrocity crimes 
perpetrated in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia. 
These developments which further defined and crystallized the international law 
on war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide have contributed to more 
recent development in the international law that is the creation of the International 
Criminal Court. The International Criminal Court  has built on all developments 
of international law and practice to establish the most modern form of 
international law on international crimes and protection of human rights, 
ascertaining the principle of individual state’s and community of state’s 
responsibility in the prosecution of atrocity crimes. 
4.1.2 War crimes 
 
Under the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, war crimes were defined as ‘violations 
of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment 
or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in 
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war, of persons on the seas, 
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killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, 
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.’378   
Building on the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Geneva conventions, 
Article 8 (2) of the Rome Statute defines war crimes as the breaches of the four 
Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of the laws and customs of war.379 
Thus, crimes committed against persons not taking part or no longer taking part in 
armed hostilities, whether in international or in non-international armed conflicts, could 
constitute war crimes. These acts include wilfully killing, torture or inhuman treatment 
including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 
body or health, et cetera.380    
4.1.3 Crimes against humanity 
 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were founded on the ideal that atrocities similar to 
those that took place during WWII would ‘never again’ recur.381 Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg Charter provided crimes against humanity to include ‘murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated’.382 This definition was an important advancement as not only the 
international dimension was given to the prosecution and punishment of international 
                                                          
378    Article 6 of the Charter of IMT, Principle VI of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 1950 No.82. 
379 The Rome Statute of ICC, Article 8 (2) (a) and (b). 
380 Ibid. 
381 See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.320-
321. 
382 IMT Charter, Article 6. 
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crimes, but also such crimes became punishable even when the perpetrators have 
acted in accordance with the domestic law. As Cassese observed:  
[…] in as much as crimes against humanity were made punishable even if 
perpetrated in accordance with domestic laws, the 1945 Charter showed 
that in some special circumstances there were limits to the ‘omnipotence of 
the State’…and that ‘the individual human being, the ultimate unit of all law, 
is not disentitled to the protection of mankind when the State tramples upon 
his rights in a manner which outrages the conscience of mankind.383 
In addition, for the first time crimes against humanity became a matter of international 
customary law prohibitions.384 Furthermore, the Nuremberg excluded head of states 
immunity for international crimes and crimes against humanity,385 thereby even head 
of states were subjected to criminal liability. Thus, from this emanates the principle of 
head of states’ responsibility under international law and that they can be held 
personally accountable for their actions. This principle was adopted and confirmed by 
the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court in its Article 27 which explicitly 
provides that: 
(1)This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State 
or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person 
from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, 
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence. 
                                                          
383 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 104-105. 
384 See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.129. 
385 Article 7 of the IMT provides that: ‘The official position of defendants, whether Heads of States or 
responsible officials in Government departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility 
or mitigating punishment.’ 
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(2) Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not 
bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.386 
 It is important to note that the process to consider crimes against humanity in 
customary international law has taken a long time. This can be illustrated by Cassese’s 
observation, quoting Robert Lansing and James Brown Scott, the two distinguished 
representatives of the United States to the Versailles Conference who  after the First 
World War were not in agreement that there is a universal law for prosecuting crimes 
against humanity. They  emphasized that ‘the laws and principles of humanity are not 
certain, varying with time, place and circumstance, and accordingly, it may be, to the 
conscience of the individual judge. There is no fixed and universal standard of 
humanity’.387 Yet the international principle was affirmed and states acted accordingly; 
national sovereignty must yield to the safeguarding of international peace and respect 
for human rights.388 Therefore, states were required to take all necessary measures 
to prosecute and to punish crimes amounting to crimes against humanity. According 
to Article 3 of the London Agreement:  
Each of the signatories shall take the necessary steps to make available for 
the investigation of the charges and trial the major war criminals detained 
by them who are to be tried by the International Military Tribunal. The 
signatories shall also use their best endeavors to make available for 
investigation of the charges against and the trial before the International 
                                                          
386 Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 27. 
387 Ibid., p.102. See also ‘Report presented to the preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the 
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement  of Penalties’ in Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet No.32, Violations of the Laws and Customs of 
War, Report of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members of the Commission of 
Responsibilities, Conference of Paris 1919, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919, p. 25-6. 
388 ‘From Nuremberg to the Hague: The Road to the International Criminal Court’, Nuremberg Human Rights 
Centre, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FromNurembergtoHague_07july_eng.pdf, accessed 
on 16 April 2013. 
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Military Tribunal such of the major war criminals as are not in the territories 
of any of the signatories.389 
The definition of crimes against humanity was further expanded in the Rome statute 
which define crimes against humanity as: 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge 
of the attack: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible 
transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, 
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, enforced disappearance of 
persons, the crime of apartheid, other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental 
or physical health.390 
Also the ICTR in the Akayesu case has emphasized that crimes against humanity are 
aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are 
committed in an armed conflict, international or internal character.391 
 
 
                                                          
389 London Agreement of 8 August 1945, Agreement of the Government of the United states of America, the 
provisional Government of the French republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the prosecution and 
Punishment of the Major war Criminals of the European Axis. 
390 Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 7(1). 
391 Also the statutes of the International Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Court exclude the link with wartime. 
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4.1.4 Crime of genocide  
 
In the wake of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, discussion and debate over how to 
prevent future horrors similar to those that had taken place in the Second World War 
led to significant changes in international law. There was no international legal 
protection of civilians against the crime of genocide until the adoption of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948.392 
Since the IMT Charter did not envisage genocide as a crime falling under the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, during the trials, war criminals were charged with crimes against 
peace and crimes against humanity due to the lack of legal basis of the crime of 
genocide in international law. As Schabas observes:  
While referring to `evidence of the atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded 
mass executions' being perpetrated by the Nazis, and warning those 
responsible that they would be brought to book for their crimes, there was 
no direct reference to the racist aspect of the offences or an indication that 
they involved specific national, ethnic and religious groups such as the 
Jews of Europe.393 
The crime of genocide under international law is modern and the term ‘genocide’ itself 
was coined in 1943 by Raphael Lemkin who defined genocide as:394  
A co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential 
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves. The objective of such a plan would be disintegration of 
the political and social institutions of culture, language, national feelings, 
religion, and the economic existence of national groups and the destruction 
of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity and even the lives of the 
                                                          
392 GA Res 260 A (II), 9 December 1948. 
393 See William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes, 1st ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 496. 
394 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for 
Redress, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, 1944. 
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individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the 
national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against 
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national 
group. 
William Schabas believes that Lemkin’s definition was paradoxically both narrow and 
broad. It was narrow in the fact that it addressed crimes against national groups rather 
than groups in general. Nevertheless, it recognized not only physical genocide but 
also acts aiming at destroying the livelihood of the groups.395 
Article 2 of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as: 
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, 
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such: 
(a)  Killing members of the group 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.396 
This definition was repeated in Article 6 of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. The two ad hoc tribunals ICTR and ICTY have contributed greatly to 
the extension of the notion of genocide. The Trial Chamber of the ICTR in the Akayesu 
case had adopted a wide definition of acts that may amount to genocide. The chamber 
held that acts which may cause serious bodily and mental injury and harm need not to 
be permanent or irremediable and these include torture, inhuman treatment, rape, 
                                                          
395 See William A.  Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes, 1st ed., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 496. 
396 See Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948. 
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sexual abuse and deportation.397 The tribunal then decided that rape, when committed 
with the intent to destroy a protected group, is considered as an act of genocide. The 
Statute of the ICTR in its Articles 2 and 3 identifies genocide and crimes against 
humanity as punishable crimes. Article 29 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia ICTY sets a duty of states to cooperate in 
investigations and to surrender suspects to the tribunal upon request.  
 
4.2 Protection of civilians under International Humanitarian Law 
 
4.2.1 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and protection from atrocity crimes 
 
The notion of protection of civilians from mass atrocities is grounded in International 
Humanitarian law (IHL) which regulates the means and methods of warfare and seeks 
to limit the effect of armed conflict on people and objects.398 Specific legal protection 
of persons who do not, or no longer, take part in hostilities appeared with the adoption 
of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949399 and was later reinforced in the two 
Additional Protocols of 1977.400  However, the adoption of the fourth 1949 Geneva 
                                                          
397 See ICTR Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v Akayesu, case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment of the ICTR, 2 September 
1998. This case is important in the protection of civilians as it is the first time an international criminal tribunal 
has convicted an individual for genocide and international crimes of sexual violence. 
398 Regarding international humanitarian law, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory Opinion of 8 
July 1996 on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons acknowledges that this body of law contains 
both the rules relating to the conduct of hostilities (so-called ‘Hague Law’) as well as those protecting victims 
of war and aims to provide safeguards to persons not taking part in hostilities (so-called ‘Geneva Law’).  ICJ, 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Reports 1996 p.256, para.75. See also François Bugnion, 
‘Law of Geneva and Law of the Hague’, International Review of the Red Cross, No..844, 2001, pp. 901-922. 
399 1949 Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, 1949 Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 1949 Geneva Convention II Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
400 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflict, hereafter Additional Protocol I, 1977 Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed 
Conflict, hereafter Additional Protocol II. 
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Convention relative to protection of the civilian population and its additional protocols 
was a particular advancement since it introduced the most specific humanitarian 
protection to civilians.401  Thus, in the conduct of hostilities either of international or 
non-international character, parties to the conflict, whether State or non-state armed 
groups are required to minimize harm to civilian population resulting from armed 
conflict.402 Persons who are no longer participating in hostilities including civilians, the 
wounded, the sick and shipwrecked, as well as prisoners of war are entitled to respect 
for their lives, and parties to conflict must treat them humanely. The provisions of 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 establish minimum standards 
that parties to the conflict, including state and non-state armed groups shall respect. 
Thus, under Common Article 3 warring parties are prohibited from engaging in acts of 
violence against persons taking no active part in hostilities including members of the 
armed forces who do not bear arms without any distinction whether the armed conflict 
is of international or non-international character. This provision reads as follows:  
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
should be bound to apply, as a minimum the following provisions:  
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other 
similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain 
                                                          
401 See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
3rd Ed., 2004,. p. 299. 
402 Additional protocol I Articles 48, 51 (2), 52 (2); Additional Protocol II, Article 13(2). 
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prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the 
above – mentioned persons: 
(a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) Taking hostage 
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording 
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial 
humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict 
should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special 
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status 
of the Parties to the conflict403. 
The duty to protect the life, dignity, health and safety of civilians and other non-
combatants constitutes a cornerstone of international humanitarian law and is 
fundamental to protecting civilians from atrocity crimes.404 However, some writers 
have questioned whether the provisions of Common Article 3 do provide effective 
protection to the civilians during military operations.  Gardam, for example, believes 
that Common Article 3 provides no protection to civilians apart from that it prohibits 
                                                          
403 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
404 See Prosecutor v. Furundziza, in this case, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia held that ‘the general principle of respect for human dignity is the basic underpinning and 
indeed the very raison d’être of  human humanitarian law and international human rights law’. Case N°. IT-95-
17/1-T para. 183. 
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outrages upon personal dignity, in particular violence to life and person as well as cruel 
treatment and torture. She also recognized that the failure to distinguish between 
civilians and combatants is contrary to the requirement of Common Article 3.405 
However, it is important to note that the provisions of the Common Article 3 have been 
widely accepted as customary international humanitarian law.406  
4.2.2 Obligation to distinguish between civilians and combatants 
 
 In order to ensure the protection of civilian population and civilian property in military 
operations, parties to the conflict are required to distinguish at all times between the 
civilian population and combatants, as well as between civilian property and military 
objectives.407 The idea of distinction is one of the important humanitarian aspects of 
the laws of war. As Best comments in relation to this:  
To call it the heart of the subject is no misnomer. This is the affecting and 
compassionate side of the war tradition, called into existence along with the 
recognition by those on its prudential and self-interested side that there 
were categories of nominally ‘enemy’ human beings whom it was possible 
and desirable not to hurt, persons whose degree of non-involvement in the 
struggle or whose irrelevance to it commonly led to their characterisation 
as ‘innocent’.408 
                                                          
405 See Judith G. Gardam, Non-Combatant Immunity as a Norm of International Humanitarian Law. Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. 
406 See for example Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Merits, 1986 ICJ Reports 27 June 2014, pp. 218, 255: Prosecutor v. Tadic, case No. IT-94-1, Appeals 
Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeals on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paras. 98, 
117; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case N°.ICTR, Trial Chamber, Judgement, 2 September 1998,. See also ICRC, 
Customary International Humanitarian Law, ed. Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Cambridge: 
CUP/ICRC, 2005. 
407 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions; Article 14 Geneva GC IV; and arts. 48, 51(2) and 52(2), 
Additional Protocol I of 1977. 
408 See Geoffrey Best, War and Law since 1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 257. See also Hugo 
Slim, ‘Why protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War’, International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3, 
2003, pp. 481-501.   
130 
 
Before discussing the principle of distinction, it is first necessary to clarify the definition 
of civilian under International Humanitarian Law. Civilians are defined as those who 
never took part in the hostilities and who form part of the normal civilian population 
and those who were combatants but are, at some stage, hors de combat and no longer 
take part in the hostilities.409 Under Article 50 of Additional Protocol I relating to the 
protection of victims of international armed conflicts civilians are defined in negative 
as persons who are not combatants. This provision reads: 
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons 
referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in 
Article 43 of the Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that 
person shall be considered to be a civilian. 
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians. 
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come 
within the definition of civilian does not deprive the population of its civilian 
character. 
Humanitarian international law expressly demands that parties to conflict direct their 
operations only against military objectives and never against civilians.410 Thus, acts or 
threats of violence whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited.411 In the Nuclear Weapons Case the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has also emphasized that the principle of distinction was one of the 
                                                          
409 Article 50 of Additional Protocol I. See also Nils Melzer, ‘Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC 1 July 2009. 
410 Art.35 and Art.48, Additional Protocol I of 1977. 
411 Article 51 (2) Additional Protocol I. 
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fundamental principles of international humanitarian law.412 As it observed in its 
advisory opinion: 
After sketching the historical development of the body of rules which 
originally were called ‘laws and customs of war’ and later came to be termed 
‘international humanitarian law’, the Court observes that the cardinal 
principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law 
are the following. The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects and established the distinction between 
combatants and non-combatants; States must never use weapons that are 
incapable of distinguish between civilian and military targets.413 
The principle of distinction has been established as a norm of customary international 
law which must be applicable in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts and binding on all states and armed groups when they are states parties or 
not to the Geneva Conventions.414  The principle of distinction which is regarded as 
one of the cornerstones of international humanitarian law415 has also been bolstered 
by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which provides that 
‘intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking part in hostilities’ are serious violations of the laws and 
customs applicable in armed conflict not of an international character.416 
Article 4 of the Additional Protocol II also sets out a list of fundamentals guarantees 
and several acts which are prohibited.  
                                                          
412 ICJ, Nuclear Weapons case, §434. 
413 ICJ, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, p.257, para. 78. 
414 For more details see Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Customary International 
Humanitarian Law’, vol 1, Rules ICRC, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. See also T. Meron, ‘The 
Geneva Conventions as Customary law’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 81, 1987, pp. 348-370. 
415 See for example Esbjon Rosenblad, International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Some Aspects of 
the Principle of Distinction and Related Problems, Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1979. p.53. 
416 Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 8(2)(e) (i). 
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This Article reads: 
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part 
in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to 
respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. 
They shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse 
distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors. 
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts 
against the persons referred to in paragraph I are and shall remain 
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever: 
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, 
in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or 
any form of corporal punishment; 
(b) collective punishments; 
(c) taking of hostages; 
(d) acts of terrorism; 
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault; 
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; 
(g) pillage; 
(h) threats to commit any or the foregoing acts. 
3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they require, and in 
particular: 
(a) they shall receive an education, including religious and moral education, 
in keeping with the wishes of their parents, or in the absence of parents, of 
those responsible for their care; 
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(b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families 
temporarily separated; 
(c) children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be 
recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities; 
(d) the special protection provided by this Article to children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take 
a direct part in hostilities despite the provisions of subparagraph (c) and are 
captured; 
(e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and whenever possible with the 
consent of their parents or persons who by law or custom are primarily 
responsible for their care, to remove children temporarily from the area in 
which hostilities are taking place to a safer area within the country and 
ensure that they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety 
and well-being.417 
 
The Fourth Geneva Convention and the additional protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions not only require the warring parties including states and non-state armed 
groups to refrain from perpetrating atrocities against civilians, but they are also 
required to take adequate measures to protect civilians from the effects of hostilities.418 
However, this duty lies first and foremost with states. Therefore, states have both 
positive and negative obligations to implement the rules of IHL within their territory, 
including adopting lawful measures to induce the transgressors to comply with the 
conventions.419 Consequently, serious violations of the provisions of IHL constitute 
                                                          
417 Article 4 of the Additional protocol II 
418 Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions; Article 14 Geneva GC IV; and Art.s 48, 51(2) and 52(2), 
Additional Protocol I of 1977.  
419 For a discussion on state’s obligations under Common Article 1 see Carlo Focarelli, ‘Common Article 1 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?’, European Journal of International Law, vol. 21, no. 1, 2010, 
pp. 125-171. See also Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
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war crimes and any person accused of grave breaches can be held criminally 
responsible.  
Although discriminate attacks against civilian population and civilian objects are 
prohibited,420 the reality of contemporary armed conflicts shows that those rules are 
violated daily, either by state forces or by non-state armed groups.421 Yet violence 
against civilians is continuing and even worsening in some conflicts. In this context, 
R2P which clearly emphasizes the duty of protecting vulnerable population lies first 
and foremost with states, would help to oblige a state to implement IHL rules. 
4.2.3 Obligation to respect and to ensure fundamental rights 
Under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, states are required to 
‘respect’ and ‘ensure respect’ for the conventions in all circumstances. Accordingly, in 
addition to its obligation to take all feasible measures to ensure the respect of the 
provisions of  IHL by all parties under its jurisdiction, a state must also take all possible 
steps to ensure that the rules are respected regardless of whether it is itself party to 
conflict or not.  This obligation which was reiterated in Article 1 of Additional protocol 
1 is generally accepted as one of the fundamental principles of humanitarian law which 
implies both national and universal obligation for states to ensure the implementation 
of humanitarian principles. This was confirmed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case in 
which the court stated:  
                                                          
Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests’,  Revue International de la Croix Rouge/ International 
Review of the Red Cross, vol. 82, no. 837, 2000,   pp. 67-87. 
420 This rule is codified in Articles 48, 51(2) and 52(2) of Additional Protocol I (in international armed conflicts) 
and Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II (in non-international armed conflicts). 
421 See for example Human Rights Council Resolution 9/9. Protection of the human rights of civilians in armed 
conflict. In this Resolution the HRC expresses ‘its deep concern at the violations of human rights during armed 
conflicts and of international humanitarian law, which undermines the protection of human rights of civilians 
in armed conflicts’.  
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The Court considers that there is an obligation on the United States 
Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to 
‘respect’ the Conventions and even ‘to ensure respect’ for them ‘in all 
circumstances’, since such an obligation does not derive only from the 
Conventions themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian 
law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression. The United 
States is thus under an obligation not to encourage persons or groups 
engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of 
Article 3 Common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.422 
This obligation is considered as imposing on all contracting states an obligation to take 
a variety of measures in order to induce not only states’ organs and private individuals 
but also other contracting states to comply with the conventions. States’ individual and 
collective obligation to respect and to ensure respect for fundamental human rights 
was reiterated in Protocol Additional I in Article 89 which states that ‘In situations of 
serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties 
undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in 
conformity with the United Nations Charter’.  Based on these principles, it is clear that 
states have extra-territorial positive duty to prevent and to halt mass atrocities and that 
the international community has the duty to ensure respect for the convention. Thus, 
under the R2P framework, where IHL prove insufficient to protect populations and 
states are manifestly failing in their duties to implement the IHL rules, the international 
community must respond in a timely and effective way to halt mass atrocities. As 
Bellamy comments, ‘when States committed to the R2P concept in 2005, therefore, 
they were effectively acknowledging the legal obligations that they already had and 
                                                          
422 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgements of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Report 1986, para. 220. 
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committing themselves to ensuring that this existing law be upheld everywhere, all the 
time’.423  
However, despite the development of the legal framework for civilian protection in war, 
it seems that the idea of civilian immunity has not always been embraced in the 
practice of war. Indeed, attacking the civilian population has become a legitimate and 
military strategy for belligerents.424 Furthermore, the principle of distinction continues 
to be challenged by the lack of implementation of IHL rules. As Chesterman has 
observed, ‘the challenge for international community is not so much to develop new 
international norms and new regimes but to make those global norms relevant to local 
contexts’425 Furthermore, IHL rules appear to be inadequate to contemporary conflicts 
which are mainly characterized by the suffering of civilians. Indeed, conflicts not of an 
international character fought between government forces and non-state armed 
groups have become more prevalent than between states. According to the 2012 
Human Security Report, between 2004 and 2008 the number of state-based armed 
conflicts rose by 25 percent.426 This study has found that since in such conflicts, 
civilians are highly exposed to greater danger and abuse related to modern warfare, 
                                                          
423 See Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: Towards a Living Reality, UNA-UK April 2013, p.6. 
424 Regarding the rejection of the idea of the civilian in the so-called ‘new war’, Slim comments: ‘The 
widespread killing and destitution of civilians in Sudan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, East Timor, Bosnia and Angola 
continued the long history of warfare that rejects the civilian idea. The military strategies of civilian terror in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia, with their signature atrocities of amputation and cannibalism alongside policies of 
displacement and enrichment, are infamous. Rejecting the civilian idea by reducing people to their most 
minimal sexual identity has also been common in all these wars. The massacre of civilian men in Srebrenica 
was an obvious and terrible example of a rejection of wider ideas of civilian identity Thousands of men were 
murdered simply because they were men and because such male massacre is a powerful symbol of conquest 
and superiority Similarly, strategies of female rape in Bosnia and many parts of Africa similarly condemn 
women to atrocities suffering purely because of their sexual identity, and also act as an extremely violent way 
of sending messages of humiliation and pollution to enemy men’ .  Hugo Slim, ‘Why protect Civilians? 
Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War’, International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3, 2003, pp. 481-501.   
425 Simon Chesterman cited in Hugo Slim, ‘Why protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War’, 
International Affairs vol. 79, no. 3, 2003, pp. 481-501. 
426 Human Security Report 2012, available at 
http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2012/HSRP2012_Chapter%208.pdf, accessed o, 26 April 2013. 
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the targeting of civilians has increased by over 60 percent between 2008 and 2009.427 
Another study has found that in internal conflicts weaker rebels are likely to use 
violence to coerce support from the civilian population.428 Many other aspects are 
related to the increasing targeting of civilians in such conflicts. Yet, the characteristics 
of contemporary armed conflicts has considerably contributed to the problem in terms 
of distinction between civilians and combatants. For example, notwithstanding that 
civilians benefit from protection against attack, those who have been enrolled 
involuntarily in combat such as child soldiers are excluded from the category of 
protected persons and may become a legitimate object of attack.429 
Another challenge is that, notwithstanding that the provisions of the Common Article 
3 to the  Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II apply also in internal armed 
conflict,  serious violation of these rules are not considered as ‘grave breaches’. 
Consequently, state parties to the Geneva Conventions, in the situation of non-
international armed conflict, do not have an obligation to exercise universal jurisdiction 
over the alleged perpetrators nor are they obliged to bring them to trial.430 Thus, 
serious war crimes against the civilian population or other protected persons are 
considered as grave breaches only when they are committed within the context of 
international armed conflict. This was reaffirmed by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, 
in the Tadic Case which held that the concept of grave breaches applied only to 
international armed conflict.431 It should be noted that one of the advantages of 
characterizing a crime as a grave breach is that ‘grave breaches’ are subject to 
                                                          
427 Ibid. 
428 Reed M. Wood, ‘Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 
47, no. 5, 2010, pp. 601–614. 
429 See for example, Jenny Kuper, ‘Child ‘’Soldiers’’ and Civilians – Some Controversial Issues’, University of 
Laverne Law Review, vol 12, 2008, p.12 
430 Ibid. 
431 ICTY Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT 94-1 para. 80. 
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universal jurisdiction of all states parties to the conventions. In other words, any 
contracting party is required and authorized to bring to trial any person accused of 
grave breach regardless the location of the crime and the nationality of the perpetrator 
or the victim.432 Nevertheless, the Rome Statute has a remedy to this failure by 
emphasizing in its article 5 that the ICC has jurisdiction over war crimes, the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. It is clear that by 
incorporating the principle of universal jurisdiction into the Rome Statute, states have 
made possible that any perpetrators of any serious violation of human rights be 
prosecuted. As the Rome Statute states in its preamble: 
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensure …Determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes…Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of 
international justice.433 
As noted earlier, states have positive obligations to implement the rules of IHL within 
their territory, and to make sure that any violation is punished. Therefore, it is clear 
that individual states have responsibility to prevent, to prosecute and to punish war 
crimes.  
Article 13 of the convention reads: ‘The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the 
populations of the countries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in 
particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate 
the suffering caused by war.’ However, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 are restricted and they are applicable only in situations of international or non-
                                                          
432 Antonio Cassese, op.cit. p. 89. 
433 Rome Statute Preamble, paras. 4, 5 and 9. 
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international armed conflict. Therefore, if a conflict such as internal disturbances and 
tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence occur, then humanitarian 
law will not apply to the civilian population. The question of protection of victims of 
such conflicts has frequently been raised as in modern internal warfare, civilians are 
highly exposed to the effect of hostilities but in this situation they would not be covered 
by the conventions. 
 As Gersters & Meyer comment:  
The most striking problem of humanitarian law today is its general lack of 
applicability. In the past fifteen years, several internal and international 
armed conflicts have occurred. However, in almost every case at least one 
of the parties to the conflict did not consider international humanitarian law 
to be applicable.434 
While the scope of International Humanitarian Law is limited to situations of armed 
conflict, International Human Rights Law seeks to protect and promote the human 
rights of an individual as a human being, regardless of the situation. Therefore, both 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law are complementary 
as sources of legal obligations in armed conflict.435 This was confirmed by the ICJ, in 
its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which held that both international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law are complementary in situations of armed 
                                                          
434 See Thomas Fleiner- Gester and Michael A. Meyer, ‘New Developments in Humanitarian Law: Challenge to 
the Concept of Sovereignty. International and Comparative law Quarterly, vol. 34, 1985, pp. 267-283; See also 
Collen C. Maher, ‘The Protection of Children in Armed Conflict: A Human Rights Analysis of the Protection 
Afforded to Children in Warfare’, Boston College Third World Law Journal, vol. 9 , 1989, p. 297. 
435 See OHCHR, ‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’, op cit. 
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conflict.436 The ICJ further acknowledged that protection provided by human rights 
standards does not cease in the event of armed conflict.437 
 
4.3 Protection of civilians and Human Rights Law  
 
In the past, in the name of sovereignty, states had absolute authority over their citizens 
and individuals were not considered to be subjects of international law.438 Hence, 
human rights and their protection was a domestic or national issue. However, the 
experiences of World War II led to the need to promote respect for human beings and 
to protect individuals from abuse by states.439 In consequence, individuals were 
recognized as full subjects of international law and the duty to take precautionary 
measures to ensure their rights and dignity became a matter of the whole international 
community.440 Since then, states’ duty to protect their population from mass atrocities 
is embedded in a range of human rights conventions including the UN Charter, the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two 1966 International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and various other human rights treaties. 
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437 Ibid. 
438See for example Robert W.Cartyle and Alexander J. Cartyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the 
West, Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1950, pp.16-17. 
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440 See Sheri Rosenberg, ‘What’s Law Got to do with it?:  The Bosnia v. Serbia Decision’s Impact on 
Reconciliation’, Rutgers Law Review, vol. 61, no. 1, 2008, pp.131-159. 
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4.3.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights treaties 
 
Human rights and their protection have been sanctioned in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights adopted by the General assembly on 10 December 1948.441 The 
declaration, in its preamble reminds that grave violation of human rights have resulted 
in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind.442 Hence, the 
declaration emphasizes the protection of human rights through the rule of law and 
specifies the principle of the dignity and rights of each individual without distinction or 
discrimination. These principles are clearly spelled out in Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the 
declaration. Article 2 states:  
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction on any kind such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on 
the basis of the political jurisdictional or international status of the country 
or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-
self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty. 
State duty to protect and to promote human rights was therefore built upon the 
provisions of the declaration. In fact, the right to life, to dignity, to liberty and security 
of person and the prohibition of slavery or servitude and the prohibition of torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment constitute the most relevant 
provisions of human rights law in terms of protection of the civilian population.  
Although the responsibility to protect people under their jurisdiction against human 
rights abuses rests first and foremost on the states, these rights are so fundamental 
                                                          
441 Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 
1948. GA Res. 217 A (III), 1948. 
442 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. 
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that their violation cannot be ignored by other states. Therefore international human 
rights standards were chosen by the United Nations as a means to guarantee the 
rights of individual vis-à-vis their own governmental authorities and other actors who 
might violate them. Thus, states are legally obliged under human rights conventions 
that they signed and ratified to protect and promote human rights of their peoples.443  
States’ obligations to protect all individuals within their territory from atrocities have 
been further consolidated within a number of international and regional human rights 
treaties. This duty is contained in the two human rights Covenants of 1966; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)444 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).445 Article 2 (1) of the 
ICCPR states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.446 
Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR states:  
                                                          
443 Those conventions include: Covenant to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (1926); Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966); American Convention on Human Rights (1969); Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discriminations against Women (1979); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981); United 
Nations Conventions against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1984); United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Article 26. 
444 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966 and entered into force from 23 
March 1976. 
445 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200(A) on 16 December 1966 and entered into 
force on 3 January 1976. 
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Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.447 
One of the important aspects of the international human rights law in connection with 
protecting civilians is that states have positive obligations to protect individuals within 
their territory, during peace or war time and to make sure that any violation is punished. 
While some exceptional derogations are permitted in war times, a number of 
fundamental rights can never be suspended.448  Thus, the right to life,449 the prohibition 
against torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment450 and other crimes 
including genocide, slavery,451 racial discrimination and crimes against humanity are 
today established under customary international law as jus cogens, meaning that no 
derogation is admissible under any circumstances.452 The Human Rights Council in 
its resolution on Protection of the human rights of civilians in armed conflict also has 
emphasized that ‘in accordance with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, certain rights are recognized as non-derogable in all 
circumstances and that any measures derogating from the provisions of the Covenant 
                                                          
447 Ibid. 
448 Article 4 of ICCPR states: ‘In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the 
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derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
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Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part II. See also International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 
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must be in accordance with its article 4 in all cases, and underlining the exceptional 
and temporary nature of any such derogations’.453 
Other relevant treaties are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination,454 Convention on the Elimination of All Form of Discrimination 
against Women,455 the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee,456 the 1984 
Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment457 and its 2002 Optional Protocol, European Convention of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms,458 the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights,459 
and the American Convention of Human Rights.460 It should be noted however that 
while in various cases many atrocity crimes are committed by non-state actors or 
organised groups which have a relationship with the state, there are no express 
provisions in international law requiring a state to protect individuals from human rights 
violations committed by private individuals.  This was the case in Darfur where many 
atrocity crimes were committed by a militia group very close to the Sudanese 
government. In this regard, Rosemberg argues that it is now generally accepted that 
states have positive obligations under international human rights treaties to prevent, 
punish, investigate and redress human rights violations in areas ranging from the right 
to life, to respect for private and family life, and the prohibition on discrimination, 
                                                          
453 Human Rights Council, Resolution 9/9. 
454 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted and opened for 
signature and ratification by General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and entered into 
force 4 January 1965. 
455  Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 
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457 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 39/46. 
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despite the fact that no express provisions exist in current international law.461 In this 
way, it can be argued that R2P reinforces states’ legal duty to  prevent state and non-
state actors from committing human rights abuses by explicitly requiring states to 
protect their populations from mass atrocities.  
4.3.2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 
1948 
 
The Genocide Convention obliges states to prevent and to punish the crime of 
genocide at all times, whether committed in international, non-international conflicts or 
in peacetime.462 In Article 1 it is stipulated that ‘the contracting parties confirm that 
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish’.463 Article 3 of the 
convention imposes upon the contracting parties not only the obligation to punish 
genocide but also acts connected with the crime including conspiracy, incitement, and 
complicity and attempt to commit genocide. This Article reads: ‘the following acts shall 
be punishable: genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; complicity in genocide’.464 Under the 
convention, states are required to criminalize genocide and punish the perpetrators. 
Article 6 stipulates that persons accused of genocide must be prosecuted and tried by 
judicial authorities of the territory in which the act was committed.  
Thus, the convention imposes upon states a dual responsibility to prevent and to 
punish genocide. This obligation was later extended by the ICJ in the Bosnia v. Serbia 
                                                          
461 See Sheri P. Rosenberg, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention’, Global Responsibility to 
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case in which the court emphasized states’ obligation to prevent and to punish 
genocide stating that Serbia has failed to prevent and to punish genocide in 
Srebrenica. In fact, in this case, following the wars in the Balkan, Bosnia sued Serbia 
before the ICJ maintaining that Serbia had violated its obligations under the Genocide 
Convention by failing to prevent and to punish genocide. Thus, the court was asked to 
find that Serbia had committed genocide under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention.  
In determining that Serbia had breached the Genocide Convention while it was not 
responsible for committing genocide on the motive that it had failed its responsibility 
to prevent and to punish genocide in Srebrenica, the court highlighted that in addition 
to the obligation to refrain from engaging in genocide, Genocide Convention imposes 
upon states an extra-territorial’s obligation to prevent and to punish genocide and 
justiciable obligation vis-à-vis citizens of other countries.465 In relation to the legal 
obligation imposed by the Genocide Convention on a third state, the same court further 
held that ‘under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, States parties have an obligation to arrest persons accused of genocide 
who are in their territory even if the crime of which they are accused was committed 
outside it’.466  
The Genocide Convention was a significant advancement as it clearly defines the 
crime of genocide as a serious crime of concern to the international community as a 
whole. As Cassese notes: 
The Convention has numerous merits…it sets out a careful definition of the 
crime, its punishes other acts connected with genocide, it prohibits 
genocide regardless of whether it is perpetrated in time of war or peace, 
                                                          
465  ICJ , Bosnia  and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, Judgment of 26 February 2007, §162-6. See also 
Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008,  p. 129. 
466 See ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, para. 
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thanks to the Convention, and it is very broad acceptance by states, at the 
level of state responsibility it is now widely recognized that customary rules 
on genocide impose erga omnes obligations.467  
 
It should be emphasized that Genocide Convention has been internationally accepted 
as a customary international law. In its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the ICJ 
described the convention as ‘principles which are recognized by civilized nations as 
binding on states, even without any conventional obligation’.468 The court highlights 
the erga omnes nature of genocide outlining that:  
The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and 
civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might 
have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one 
hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the 
other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In 
such a convention the contracting States do not have any interest of their 
own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the 
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the 
convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of 
individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of 
a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals 
which inspired the Convention provide by virtue of the common will of the 
parties, the foundation and measures of all its provisions.469 
The collective legal obligation to intervene in a case of genocide is clearly underlined 
in Article 8 of the Genocide Convention. This states:  
                                                          
467 Antonio Cassese, op. cit., p. 130. 
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469 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory 
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Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United 
Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide 
or any other acts enumerated in Article III.470 
It is therefore clear that the convention contains an explicit extra-territorial state’s duty 
to prevent and to punish genocide. However, the main issue here is to determine when 
a mass killing amounts to genocide. For instance in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, it 
was visible that the escalation of violence marked by the extremist propaganda and 
the well organization of the militias could culminate into genocide.471 Notwithstanding 
that a larger number of observers had little doubt that something terrible was underway 
in the country, the international community has consciously avoided characterising the 
mass killing as genocide. This is illustrated in the conclusions of the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur: 
The massacres that had already taken place seemed to conform to the 
Genocide Convention’s definition of the genocide: the victims of attacks, 
Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely 
because of their membership in a certain ethnic group and for no other 
objective reason.472 
However, there was an attempt to minimize the extent of the conflict which for a long 
time was qualified as a civil war. Despite the mass killings, the whole international 
community was denying that genocide was occuring. The gravity of the events was 
minimized, as one of the UN Officials comments: 
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At this time, U.S. officials and others in the Security Council repeatedly 
stated that there was no basis for intervention because there was no peace 
to keep in Rwanda, a country devastated by a civil war…The Council’s 
duplicitous way to refuse to call the events by their proper name –
genocide—for fear of being compelled to act.473 
The disastrously inadequate international community response to the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide highlights the weaknesses of the Genocide Convention, in particular the 
resistance that it meets in practice.474 Several writers such as Evans475 and Focarelli476 
have made criticisms about the effectiveness of the Convention to protect civilians 
against genocide. In analysing why the convention has failed to prevent and to stop 
genocide in Rwanda and to prevent murderous ethnic cleansing in some countries 
including Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Sudan, Evans argues that the major 
problem with the Genocide Convention is that its definition language is very precise. 
He notes that this gives a way to endless legal arguments as it demands to 
demonstrate that there is an intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group.477 As a result, the killings and mass atrocities continue when 
the international community is trying to find sufficient evidence of genocidal intent.478  
                                                          
473 See Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda. Ithaca New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2002. 
474 See United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 912, 1994. 
475 See Gareth Evans, ‘Crimes against Humanity: Overcoming Indifference’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 
8, No. 3, 2006, pp. 325-39, 430. 
476 See Focarelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble’, European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 21, pp. 125-171. 
477 See Gareth Evans, op. cit. 
478  Evans comments that: ‘This was exactly the problem which confronted the UN Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur when it reported in February 2005: while accusing the Khartoum government of multiple abuses of 
international humanitarian law, saying in so many words that ‘massive atrocities were perpetrated on a very 
large scale and have so far gone unpunished’, it was unable to find sufficient evidence that the killing and 
village-burning and raping that that had occurred was actually genocidal in its intent.  And the result of course 
was to give a major propaganda victory to the Sudanese leadership, whose behaviour on any view was, and 
remains, ugly, indefensible and deserving of the strongest international response’. 
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In his statement in which he recognized the failure of the United States and the 
international community to stop genocide in Rwanda, President Bill Clinton recognized 
that the atrocities perpetrated in Rwanda were not called by their rightful name 
‘genocide’ and that they did not do as much as they could have and should have 
done.479 There is no doubt that states were very reluctant to recognize that genocide 
was going on in Rwanda due to its implied obligation on the international community 
to act.  
The question has also been raised in the Darfur Conflict whether the atrocities amount 
to genocide or not. While the United States was the only Security Council member to 
declare that the abuses committed in Darfur amounted to genocide, the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur chaired by Antonio Cassese, in its report, concluded  
that the government of Sudan did not pursue a policy of genocide.480However, the 
commission recognized that gross violations of human rights and grave breaches of 
international humanitarian law were committed on the civilian population by the 
government  forces and the militia Janjaweed under their control. Neverthless, the 
commission  underlined that they recognize that in some instances  individuals 
including government officials may have been committed acts with genocidal intent  
but only a competent court can determine whether or not that was the case in Darfur.481  
It should be noted that, the Prosecutor of the ICC has requested an arrest warrant 
against Omar Al Bashir, the President of Sudan for genocide, crimes against humanity 
                                                          
479 In March of 1998, on a visit to Rwanda, President Bill Clinton spoke to a crowd of Rwandese assembled on 
the tarmac at the Airport in Kigali apologizing for the failure to act during genocide stating that: ‘We come 
here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the United States and the world community did not do as 
much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred’. 
480 See The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-
General in 2004. 
481 Ibid. 
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and war crimes.482 This recalls the complexity surrounding the definition of genocide. 
For example, in order to maintain that genocide has occurred, it must be proved that 
the atrocities were directed with the intention to destroy in whole or in part one of the 
protected groups. Unfortunately, as was the case in the 1994 Rwanda genocide, when 
the Security Council realized that the mass killing of a significant number of men, 
women and children may amount to genocide, it was too late. This can be illustrated 
by the report of the United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali to the 
Security Council two months after the eruption of genocide in Rwanda. In reporting 
that an estimated 250,000 to 500,000 Rwandans had already been killed, he 
highlighted the failure of the international community to responds to the crisis. He then 
states that: 
The magnitude of the human calamity that has engulfed Rwanda might be 
unimaginable but for its having transpired. On the basis of the evidence that 
has emerged, there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide. Since 
there have been large-scale killings of communities and families belonging 
to particular ethnic groups. In the meantime, it is unacceptable that, almost 
two months since this violence exploded, killings still continue.483 
Another deficiency of the convention is the ambiguities surrounding its scope. For 
example it is not clear whether the convention places an obligation upon states to take 
action in cases of genocide outside of its territory. Some commentators such as Ben 
Okolo484 observe that a legal response to that question is still not relevant but there is 
at least if not a legal then a moral obligation to act. Glanville also believes that states 
have only an obligation under Article VII to call upon the competent organs of the 
                                                          
482 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09. 
483 UN Doc SG/SM/5292. For more discussion see Hazel Cameron, Britain’s Hidden Role in the Rwandan 
Genocide: The Cats Paw. Oxon:  Routledge, 2013. 
484 See Simon Ben Okolo, ‘Darfur and the Genocide Debate’.  African Journal on Conflict Resolution, vol.9, 
no.3, 2009. 
152 
 
United Nations to take appropriate measures. Nevertheless, he observes that due to 
the consolidation of international human rights regime there is a general belief that 
Genocide Convention imposed upon states a duty to intervene beyond borders in 
response to genocide.485 
It is beyond any doubt that with the emergence of R2P, the world community has 
reached a consensus that genocide is unacceptable and that states can no longer 
stand by when faced with genocide and other atrocity crimes whether committed in 
time of peace or in time of war. As Albright and Cohen comment:  
The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and 
mass killings continue. Our challenge is to match words to deeds and stop 
allowing the unacceptable. That task, simple on the surface, is in fact one 
of the most persistent puzzles of our times. We have a duty to find the 
answer before the vow of 'never again' is once again betrayed.486 
While the provisions of the Genocide Convention, particularly Article 2, have been 
repeatedly reaffirmed and clarified by international courts,487 efforts are still needed in 
order to strengthen international mechanisms to prevent and to end the threats of 
genocide and other atrocity crimes against the civilian populations. In this regard, R2P 
is a great advancement in addressing genocide and other atrocity crimes as it 
emphasizes states’ individual and collective obligation to protect populations not only 
from genocide, but also from war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity as articulated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.488 Like the 
                                                          
485 Luke Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders’, Human Rights Law Review, 2012. 
486 See The Genocide Prevention Task Force Report  issued on December 8, 2008 available at 
http://media.usip.org/reports/genocide_taskforce_report.pdf  
487 See for example Article 6 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court; Article 2 of the Statute of the 
International criminal tribunal for Rwanda; Article 9 of the Statute of the Special Court for Cambodia. 
488 See Marko Milanovic, ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’, European Journal of International Law, vol. 17, 
no. 3, 2006, pp. 553-604. 
153 
 
Genocide Convention, R2P intends to prevent crimes that shock the conscience of 
humankind.  As Rosenberg correctly explains:  
The Genocide Convention grew out of the horrors of the Holocaust and is 
intended to prevent genocide. R2P grew out of the mass atrocities 
committed during the 1990s and is intended to prevent genocide and other 
mass atrocities. In this sense, R2P is the progeny of the Genocide 
Convention reflecting the complex social fabric that now makes up today’s 
gruesome tales of crimes that ‘shock the conscience’ of the world.489 
 
4.4 Protection from mass atrocities and international courts and 
tribunals 
 
Impunity for international crimes and for systematic and widespread 
violations of fundamental human rights is a betrayal of our human solidarity 
with the victims of conflicts to whom we owe a duty of justice, remembrance, 
and compensation. To remember and to bring perpetrators to justice is a 
duty we also owe to our humanity and to the prevention of future violations 
of international humanitarian and human rights law490. 
 
Ensuring that perpetrators of serious crimes are held accountable at both a domestic 
level and an international level is one of the fundamental aspects of protecting civilians 
from mass atrocities. Therefore, when states fail to fulfil their protection obligations, 
and civilians become victims of mass atrocity crimes, there is a duty to ensure that 
there is no impunity for those who commit serious violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, including war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide, and that victims or survivors are given reparation. 
                                                          
489 See Sheri P. Rosenberg, ‘A Framework for Prevention’, Global Responsibility to Protect, vol.1, 2009, pp. 
442-477. 
490 See Cherif M. Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violation of International Humanitarian Law and other Serious 
Violations of Human Rights’. Op.cit. 
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4.4.1 National and international prosecutions  
 
Prosecuting the perpetrators of international crimes was developed and expanded in 
international law following the gravity of crimes committed in World War II. As 
previously mentioned, international criminal law was born out of the horrors of the 
Holocaust which was characterized by the systematic extermination of millions of 
people. In response to the horrors of the Holocaust in Europe and the Japanese crimes 
perpetrated during World War II, the allied powers491 sought to prosecute and to 
punish the major war criminals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against 
peace and conspiracy.492 Therefore, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) known as 
the ‘Nuremberg Tribunal’ and The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE)493 were established to prosecute individuals for those crimes.494 The 
establishment of these international tribunals was of great importance as until that time 
states had a monopoly over criminal jurisdiction concerning international crimes.495  
The end of the Cold War was also a crucial moment which has significantly contributed 
to the effort to create adequate mechanisms for international justice. It is in this context 
that, shocked by the mass killings in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in 
Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council set up two ad hoc tribunals, namely the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),496 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).497 As Cassese observes: 
                                                          
491 After the defeat of Germany in 1945, The United Kingdom, France, the United States and the Soviet Union 
convened at the London Conference to decide the punishment which should be reserved to the High-ranking 
Nazi criminals. 
492 IMT’s Charter, Article 6. 
493 The International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter was approved on 19 January 1946. The Tokyo 
trial started on 3 May 1946 and lasted almost two and a half years. 
494 The International Military Tribunal was established in the summer 1945 and met from 14 November 1945 
to 1 October 1946. 
495 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.323. 
496 UNSC Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993. 
497 UNSC Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. 
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It [the end of the Cold war] a fragmentation of the international community 
and intense disorder which, coupled with rising nationalism and 
fundamentalism, resulted in a spiralling of mostly internal armed conflicts, 
with much bloodshed and cruelty. The ensuing implosion of previously 
multi-ethnic societies led to gross violations of international humanitarian 
law on a scale comparable in some respects to those committed during the 
Second World War…This period is thus characterized by the development 
of institutions empowered to prosecute and punish serious violation of 
international humanitarian law.498 
 
 The ICTY was empowered to exercise jurisdiction over war crimes and human 
rights violations that constitute international crimes allegedly perpetrated in any 
part of the former Yugoslavia after 1 January 1991.499 The ICTR was also limited 
to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in 
Rwanda or in the territory of neighbouring states by Rwandan citizens between 
1 January and 31 December 1994.500 The establishment of the two ad hoc 
criminal tribunals was certainly a reaffirmation of the belief that genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity are human rights violations of extreme 
magnitude that invoke legal responsibility. The ICTY and ICTR have significantly 
contributed to the advancement of legal protection of civilians in armed conflict 
by bringing to justice those who are responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and by rendering justice to victims of massive 
crimes.501 
                                                          
498 Cassese, op. cit., p. 325. 
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501 See Payam Akhavan, ‘Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?’, The 
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Despite the fact that the two ad-hoc tribunals are limited both temporally and 
geographically, they have proved to be effective instruments for preventing 
further ethnic violence and mass violations of human rights.502 Nevertheless, 
there was still the need to render justice to the victims of civil war including in 
Sierra Leone,503 Cambodia,504 East Timor505 and Lebanon.506 This illustrates how 
the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC)507 was a result of a long 
process toward a universal, permanent international criminal court charged with 
trying crimes against international law.  
This was an important advancement and great tool for protecting civilians against 
mass atrocities. As one commentator correctly observes ‘if people responsible 
for these crimes are actually held to account, others may make different 
decisions when weighing the costs of their actions’.508 There is no doubt that the 
establishment of a permanent international court was a strong signal that war 
criminals can no longer count on impunity. Further, as demonstrated earlier, the 
statutes and jurisprudence of these international tribunals and courts had 
considerably contributed to promoting the security of individuals. With jurisdiction 
                                                          
502 Ibid. 
503 In the late1990s and early 2000s the UNSC considered the situation in, among other places, Sierra Leone, 
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The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time, Oxford: Oxford University 
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over genocide, these courts and tribunals have helped in clarifying the elements 
of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It should be noted that 
states have the duty to persecute all persons who have committed genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity while international persecutions is limited 
to policy makers, the leaders and high ranking executors.509 
4.5 Victims of mass atrocities’ reparation and assistance under 
international law  
 
As noted above, in the face of mass atrocities states have the obligation to provide 
protection to their populations including support and redress to victims.  Victims’ rights 
to a remedy is well enshrined in international humanitarian law510 and in a number of 
international human rights standards including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,511 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination,512 the Convention against Torture,513 and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.514  Therefore, states have a duty to provide remedies to victims 
under their jurisdiction. As Bassiouni comments: 
The provisions of a remedy and reparations for victims of these violations 
is fundamental component of the process of restorative justice. To this end, 
states and their national legal systems serve as the primary vehicle for the 
enforcement of human rights and international humanitarian law. 
Accordingly, the existence of a state’s duty to provide a remedy and 
                                                          
509 For more discussion on national and international prosecution, see Cherif M. Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights’. Op.cit. 
510 State’s duty to provide reparations to victims of violation of International Humanitarian law is grounded in 
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511 ICCPR, Article 2. 
512 Article 6. 
513 CAT, Article 14. 
514 CRC, Article 39. In relation to the victim’s rights under international human rights law, see ICRC, 
‘International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict’. 
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reparations forms a cornerstone of establishing accountability for violations 
and achieving justice for victims.515 
While a state’s duty with regard to protection of civilians is well grounded in both 
conventional and customary law, the issue of reparations remains a big challenge. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1927 recognized in the Chorzow Factory 
Case that states have a duty to provide reparations to victims stating that: ‘It is a 
principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation 
to make reparations in adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable 
complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no necessity for this to be 
stated in the convention itself’.516 
Few efforts have been undertaken by states to provide support and reparation to 
victims of mass atrocities and this aspect has been considerably neglected. However, 
the international community has been increasingly concerned with encouraging 
domestic authorities to punish the perpetrators of the mass atrocity crimes and to 
provide reparation to the victims of such acts.517  One of the achievements of the ICC 
is that its mandate includes holding accountable those responsible for genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity and providing support and reparation to 
victims.518 While the Nuremberg Tribunal and other previous international criminal 
tribunals were concentrated on perpetrators and their rightful punishment, the ICC 
gives victims the right to material assistance and reparations.519 The Rome Statute 
makes clear that victims’ rights include obligation to take protective measures and 
assistance. Article 43 (6) of the Rome Statute states that: 
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The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Witnesses Unit within the Registry. 
This Unit shall provide, in consultation with the Office of the Prosecutor, 
protective measures and security arrangements, counselling and other 
appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, 
and others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses. 
The Unit shall include staff with expertise in trauma, including trauma 
related to crimes of sexual violence.520  
The Rome Statute provides that ‘The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect 
the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and 
witnesses’.521 Under Article 75 the court may determine the scope and extent of any 
damage, loss and injury to the victims, and can order convicted persons to make 
appropriate reparations including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.522 This 
article states: 
1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in 
respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. 
On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its 
own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent 
of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the 
principles on which it is acting.  
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court 
may order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund 
provided for in article 79. 
The statute also provides for the creation of a trust fund for the benefit of victims and 
their families by decision of the Assembly of States Parties523. However, the 
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operationalization of victim reparations at the ICC faces numerous challenges. For 
example, in most of the cases which require reparation, states or individuals are 
unable to provide redress to the victims. Moreover, reparations will only be granted to 
victims of crimes for which a person has been convicted. Consequently, the victims of 
crimes that the prosecution has failed to prove are excluded from reparations. 
According to the ICRC report: 
The criminal punishment of war criminal takes places once atrocities have 
been committed, and other several years after the events, but the victims’ 
needs are immediate and require that mechanisms be used which can 
prevent violations and/or halt them during the hostilities. Provision must 
also be made for procedures guaranteeing that the harm that has been 
suffered will be recognized and that due reparation will be awarded 
effectively and rapidly.524 
In many cases victims of mass atrocities remain helpless given the fact that the ICC’s 
prosecutorial strategy focuses on a limited number of crimes committed by small 
groups and many victims are ineligible for reparations.525 As Rehn comments:  
We cannot and should not expect that the ICC and the Trust Fund take over 
the responsibility of States to properly look after their own victimized 
populations. Governments in situation countries maintain the responsibility 
to ensure reparative, restorative and transformational justice on their own 
territories. If so desired, the international community can play a supporting 
role. The Trust Fund for Victims may then serve as a source of experience 
and expertise.526 
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This statement is logical since the ICC can only exercise its jurisdiction where the state 
of which the accused is a national, and is unable or unwilling to prosecute according 
to the principle of complementarity. Nevertheless, the Trust Fund for Victims has 
provided assistance to several thousand victims in Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Some programmes were therefore developed to help victims 
to rebuild their lives and to regain their dignity.527 
However, some writers such as Bassiouni emphasise others mechanisms of 
reparations which include historical record of the wrongful acts and a public 
acknowledgement of the violations. As he comments:   
Monetary compensation should not, however, be deemed the only available 
remedy. Non-monetary forms of compensation should also be developed, 
particularly in societies where the economy is unable to absorb the loss of 
large monetary sums. The various modalities of reparation do not 
exclusively involve some form of valuable consideration or social service to 
redress a past harm. Rather, reparation could also include an accurate 
historical record of the wrongful acts and a public acknowledgement of the 
violations.528 
While such mechanism may certainly help to redress the harm in the long term, 
in most of the cases, victims are in actual need of aid to rebuild their life.  
4.6 Chapter conclusions 
  
Despite the rules laid down by international humanitarian law and human rights law to 
protect civilians against the effect of hostilities, thousands of civilians are nevertheless 
deliberately targeted by armed groups. Civilians continue to be victims of violence 
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causing serious bodily and mental harm through rape, torture, killing, abduction and 
forced displacement. Unfortunately, in modern conflicts, civilians being targeted by 
state and non-state forces has become a rule rather than the exception.529 This has 
been an increasing and alarming phenomenon. As the preamble of the Rome Statute 
reminds us ‘millions of children, women and men have been victims of unimaginable 
atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity’. Putting an end to impunity 
and thus contributing to the prevention of futures crimes was one of the major goals 
of the ICC. 
As indicated throughout this chapter, international humanitarian law, international 
rights law and international criminal law provide extensive protection to civilians 
against atrocity crimes. However, numerous challenges impede the implementation of 
humanitarian and human rights rules. The challenges are summarized best in a recent 
ICRC report which acknowledged that the inability to respect the fundamental rules of 
international  humanitarian law applicable to protection of civilians against the effect 
of hostilities continue to be the predominant cause of civilians’ suffering during armed 
conflict.530 The report argued that the perennial problem is not the insufficiency or 
absence of rules but the lack of adequate infrastructures for the implementation of the 
law coupled with lack of political will. It further identified several consequences in 
human terms due to the reality of current armed conflicts which are characterized by 
commission of atrocity crimes against civilians. 
As demonstrated above, the responsibility to prevent and to protect mass atrocities 
articulated in R2P is firmly grounded in international law. Moreover, there is a 
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commitment on behalf of the world community to continue to consider the R2P as a 
developing norm which requires states to prevent and protect populations from mass 
atrocities. Since prevention of mass human rights atrocities constitutes the main 
dimension of R2P, both individual states and the international community are required 
to build capacity to protect population from mass atrocities. Therefore, the R2P 
framework requires individual states to take adequate measures to prevent the acts 
that it addresses and the international community to take concrete action to assist 
states to prevent atrocity crimes. However, in the situation that preventive measures 
have failed and mass atrocities have occurred, under R2P pillar 3 the international 
community should react in timely and decisive manner in order to halt mass atrocities 
and to make sure that the perpetrators are punished. The implementation of these 
requirements is, as will be seen in the coming chapters, crucial in strengthening the 
protection of civilians from mass atrocities. While R2P was conceived to address 
conflicts characterized by the commission of mass atrocities, it remains unclear when 
and how it should apply to such conflicts. This affirmation will be investigated in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo case study in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5: The Case Study: The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Crisis 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
It is the aim of Part II of this thesis to apply the legal and normative framework, 
particularly R2P, to the case study with the objective of analysing the efficacy and 
workability of this framework. The following chapter will therefore apply the legal 
framework as set out in the theoretical part of this dissertation in relation to protection 
of civilians from mass atrocities to the case of the civilian population in Eastern DRC. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo crisis was chosen as a case study because it 
stands out as one of the most complex and difficult situations of the protection of 
civilians. Although the mandate of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the 
DRC since 1999 has moved from monitoring a ceasefire agreement to providing direct 
protection to civilian population under imminent physical threat,531 violence against 
civilians including murder, rape, recruitment and use of child soldiers and forced 
displacement continue unabated.532  
Fundamentally, the DRC is an appropriate test case to illustrate the enormous 
difficulties of implementing R2P to address the most atrocious crimes in a long-term 
conflict. In order to fully appreciate whether R2P does contribute to how the conflict is 
addressed in that region, an historical overview of the DRC conflict and the origin of 
the conflict that has gripped the country for 17 years will first be provided. Particular 
attention is paid to the role that FDLR and other armed groups have played in 
fomenting tensions in the country. After describing how and why the eastern provinces 
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continue to be the epicentre of the conflict, the chapter describes the effects of the 
conflict on the civilian population, highlighting that the vast majority of the atrocities 
are committed against protected persons as defined in the Geneva Conventions.  It 
concludes with an analysis of the Congolese government’s response to the conflict 
and its responsibility to protect its population from mass atrocities. 
5.1 Background 
 
       The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one of the largest countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. It is located in the central part of the continent with a population 
estimated at 71 million.533 Its capital is Kinshasa and it has borders with the Republic 
of Congo, Central African Republic, Zambia, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Sudan. The major languages spoken are French, Lingala, Swahili, 
Kikongo and Tshiluba.534 An estimated 80 percent of the population is Christian, 10 
percent follow indigenous faiths, and 10 percent are Muslims. Life expectancy for 
males is 47 years and for females it is 51 years.535 The DRC has a vast mineral wealth 
including cobalt, copper, diamond, gold, silver, manganese, zinc, tin, tantalum, 
petroleum, uranium etc.536 Unfortunately, the illicit exploitation and trade of natural 
resources constitute one of the major factors fuelling the conflict in the DRC.537 Thus, 
the country has been an epicentre of a continuing conflict for almost two decades; the 
struggle for power and access to resources between Congolese and foreign armed 
groups has kept the region in a state of conflict.  
                                                          
533 World Health Organization (WHO), countries’ statistics, DRC available at 
http://www.who.int/countries/cod/en/. 
534 Ibid. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Further information available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/cg.html, accessed on 18 February 2013. 
537 UN. Doc. S/RES/2053, 2012, 27 June 2012. 
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5.2 A Brief political and conflict history538 
5.2.1. Political background 
The DRC, formerly Zaire, was ruled by Belgium from 1908 until its independence on 
30 June  1960. Joseph Kasavubu became President and Patrice Lumumba the first 
Prime Minister.539 However, a few days after the transferal of power from Belgium to 
the Congolsese government, the army mutinied  and numerous attacks were launched 
against European, Belgians in particular. In response to the crisis, Belgium sent 
paratroops to  Congo to protect its citizen without the consent of the Congolese 
government. This was considered as an act of aggression as Congo was an 
independent country. The situation deteriorated when Moise Tshombe declared the 
mineral-rich province of Katanga independent of the Republic of Congo. In response, 
Lumumba requested the intervention of the United Nations in order to re-establish 
peace and to put down a secessionist movement in Katanga.540 In its Resolution 143 
adopted on 14 July 1960, the Security Council called upon the Government of Belgium 
to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of Congo and decided to 
provide the Government of Congo with military assistance.541 Meanwhile, Lumumba 
was abducted and murdered by mercenaries on 17 January 1961. In July 1961, a UN 
peacekeeping force OPERATIONS DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO (ONUC) was 
                                                          
538 See Jean-François Hugo, La République Démocratique du Congo : Une Guerre Inconnue 2006, 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=359, accessed  on 23 January  2013.  
539 Ibid.  
540 In a cable sent to the UN Secretary-General, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba accused 
the Belgian Government of having carefully prepared the secession of Katanga and underlined the fact that the 
purpose of asking for military assistance was to protect the national territory of the Congo against the external 
aggression which is a threat to international peace and security. See UN Doc S/4382, 1960.  
541 UN Security Council, Resolution 143, 1960 of 14 July 1960, S/RE/143, 1960, available at: 
http://wwww.refworld.org/docid/3b00f00d50.html, accessed 3 May 2014. This was the first of a series of 
Security Council resolutions authorizing the deployment of UN-led military forces to assist the Republic of 
Congo. For example, Security Council Resolution 161, 1961 adopted on 21 February 1961; Resolution 169, 
1961. 
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deployed in Congo with a mandate to oversee the withdrawal of Belgian troops and to 
assist the Congolese government in restoring law and order. The operation was 
considered as successful by many people as Dobbins has underlined: ‘Over the next 
three years, UN troops forced the removal of foreign mercenaries and suppressed the 
Katanga secession while civil elements of the mission provided a wide range of 
humanitarian, economic, and civil assistance to the new regime. Measured against the 
bottom-line requirements of the international community—that decolonization 
proceed, colonial and mercenary troops depart, and the Congo remain intact—the 
United Nations was largely successful’.542 However, despite the success of the 
intervention, a number of controversies emerged as to the costs of the operation and 
the partiality of the United Nations. Some people for example questioned the role of 
the United Nations in the execution of Patrice Lumumba. According to some authors, 
these controversies have severely overshadowed the accomplishments of the  United 
Nations in Congo.  However, following the United Nations’ departure the new nation 
was continuously threathened by a vicious civil conflict. In 1965, following the power 
struggle between Moise Tshombe and President Kasavubu, Lieutenant General 
Joseph Désiré Mobutu who was commander in chief of the national army took power. 
After three decades of misruling the country, Laurent Désiré Kabila who had fought 
alongside the Lumumbaist forces during the mid-1960s following the assassination of 
Lumumba, created a base in eastern DRC  and looked forward to overthrow 
Mobutu.543 In May 1997,  helped by the Rwandan and Ugandan troops, Kabila 
marched into the capital Kinshasa and ousted Mobutu from power. Then, the new 
government decided to change the country’s name from Zaire to Democratic Republic 
                                                          
542 See  James Dobbins et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq, Santa Monica : RAND 
Corporation, 2005, pp 5-27. 
543 Ibid. 
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of the Congo (DRC). On 16 January 2001, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated 
and his 29 year old son Joseph Kabila was appointed to assume presidency. 
5.2.2 Background to the conflicts in the DRC544 
 
Following the Hutu genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994, over two million of 
the Hutu fled Rwanda and sought asylum in Eastern Zaire.545 Many authors believe 
that this was the crucial point of the crisis in Zaire. In fact, shelter was provided not 
only to the civilians who were fleeing the genocide but also to the Rwandan Hutu 
military and the extremist Guerilla group called Interahamwe.546 The United Nations, 
instead of disarming the Rwandan Hutu army when they opened a humanitarian 
corridor as required by international law, let them enter the Zairian territory with 
weapons and ammunition, from which they often launched attacks on Rwanda.547  This 
was a critical juncture in the history of the crisis in the Great Lakes. 548  
The relationship between Rwanda and Zaire deteriorated as the former accused the 
latter of failing to stop Interahamwe incursions in Rwanda from refugee camps in Kivu 
provinces.549 In October 1996, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, Laurent Desiré 
Kabila announced the creation of a rebellion movement led by him called Alliance des 
                                                          
544 Information for this short history of the conflict in the DRC has been drawn, in part, from  Jean-François 
Hugo, La République Démocratique du Congo : Une Guerre Inconnue 2006, Paris: Michalon, 2006. See  also 
Jacques Morel, La France au Cœur du Génocide des Tutsis, Paris: L’Esprit Frappeur, 2010. 
545 Jacques Morel, La France au Cœur du Génocide des Tutsis, Paris: L’Esprit Frappeur, 2010. 
546 For further details see Enough, ‘Roots of the Crisis- Congo’ available at 
http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict_areas/eastern_congo/roots-crisis, last accessed 31 August 2013. 
547 See John Pomfret, ‘Aid Dilemma: Keeping It From the Oppressors; UN, Charities Find Crises Make Them 
Tools of War’, Washington Post, 23 Sept. 1997. 
548 See for example Jean-François Hugo, La République Démocratique du Congo : Une guerre 
Inconnue,op.cit.; Ephrem Libutu la Mboga, Espoirs déçus en République Démocratique du Congo, Paris : 
Harmattan, 2011. 
549 See John Pomfret, ‘Aid Dilemma: Keeping it from the Oppressor; UN Charities Find Crises make Them 
Tools of War’, Washington Post, Sept. 1997. 
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Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire (AFDL).550 The AFDL along 
with the Rwandan and Ugandan troops advanced quickly across the country until they 
marched into the capital Kinshasa and ousted Mobutu from power in May 1997. Then, 
the new government decided to change the country’s name from Zaire to Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC).551 According to an Amnesty International report552 
during a seven-month war, tens of thousands of civilians were killed; women and girls 
were raped and thousands of children were forced to take active part in hostilities. 
Indeed, this period was marked by widespread attacks against the Tutsi and 
Banyamulenge population, principally in the eastern region of the country.553 
A new conflict erupted in August 1998, when Laurent Kabila decided to separate with 
his allies, Rwanda and Uganda. Due to internal pressure from the population, Kabila 
ordered all foreign troops that brought him to power out of the country.554 In fact, when 
Kabila decided to purge Rwandan personalities from the government, two camps 
started to develop within the DRC. The locally called ‘authentic Congolese’ on one 
side and the Tutsi Rwandan and Banyamunlenge555 on the other side. This situation 
triggered the launch of new rebellion against the Kabila regime with the intention of 
ousting him.556 The rebellion movement was mainly composed of the Rassemblement 
                                                          
550 See Jean-François Hugo, op. cit. 
551 Ibid. 
552 See DRC reports entitled ‘Deadly alliances in Congolese forests’, AI Index: AFR 62/18/98, published on 15 
may 1998. 
553 See Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Tutsis in the Dem. Rep. of the Congo, 2004, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/469f388115.html   
554 See International Crisis Group, Africa’s Seven-Nation War, Democratic Republic of Congo, Africa Report 
No. 4, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/004-africas-seven-
nation-war.aspx, accessed on 01 February 2013. 
555 Banyamulenge are descendants of Rwandan migrants who had settled on the South Kivu Mulenge 
mountain during the colonial period. They took up arms alongside Kabila in 1996 to vindicate their rights to the 
Congolese citizenship. 
556 See International crisis Group, North Kivu, into the Quagmire? An Overview of the Current Crisis in North 
Kivu, Africa Report No. 1, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-
congo/001-north-kivu-into-the-quagmire-an-overview-of-the-current-crisis.aspx, accessed on 01 February 
2013. 
170 
 
Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) and Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo 
(MLC) in the eastern region557 was supported by Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda.558 
While Rwandan, Burundian and Ugandan troops fought alongside the rebel groups, 
Kabila called on Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. Acting in the name of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe sent 
troops which stopped the rapid advance of rebels toward Kinshasa.559 Apparently, 
Chadian troops were also fighting alongside Congolese troops.560 Laurent Kabila also 
armed militias called Mai-Mai561 and the Hutu Interahamwe to fight the rebels.562 Given 
the numerous actors involved in the conflict, this war was referred to as the Congo 
Second War or the African World War.563 In 1999, the country was divided into three 
sections; the RCD had control over the eastern part of the country, MLC occupied 
northern DRC and the rest was controlled by Kinshasa.  During this period, civilians 
were targeted and brutalized by all warrior parties.  Amnesty International for example 
has noted that: 
Many unarmed civilians were killed as a result of direct or discriminate 
attacks. Some of the victims were reportedly killed by government forces 
who suspected them of supporting armed opposition groups and their allies. 
                                                          
557 The rebellion movement incorporated former Mobutu politicians and army officers, Congolese Tutsis 
Banyamulenge and former FDLR leaders who had deserted and joined the rebellion. 
558 Uganda and Rwanda were playing a key role behind the rebels groups. However, disagreement over the 
control of natural resources degenerated between Rwanda and Uganda and led to the clashes between 
Ugandan and Rwandan troops in eastern DRC. See http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-
issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/dr-congo.aspx, accessed 01 February 2013. 
559 See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html, accessed on 01 February 
2013. This conflict was called ‘African World War’ by many commentators as it involved almost a dozen African 
countries. 
560 Ibid. It has been argued that Libya and Sudan have also provided considerable support to Kabila.  
561 Mai-Mai is a Congolese militia group active in the DRC since 1998. Both their name and origin is derived 
from anti-colonial uprisings in East Africa at the beginning of the XXth century. ‘Mai’ or ‘Maji’ is Swahili word 
meaning ‘water’ for these combatants were said to use it along with or other medicines to protect themselves 
against the enemy’s bullets (or to turn the enemy’s bullets into water). See James Giblin and Jamie Monson 
(eds.), Maji Maji. Lifting the Fog of War, African Social Studies Series, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010. 
562 http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/drc/Drc005-01.htm, accessed on 01 February 2013. 
563 See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html, accessed on 01 February 
2013. 
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Many civilians were reportedly killed when government aircraft 
indiscriminately bombed areas in which there were high concentrations of 
unarmed civilians. Armed opposition groups and its allied foreign forces 
also deliberately killed and abducted unarmed civilians including many 
women.564 
In fact, the involvement of several government armies and multiple militia groups led 
to the outbreak of several armed conflicts around the country, characterized by serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.565 In this period, 
civilians who were believed to be Tutsis were persecuted across the whole territory of 
the country. 566 In order to put an end to this conflict, a mediation was initiated by the 
SADC, led by Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, assisted by Tanzania President 
Benjamin Mkapa and Joaquim Chissano, President of Mozambique. The mediation 
culminated in a peace agreement in Lusaka (Zambia) on 10 July 1999.567 Signed 
between the major antagonists in the conflict, including the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Uganda, Angola, Namibia and Uganda, the agreement called for the immediate 
cessation of hostilities within, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC, cessation 
of attacks against the civilian population and disarmament of militia forces. The 
agreement also contained a proposal for the deployment of a United Nations force in 
collaboration with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to oversee the cease-fire.568  
                                                          
564 See Amnesty International Report 2000-Congo (Democratic Republic of the), 1 June 2000, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa0e34.htlm,  accessed 31 August 2013. 
565 See United Nations Human Right, office of the High Commissioner, Report of the Mapping Exercise 
documenting the most serious violation of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within 
the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2013’, August 2010. 
566 Ibid. 
567 Officially the war ended with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July 1999, which MONUC was initially 
designed and deployed to monitor, but widespread fighting continued. Additional agreements were signed, 
including the Sun City Agreement, the Pretoria Accord, and the Luanda agreement in 2002, which eventually 
led to the formal withdrawal of most foreign forces by mid-2003. 
 568 Lusaka ceasefire Agreement, available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/a/af/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/2lusaka.pdf, accessed on 01 February 2013. See also 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/005-democratic-republic-of-congo-an-
analysis-of-the-agreement-and-prospects-for-peace.aspx, accessed on 01 February 2013. 
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The signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was welcomed as a significant step in 
the resolution of the conflict in the Great Lakes region, particularly in the DRC. As Kofi 
Annan noted ‘the success of the Congolese parties and other governments involved 
in arriving at a peace agreement can be viewed as a major first step toward an 
eventual recovery…the international community and the United Nations should 
therefore do everything in their power to assist the Congolese government, parties, 
and people, as well as the other governments involved, in achieving a peaceful 
solution’.569  
In August the agreement was endorsed by the two major rebel groups, namely RCD 
and MLC after having initially refused to sign.570 Despite the fact that the framework of 
the agreement was considered as complex and ambitious,571 this was the first time 
since the beginning of the conflict that all belligerents agreed on the modalities of 
peaceful resolutions of the crisis. However the Lusaka agreement did not end the 
hostilities in the DRC, the fighting continued in the eastern provinces in which civilians 
accounted for the vast majority of casualties; women, children and other vulnerable 
groups were particularly targeted.572  
 On 16 January 2001, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his 29 year old 
son Joseph Kabila was appointed to assume presidency.573 Following the 
                                                          
569 UN Doc. S/1999/790, 15 July 1999. 
570 International Crisis Group, DRC: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace, Africa Report no. 
5, 20 August 1999, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/005-
democratic-republic-of-congo-an-analysis-of-the-agreement-and-prospects-for-peace.aspx, accessed on 01 
February 2013. 
571 For example Joseph Kabila in his speech at the SADC meeting in 2002 argued that the Lusaka Agreement 
contained obstacles to its own implementation. See Joseph Kabila, « Allocution du Président de la République 
Démocratique du Congo au Sommet des Chefs d’Etats de la SADC », Blantyre, Malawi, 14 janvier 2002; Also 
see H. Weiss, ‘War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, available at 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomt/AD_issues/amdipl_16/weis/weiss. 
572 See UN Doc. S/RES/1265, 1999, 17 September 1999. 
573 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html, accessed on 01 February 
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assassination of Laurent Kabila, peace talks were re-launched and led to Pretoria 
agreement signed on 30 July 2002 in South Africa.574 The Pretoria accords resulted in 
Rwandan and Ugandan troop’s withdrawal from the DRC in late 2002. Although some 
progress was reported from both Kigali and Kinshasa,575 Kabila government did not 
manage to disarm the Rwandan Hutu rebels (FDLR) and Rwanda and Uganda 
continued to keep their influence in eastern DRC. 
The new president Joseph Kabila however, agreed to the deployment of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping Mission to monitor the agreement. The International 
Congolese Dialogue held in Sun City led to the formation of a government of national 
unity composed of representatives of the former government’s major armed groups, 
opposition political parties and civil society in July 2003.576 The Sun City peace 
agreement signed in South Africa in 2003 brought a significant security situation in the 
country which led to the first democratically presidential election in 2006.577 However, 
the agreement focused on stability at national level but failed to address several issues 
raised by local conflicts.578 The most serious consequences of this failure are by far in 
the eastern part of the country. 
                                                          
574 Ibid. 
575 One of the significant actions of the Pretoria agreement signed between Rwanda and DRC to end 
hostilities was the implementation of the Joint Verification Mechanism signed on 22 September 2004 which 
aims to deal with the issue of the Interahamwe and the serious threats that they pose to the regional stability. 
Thus, in term to neutralize those negative forces, a Tripartite Joint Commission was established with the aim of 
disarming, demobilizing and repatriating foreign armed groups. Both Rwanda and DRC has shown interest in 
finding a solution on security matters as one writer observed: ‘The governments of Rwanda and DRC 
cooperate on a wide range of issues, including on security matters. Rwanda helped facilitate dialogue between 
the Kabila government an some political groups in DRC on issues related to the 2006 elections. Moreover, 
Rwanda agreed to help find a political solution with General Nkunda, as requested by President Kabila’. See 
Ted Dagne, The Democratic Republic of Congo: background and Current Developments, Congressional 
research Service, 2010. 
576 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/key-issues/research-resources/conflict-histories/dr-
congo.aspx, accessed on 01 February 2013. 
577 Ibid. 
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5.3 Conflicts in the eastern provinces 
 
Despite several peace agreements in the DRC and relative stability, the situation 
remains extremely confused in the eastern region of the country, which has been the 
epicentre of violence since the conflict began and where numerous armed groups are 
still operating. While a relative stability prevails in a major part of the DRC, tensions 
remains very high in this region, particularly in North and South Kivus. This area has 
been the main theatre for confrontation between local warlords, national and even 
regional protagonists. This can be considered as an extension of the Rwandan, 
Burundian and Ugandan civil wars. According to a Human Rights Watch report, 
eastern DRC has seen a rise in inter-ethnic violence since the beginning of the 
conflict.579 In fact, insecurity stems from several militia groups, mainly in the South and 
North Kivu and Orientale province, along with the Rwandan Hutu militia of the 
Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), the Ugandan Lord’ Resistance Army 
(LRA), the Burundian rebel group Forces de Defence de la Démocratie (FDD) and the 
M23 rebellion movement. 580 However, much of the insecurity is also created by the 
FARDC itself, not only through military clashes with the militia groups but through 
harassment of the civilian population.581  
Following the agreement signed in Pretoria on 30 July 2002 in which Rwanda engaged 
to withdraw its troops from the DRC and Kabila government to disarm the Rwandan 
                                                          
579 See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in the DRC, available at http://www.hrw.org/drc, accessed on 17 
October 2013. 
580 The leaders of Uganda’s Resistance Army (LRA) have established their base in the Oriental province 
(North-Eastern Congo) where they continue to pose a regional threat to the civilian population. Grave 
violations against children and women committed by the LRA are frequently reported by many organizations. 
Despite the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against its leader Joseph Kony, the rebel 
groups remains actively operating in the DRC, the central African Republic, and South Sudan. For more 
information see ‘Africa’s Most wanted: Uganda, Sudan and Congo’, The Economist, 3 June 2006. 
581 For additional information see for example Monika Thakur, ‘Demilitarising Militias in the Kivu (Eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo),’African Security Review, vol. 17, no. 1, Institute for Security Studies. 
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Hutu rebels (FDLR), some progress was reported from both Kigali and Kinshasa. 
However, despite the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Congolese territory due to 
the international community pressure, its presence and influence on the ground 
remained high. According to Human Rights Watch, Kigali has found an alternative to 
the withdrawal of its army by using a Congolese ally, the Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Democratie (RCD). While several reports were accusing Kigali of being 
motivated by the exploitation of mineral resources in the region, Kigali maintained that 
there was a need to secure its borders as its security was threatened by interahamwe 
militias.582. Kinshasa, on the other side continued to give military support to the Mai 
Mai militias in order to weaken Rwandan influence in the Kivus. However, Kinshasa 
appeared unwilling and incapable of disarming and neutralizing the Rwandan Hutu 
rebels (FDLR). Therefore, Kigali accused the Congolese government of fuelling the 
offensive and threatened to redeploy its troops into the eastern DRC to prevent the 
Rwandan Hutu rebels (FDLR) from infiltrating into Rwanda. 
In 2004, rebel soldiers loyal to dissident General Laurent Nkunda, a former military 
officer of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD-Goma) and Colonel 
Jules Mutebusi, clashed with the FARDC in the city of Bukavu South Kivu’s capital.583 
Nkunda and his troops captured the town on 2 June 2004 after the ill–equipped 
Congolese troops decided to flee as they could not resist the thousands of rebels 
leaving the civilians population to defend themselves.584 Nkunda claimed he was 
attempting to prevent genocide against the Banyamulenge who were threatened by 
                                                          
582 See Global Issues, ‘The Democratic Republic of Congo’, available at http:// 
www.globalissues.org/article/87/the-democratic-republic-of-congo, last accessed 31 August 2013. 
583 See International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 91, The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, 30 
March 2005. 
584 See Berkman and Holt, 2006, p.164. 
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FDLR.585 He took advantage of the weakness of the state characterized by an ill-
disciplined army, a lack of reliable security and total impunity.586 In fact, there was an 
anti-Tutsi sentiment in the eastern population. According to Human Rights Watch, 
several Tutsi civilians including women and children were killed by the national army 
and around 3,000 were forced to flee their home.587 This was followed by 
indiscriminate killings and the systematic rape of many women and girls was used as 
a weapon of war.588 The attack against Banyamulenge who had fled to Gatumba 
refugee camp in Burundi resulted in the killing of 160 civilians. Many of them were 
burned to death in their sleep. This also hardened General Nkunda’s resentment that 
genocide against Tutsis was occuring.589 
Under the auspices of Rwanda, an agreement was concluded between Kabila and 
Nkunda for the progressive integration of Nkunda’s troops into the Congolese armed 
forces known locally as mixage.590 However, the agreement did not succeed as 
Nkunda was accused by his counterparts of betrayal and they threatened to stop 
supporting him.591 This led to the collapse of the agreement in May 2007. The failure 
was quite evident since the agreement failed to address the local root causes of the 
conflict and to outline the modalities needed to neutralize the Rwandan rebel group 
                                                          
585 Interview with a FARDC official, Bukavu, 16 October 2012. 
586 Ibid. 
587 ‘DR Congo: War Crimes in Bukavu’, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, June 2004. 
588 See International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 91, The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, 30 
March 2005. 
589 Burundi’s National Liberation Front (FLN) has claimed the responsibility for the attack. However, Nkunda 
continue to claim that the massacre was planned by the Congolese government. According to a United Nations 
Investigation conclusion, there were no sufficient elements that the killings were planned by the Congolese 
government.     
590 International Crisis Group, ‘Congo Bringing Peace to North Kivu’, Africa Report no. 133, 31 October 2007. 
591 Interview with M23 officials, October 2012. 
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Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) without putting the civilian 
population at risk.592  
In the second half of 2008, violent fighting broke out between Laurent Nkunda militias 
called the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) and the DRC 
Armed Forces (FARDC) in the province of North Kivu593. Mai-Mai militias and 
Rwandan Hutu rebels (FDLR) were fighting alongside the Congolese troops.  Many 
small towns were captured by the CNDP and the Congolese forces were defeated in 
many areas.594 The conflict claimed at least 150 civilians. After Mai-Mai militias 
defeated by the CNDP had retreated from the town of Kiwanja, some civilians who 
were suspected of being members or collaborators of the militias were systematically 
executed as they were suspected of supporting the Mai-Mai militias.595The build up to 
the massacre started on 28-29 October, when the CNDP overcame government forces 
and took control of Kiwanja, followed by an attack on 4 November 2008 by pro-
government Mayi Mayi militia. The CNDP regrouped and counter-attacked without 
giving prior warning to civilians. At roughly 5am on 5 November, the CNDP started its 
offensive and by roughly 2pm, had retaken Kiwanja while the Mai Mai fled to position 
nearby. The CNDP reportedly used weapons such as mortars and rockets during the 
offensive. Once in control of Kiwanja, the CNDP undertook a systematic reprisal 
operation against civilians, going from house to house through the Buturande and 
Mabungo districts in the centre of the town from late afternoon until the following 
                                                          
592 For more information see International Crisis Group, ‘Congo Bringing Peace to North Kivu’, Africa Report, 
no. 133, 31 October 2007. 
593 International Crisis Group, Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report, No. 133, 31 October 2007. 
594 For more information see Human Rights Watch report, ‘Killing in Kiwanja’: UN’s inability to protect 
civilians’, December 2008. 
595 Ibid. 
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morning. By 6 November, some 150 people had been killed, most of them Nande and 
Hutu victims of unlawful killings by the CNDP. 
According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, most of the killings 
were perpetrated by CNDP troops under the command of Colonel Sultani Makenga. 
As the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay comments:596 
The actions of the CNDP could well amount to war crimes or crimes against 
humanity, and are part of a self-perpetuating pattern of brutality in eastern 
DRC which continues to go largely unpunished. I am deeply concerned that 
members of the CNDP who may be implicated in these crimes - especially 
Bosco Ntaganda, against whom there was already an International Criminal 
Court arrest warrant - are either still at large, or have even been absorbed 
into the FARDC. 
 
A recent episode of conflict in eastern DRC broke out in April 2012 when a group of 
soldiers who mutinied from the DRC national army created a rebellion movement 
called M23.597 According to M-23 officials, rather than effectively implementing the 23 
March 2009 peace agreement, the Congolese government has instead only feigned 
the integration of the CNDP into political institutions.598 One of its leaders, Col. 
Makenga Sultani, argued that the mutiny was due to the failure of the Congolese 
                                                          
596 See Joint OHCHR/MONUC Human Rights Office in The DRC, Consolidated Report on Investigation 
Conducted by UN Joint HRO Into Grave Human Rights Abuses Committed in Kiwanja North Kivu, in November 
2008, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/Kiwanja_Report_September2009.pdf, 
accessed on 19 March 2013. 
597 M23 refers to the date peace accords were signed 23 March 2009 between the Congolese government 
and the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a rebel group led by Laurent Nkunda. Under 
the accords, former fighters were supposed to have been integrated into national army. But some of them say 
they were not treated fairly, and that the peace treaty was never fully put into effect. This was apparently the 
reason that pushed them to defect from the government army and to form the M23 movement. According to 
the UN Security Council’s Group of Experts, M23 movement is believed to be supported by Rwanda and 
Uganda by providing it with arms, support and soldiers. However, both countries have strongly denied this 
allegation rejecting the veracity of the report. It should be also noted that Bosco Ntaganda who is now wanted 
by the international Criminal Court (ICC) is one of the officials of the M23 movement. 
598 Interview with M23 officials. 
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government to implement the 2009 peace agreement and the grievances of former 
CNDP members and the Tutsi community into the Congolese army.599 
Likewise the group appears to have only pretended to integrate into the Congolese 
army. The Journalist Colette Braeckman states that the former CNDP fighters had 
created an army within the army and that they refused to be ruled as the other regular 
FARDC soldiers. For example, they did not want to be removed from their eastern 
provinces to be sent to other parts of the country as was normally the case for the 
other battalions. Furthermore, some of their officers, such as Bosco Ntaganda, were 
suspected of atrocities and mass killings against the civilian populations.600  
However, some commentators argued that this rebellion was created when, urged by 
the international community, Joseph Kabila demonstrated his willingness to arrest 
Bosco Ntaganda, who then decided to leave Goma along with his men and 
mutinied.601 After heavy fighting against the Congolese troops the M23 grew in power 
and seized a part of North Kivu’s territory in which it created its own administration and 
its own financing system. Meanwhile Mai-Mai groups were expanding in rural areas 
where they also committed atrocities that exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions.602 
On 15 November 2012, heavy fighting broke out between the M-23 rebels and the 
Congolese army which led to the capture of Goma. According to the United Nation’s 
group of experts, M-23 was backed by both Rwanda and Uganda with recruitment and 
ammunitions.603 However, Kigali and Kampala vehemently rejected the accusations. 
                                                          
599 Interview with the author. 
600 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/afrique/region/2012/07/120711_rdc_ntaganda_portrait.shtml, accessed on 23 
January 2013. 
601 See http://blog.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/2012/07/16/limprudence-de-kinshasa-cest-davoir-voulu-
demanteler-larmee-dans-larmee/, accessed on 23 January 2013. 
602 Ibid. 
603 See UN. Doc. S/2012/348, 27 June 2012; UN.Doc. S/2012/843, 15 November 2012. 
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It should be noted that there was no consensus among the Security Council members 
about the alleged support of Rwanda and Uganda to the M-23 rebels. Apparently, the 
Council was divided due to political, economical and diplomatical interests of its 
members in the Great Lakes region.604 
5.4 The effects of the conflict on the civilian population 
 
The continuing DRC crisis which has claimed five million lives has been devastating 
for the civilian population who are systematically targeted by all protagonists of the 
conflict.605 Widespread and systematic sexual violence against women, abduction, 
killings, torture, arbitrary detention, extra judiciary executions and other atrocity crimes 
form part of everyday life of the population, particularly in eastern DRC.606  A report 
produced by a United Nations expert group in 2010 has shown evidence of serious 
violation of human rights and humanitarian law allegedly committed by all parties in 
the conflict. In this report, the experts state that armed groups such as the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) and the Democratic Force for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR) had committed atrocities to the civilian population which amount to grave 
breaches of international humanitarian law and in some instances may constitute 
crimes against humanity.607 They also found that members of the Congolese force 
(FARDC), the National Police, the National Intelligence and other armed groups are 
                                                          
604 Interview with a French Diplomate, January 2013. 
605 See for example, Anna Maeld, ‘Rape as Weapon of War in the Eastern DRC? The Victim Perspective’, 
Human Right Quartely, vol. 33, No. 1, February 201,1 pp. 128-1476; T. Paul Cox, ‘Farming the Battlefield: The 
Meanings of War, Cattle and Soil in South Kivu, DRC’; Jon Lunn, ‘The African Great Lakes Region: An End to 
Conflict?’International Affairs and Defense Section; Human Rights Watch, ‘You Will be Punished’, Attacks On 
Civilians In Eastern Congo, Dec.2009; Jeffrey Gettleman, Congo: ’UN’s Crowning Failure’; Peacekeepers 
Incapable of Protecting Civilians From Sexual Violence’, International Herald Tribune, 5 Oct. 2010. 
606 See UN. Doc. S/RES/2053, 2012, 27 June 2012. 
607 Second Joint Report of seven United Nations Experts on the Situation in the Democratic republic of Congo, 
A/HRC/13/63, 8 March 2010. 
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also responsible for sexual violence, summary execution, torture and ill-treatment, 
abduction and use of children as soldiers, and pillage.608  
The conclusions of several other studies on human rights violations in eastern DRC 
including this author, after research and interviews conducted in North and South 
Kivus with eyewitnesses, survivors, local authorities, representatives of international 
and national NGOs follow the same pattern. While crimes under international human 
rights and humanitarian law have been and continue to be committed on a large scale 
by armed groups and the Congolese army, this author focuses on specific cases of 
serious violations that illustrate that this conflict is one of those that  R2P was designed 
to address. 
5.4.1 Rape and other forms of sexual violence  
 
Heavy fighting in the DRC occasionally makes the news, but systematic 
and widespread crimes against humanity simmer below surface. 
Congolese women and girls in particular bear the vicious brunt of this crisis. 
Without question, eastern Congo right now is the worst place in the World 
to be a woman or a girl- perhaps ever. Sexual violence and rape occur on 
a scale seen nowhere else on earth. Violence against women is intended 
to mutilate and humiliate. Rape as a weapon of war –defined by the United 
Nations as a war crime-is causing the near total destruction of women, their 
family and their communities.609 
Unfortunately, the above statement made five years ago continues to be the reality 
today. In recent years, many reports of women and girls who have been raped in 
eastern DRC have gained attention from the media and the international 
                                                          
608 Ibid. 
609 See Enough, ‘Congressional Human Rights Caucus Briefings on the Democratic Republic of Congo’, March 
6, 2008, available at http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/congressional-human-rights-caucus-briefing-
democratic-republic-congo. 
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community.610 In fact, the DRC conflict is particularly characterized by systematic use 
of rape and sexual assault allegedly by all armed forces. It is in this context that DRC 
has been described as the ‘rape capital of the world’611 and the worst place in the world 
to be a woman or girl.612 While some sources reveal the rape of men, 613 rape forms 
part of the daily reality for women in eastern DRC, where tens of thousands of women 
and girls have been raped since the beginning of the conflict.614  Since armed groups 
are using rape as a weapon of war,615 women and girls are paying a heavy price in 
this conflict in which sexual violence has reached an epidemic level616 causing the 
near total destruction of hundreds of thousands of women and girls of all ages.  
It should be noted however, that massive sexual violence in the eastern DRC had 
been documented or reported only to a limited extent and that the existing statistics 
on sexual violence are far from reflecting the reality. It is indeed difficult, if not 
impossible, to collect data on the number of victims of widespread sexual and gender-
based violence in the DRC.617 One of the main reasons is that in addition to the fact 
                                                          
610 See Anaia Bewa, Marie-Louise Eagleton, Claudine Lumamba, Lina Piripiri, Marion Pratt and Leah Werchick, 
Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: An Assessment Of 
Programmatic Responses to Sexual Violence in North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Orientale Provinces, 
USAID/DCHA assessment report, January 9-16, 2004, see http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK346.pdf, 
accessed on 18 February 2013. 
611 Margo Wallstrom, UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, quoted in Top UN Official Calls 
DR Congo ‘Rape Capital of the World’, Agence France Presse, April 27, 2010. 
612 Rebecca Feely and Colin Thomas-Jensen, Getting Serious About Ending Conflict and Sexual Violence in 
Congo, Enough Strategy Paper, March, 12, 2008. 
613 See for example http://www.rue89.com/2011/08/02/viols-au-congo-le-jour-ou-ils-ont-fait-de-moi-une-
femme-216257, accessed on 23 January 2013. 
614 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Soldiers who Rape, Commanders who Condone: Sexual Violence and Military 
Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, New York, Human Rights Watch, 2009. 
615 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, delivered to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2000/712, A/55/163, 19 July 2000. 
616 See for example L. Addario and S. Egan, ‘Legacy of War: an Epidemic of Sexual Violence in DRC’, November 
2008, available at http://www.unfpa.org/public/News/pid/1399; Wairagala Wakabi, ‘Sexual Violence 
increasing in Democratic Republic of Congo’, The Lancet, vol. 371, no. 9606, January 2008, pp. 15-16; Emily 
Wax, ‘A Brutal Legacy of Congo War; Extent of Violence Against Women Surfaces as Violence Recedes’, 
Washington Post, October, 25, 2003. 
617 According to the United Nations Population Fund statistics, 13, 404 case of sexual violence have been 
registered in 2006; 13,247 in 2007; between 14,245 and 15,996 in 2008, and 17,507 cases in 2009, see 
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that victims of sexual violence are profoundly affected by the physical and 
psychological effects of such inhumane treatment, shame prevents large numbers of 
them from reporting the attacks.618 Others live in silence, unable to share their painful 
memories out of fear that they will be rejected by family members. In many cases, 
victims have a fear of being stigmatised.619 As Furaha, a survivor, told the author:  
I was raped by five men who took me to the bush where I became their sex-
slave. They kept me in the forest fifteen months and raped me every day at 
any time they wanted. I got pregnant but they kept raping me. One day I 
lost consciousness after being raped by eleven of them and I miscarried the 
baby.  They abandoned me in the middle of the forest. Since then I feel 
ashamed and I cannot go back to my family, I remain outside in the street.620 
In the DRC, being raped is often considered as a shame for the family.621 Victims of 
sexual violence are subjected to being socially outcast, therefore, girls who have been 
raped have little prospect of getting married as they are accused of not having resisted 
enough.622 Women who are raped are frequently rejected by their husbands and 
families in general, and children who are born as a result from rape are rarely accepted 
in the society to extent that some of them are slaughtered to stop a new breed in the 
community.623 As Rehema told this author: 
                                                          
Delphine Schrank, Democratic Republic of Congo in The Responsibility to protect: The promise of Stopping 
Mass Atrocities in Our Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, p.331. 
618 Interview with NGO staff, Bukavu, 15 October 2012. 
619 Women sexually assaulted by members of one rebel organisation are accused of being the wives of that 
group and raped again as punishment when a new militia take over the area. See also Jocelyn Kelly, Rape in 
War: Motives of Militia in DRC, U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report 243, June 2010, p. 10. 
620 Interview with a victim, Goma, September 2012. 
621 Interview with NGO staff, Bukavu 17 October 2012. 
622 For example during the interview, one of the victims said that she was raped by 13 armed soldiers after 
the village was attacked. She was living with her parents and two brothers. One night, people with guns and 
knives came to her house. They forced open the door. Ten men gang raped her mother after they killed her 
father and two brothers. She was raped and badly injured as those men inserted knives and bottles into her 
vagina. She and her mother had no money to go to the hospital. She said that people were disgusted by her 
smell which was terrible. She felt like she was not a human being as she was destroyed and her femininity was 
destroyed. She said she prefers death to being in such a situation. 
623 Abortion is illegal in the DRC, and the capacity of adoption of these unwanted children is quasi inexistent.   
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I was coming from the school when a group of men in military uniforms 
speaking Kinyarwanda forced me to go to the bush with them. After being 
repeatedly raped, I got pregnant and they left me go after few months as I 
could not walk a long distance with them. I was praying God that I want to 
die instead of having this baby. I went back to my village but I was not 
accepted, by neither my family nor my neighbours. I could not go back to 
school. Everybody abandoned me saying that I am carrying an evil in my 
womb. I gave birth to a baby boy but I am stigmatized because I am a 
mother of a ‘Satan’. 624 
Another factor which contributed to the lack of empirical data on widespread sexual 
violence committed by armed groups in the DRC is the fact that most of the cases of 
sexual violence take place in villages far from the city where victims do not have 
access to medical facilities. Almost half of the victims who were interviewed by this 
author stated that they were attacked on their way to a farm, collecting firewood or 
travelling to school or to market.625 However, one thing is clear: almost all of the studies 
agreed that widespread sexual violence is perpetrated on women in eastern DRC on 
a large scale.626 In some cases, armed groups raped women in their homes at night 
in the presence of their children and husbands. One survivor, Safi, told this author: 
When the attack occurred, I was with my husband and our seven children. 
They took me while I was breastfeeding my 2month-old baby. They took 
away my baby and asked my husband to tie a cord around his neck or he 
will be killed. My husband told them he would not do that.  As he resisted, 
they stabbed him to death, opened his stomach and they forced us to eat 
his intestines. As we were crying   and screaming they ordered us to shut 
up and asked us to open the mouth and forced us to eat the intestines. 
                                                          
624 Interview with a victim, Walungu, October 2012. 
625 Interview with survivors, Bukavu, 16 October 2012. 
626 See for example Kirsten Johnson et al., Association of Sexual Violence and Human Rights Violations with 
Physical and Mental health in Territories of the Eastern Democratic republic of the Congo, 304(5) JAMA 553-
62, 2010; Anna Maedl, ‘Rape as Weapon of War in the Eastern DRC?: The Victim’s Perspective’, Human Rights 
Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 1, February 2011, pp. 128-147. 
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Then they took my 12 years old daughter and I and gang-raped us in the 
presence of my other children, and forced my two sons16 and 14 year old 
to hold our legs while they raped us. Following this, we was brought to the 
hospital where we were re-animated as they left as quasi-dead and my 
daughter internal genital organs were severely damaged. Today we are 
alive but destroyed, in addition to the incontinence and the HIV as 
consequences of this nightmare, I feel ashamed.627 
Nevertheless, a study conducted by the United Population Fund reveals that an 
estimated 160 women are raped every week in North and South Kivu provinces. The 
same study has found that 15,996 cases of rape had been reported in 2008.628 Another 
study has found that 50,000 rape cases were registered in 2006 in nearly half of the 
health centre in the DRC.629  
Based on the allegations of the victims of sexual violence,630 all of the attacks are 
directly linked to the armed conflict and all armed groups operating in eastern DRC 
are involved. However, most of the cases of  rape with extreme sexual violence are 
attributed to ‘Interahamwe’631 and Mai-Mai groups. Indeed, many survivors have had 
foreign objects such as firearms inserted in their vaginas and some have had their 
sexual organs mutilated by knives or machetes.632 As a result of the trauma, serious 
complications such as fistula, which can cause uncontrollable mixed urine and faecal 
materials, are common.633 Many interviewed women were badly injured to the extent 
                                                          
627 Interview with the author, Bukavu, November 2012. 
628 Human Rights Watch, Soldiers who Rape, Commanders who Condone, New York, 2009, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/07/16/soldiers-who-rape-commanders-who-condone, last accessed on 18 
February 2013. 
629 Tara Gingerich (JD, MA) and Jennifer Leaning (MD, SMH), The use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the 
Conflict in Darfur, Sudan, Prepared for USAIDS, 2004, available at  
http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/report-2004-oct-darfurrape.html. 
630 During the interviews, participants were asked in detail about the perpetrators. The questions included 
their uniform, the language they spoke and their armament. See the Annex. 
631 Rwandan Armed Group which fled to the DRC after carrying out the Rwandan Genocide in 1994.   
632 Ibid. 
633 A girl met at Panzi Hospital in Bukavu, the only hospital specialized in such trauma in south Kivu, told the 
author that her vagina was totally destroyed and that she will not be able to have children. 
186 
 
that they required reconstructive surgery and many have contracted HIV.634 However, 
the unvailability of medical services leaves most of the victims without treatment.635  
In one such situation, a 45 year old female survivor, who was held in the bush and 
gang raped for 5 months, described her ordeal to this author. She recounted how she 
was forced by the armed groups to watch the slaughter of her four daughters and her 
husband after the latter has refused to rape his own daughters.636 This highlights the 
fact that in many areas in such situations, armed forces use rape as means of terror 
to the society. Apparently, most of the attacks during military operations have been 
motivated by the combatants’ desire to terrorise and to humiliate the local 
population.637 As Major General Partick Cammaert, the former commander of the UN 
peacekeeping force in eastern DRC, who had personally witnessed the destructive 
power of the rape on the population, comments: ‘It is a very effective weapon, because 
the communities are totally destroyed. You destroy communities. You punish the men, 
and you punish the women, doing it in front of the men’.638  
In addition to the physical trauma, victims are also psychologically destabilized. 
According to Dr Mukwege, the renowned gynaecologist at Bukavu Panzi hospital who 
is taking care of the victims of sexual violence, some parents who witnessed their 
young children being raped live in extreme suffering as they feel guilty that they were 
                                                          
634 Interview with survivors, Bukavu, 16 October 2012. 
635 Most of the victims do not have access to treatment as in Eastern DRC, there are only two referral 
hospitals which have resources to treat women who are suffering from trauma and infection caused by violent 
rape. Moreover, many women who have been raped are from the rural areas where health centres have not 
staff specialised in such trauma. 
636 Interview with a Survivor, Bukavu, 16 October 2012. 
637 Interview with Women for Women International. 
638 Maj. Gen. Patrick Cammaert, former UN Peacekeeper to BBC News, available at 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7464462.stm, accessed 02 September 2013. 
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not able to protect their own children.639 Despite these injuries and psychological 
trauma, only 20 per cent of victims reported receive medical and psychosocial 
assistance. 
Given the scale and gravity of inhuman acts committed on women and girls in eastern 
DRC highlighted in this study, it can be argued that sexual violence and rape forms 
part of a military strategy in the DRC conflict. There is no doubt that these widespread 
and systematic  sexual violence are crimes under international law which R2P was 
designed to address.640 This means that the widespread and systematic attacks 
against the civilian population in eastern DRC could amount to crimes against 
humanity, which may trigger the application of R2P. 
 
5.4.2 Characteristics of the crimes and the perpetrators 
When analysing the data with a focus on the characteristics of the crimes, we found 
that  sexual violence and rape form part of military strategies in eastern DRC and that 
they are systematic and widespread. In the interviews, victims were asked about their 
experiences during the attack. Participants were aged between 18 and 82 years. Of 
the 80 victims interviewed, 97 per cent reported they were raped and beaten; 80.0 
percent were gang raped;  63.7 per cent were raped many times; 28.8 per cent have 
witnessed  killings generally or more specifically of family members and 87.5 per cent 
were attacked with their relatives. All the perpetrators were described by the 
participants as being members of an armed group wearing military uniform. 81.3 
                                                          
639 Dr Denis Mukwege is the founder of Panzi Hospital in Bukavu South Kivu. The hospital is known for the 
treatment of survivors of sexual violence. He left Bukavu in October 2012 after an assassination attempt on 
him but he has since returned.   
640 Rape and other forms of sexual violence during armed conflict are prohibited under the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols.  
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percent were identified as Swahili and Lingala speakers and 86.4 were described as 
having a Rwandan background. As to pepretrators strategies, most of the  participants’ 
narratives revealed that most of the cases of sexual violence take place in villages far 
from the city and  that women and young girls are attacked and abducted on their way 
to farm, to school or to market.  Participants’ accounts also demonstrate that rape is 
used to terrorise and to humiliate the local population as in many cases, women were 
raped in their homes in the presence of their children and husbands.  
 
Experiences during 
the attack 
Number of responses 
(nb) 
Percentages 
(%) 
Beaten 78,0 97.5 
Raped 79,0 98.7 
Witness Killings 23,0 28.8 
Raped many times 51,0 63.7 
Gang group 64,0 80.0 
Military Uniform 80,0 100.0 
Civilian clothes 4,0 5.0 
Swahili/Lingala 65,0 81.3 
Kinyarwanda 69 86.4 
Attacked with their relatives 70,0 87.5 
   
 
5.4.3 Summary 
These findings are instructive: it suggests that atrocities commited on the civilian 
population, particularly women and girls in the DRC, are widespread and may amount 
to war crimes and crimes against humanity which may trigger the application of R2P. 
Additionaly, victims’ accounts revealed that most of the atrocities were committed by 
different armed groups operating in eastern DRC and provide information about 
strategies and tactics used by the perpetrators. Furthermore, victims narratives show 
that most of the attacks occurred between 2008 and 2013. Remarkably, despite the 
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adoption of R2P in 2005, the civilian population  in the DRC continue to face mass 
atrocities. It is therefore not suprising that  from the victims perspective, the 
international community did not do enough to protect them. Only 10 per cent said the 
presence of MONUC troops was helpful or very helpful, and 55 per cent said it was 
not helpful at all. Although, most victims – 85 per cent – were satisfied with the NGOs’ 
support. However, when asked about the government support after the attack, 80 
percent said that the government did not take enough measures to protect them and 
that the  crimes perpetrated against them have gone unpunished. All victims spoke 
about reparation and compensation. They raised the issue that their lives have been 
seriously damaged and that the government must acknowledge this. In fact, the 
obligation to provide reparation and compensation to victims of serious human rights 
violations has become part of international law. In this regard, the possibility given to 
victims in terms of reparation under the Rome Statute of the ICC was a considerable 
innovation in the history of international justice. The issue of  compensation and 
reparation will be discussed in depth in chapter six. 
Pie chart: Available support after the attack 
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5.4.4 Grave violations against children by all parties to the conflict   
 
The worsening plight of children affected directly or indirectly by the conflict is one of 
the major challenges that the DRC and the international community is facing today. 
These include; child combatants, displaced children, unaccompanied children, and 
victims of atrocities.641 In fact, the endeless conflict in eastern DRC has destroyed the 
lives of thousands of children,  forcing them into poverty and  onto the streets where 
they are facing different and difficult situations such as forced prostitution, labour 
exploitation and prison.642 Given the fact that there are only a limited number of IDPs 
camps in the eastern DRC, the number of street children has increased significantly, 
particularly in the cities of Goma and Bukavu as a result of continued fighting.643 
Therefore, displaced children have no access to basic needs like shelter or food, which 
makes them more vulnerable to join armed groups.644 In this context, children are at 
risk of violations of their security and rights, particularly forced recruitment into armed 
forces. Local militias and even official troops are taking advantage of this situation as 
it is very easy to mobilize children in such precarious situations. One former child 
soldier told the author that it was a chance for him to be recruited as he could use the 
power of the gun to get food and improve his living conditions. He said that when his 
family fled into forests he and his sisters and brothers were suffering from malnutrition, 
food insecurity, unsanitary living conditions and others problems.645 
The litany of violations against children’s security and rights in eastern DRC is 
shocking. Typical violations, most often committed with impunity, include systematic 
                                                          
641 See Annual Report of the UN Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict, Security Council, 
S/2007/757, 21 December 2007. 
642 Civil society reports, Sud- Kivu, 2007-2008. 
643 Interview with a WHO staff member, Goma, 4 November 2012. 
644 Interview with civil society organisation,  Goma, 6 November 2012 
645 Interview with a former child soldiers in the DRC. 
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rape, abduction and recruitment or use of children as soldiers, sexual torture, illegal 
arrest and detentions, and other extreme forms of torture and cruelty.646 For example, 
some children are obliged to witness the rape or the killing of their parents and young 
girls are raped in the presence of their family members.647 Also, they are forced to kill 
their close relatives including their parents with the idea that such acts will make them 
strong to become a brave soldier who cannot think of returning home.648 Forcing 
children to witness crimes against their parents has been reported to be part of the 
initiation of children as combatants.649 
The recruitment process in most cases is done through abduction, manipulation or 
force.650 Given the fact that government troops are ill-disciplined and ill-equipped, 
children are recruited to face  heavy attacks launched by armed groups. This was, for 
example, the case in the Goma crisis where a campaign was initiated by Congolese 
soldiers to defend the city when threatened by the CNDP rebels in 2008.651According 
to the United Nations, at least 264 civilians, including 83 children, were arbitrarily 
executed by armed groups in more than 75 attacks between April and September 2012 
in Masisi in the North Kivu province.652 
As mentioned earlier, the DRC conflict is marked by the widespread use of children as 
combatants by all protagonists involved in the conflict to the extent that the country 
has been described as one of the countries in the world where the phenomenon of 
                                                          
646 Interview with a UNICEF staff member, Goma 5 November 2012. 
647 Interview with NGO staff, Goma, 4 November 2012. 
648 Interview with demobilized child soldiers, Bukavu, October 2012. 
649 Interview with local actors, Bukavu, 18 October 2012. 
650 Ibid. 
651 Interview, with UN staff, Goma, 4 November 2012. 
652 Report of the UN Joint Human Rights Office, available at http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-
congo/report-united-nations-joint-human-rights-office-human-rights, accessed on 07 February 2013. 
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child soldiers is most common.653 Despite the signing of an Action Plan and the 
commitment of the DRC government to end the recruitment and use of children by 
Congolese armed forces and the security services, the wave of child recruitment and 
use by armed groups continue in eastern DRC.654 A recent report of the UN Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Conflicts highlights the fact that the resurgence of 
fighting between M23 and the government forces has increased the scale of violations 
against civilians by a variety of armed groups including systematic recruitment and the 
use of children.655 It further shows that these children are facing indescribable violence 
including murder, rape, torture, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and are 
deprived of all their rights.  
                                                          
653   See Child Soldiers International, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 - Congo, Democratic Republic of the, 
20 May 2008, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/486cb0f5c.html   
654  On 4 October 2012, the government of the DRC and the UN officially committed to ending violence 
against children particularly the recruitment and use by armed groups in armed conflict with reference to 
sexual violence. See http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/FINAL-Discussion-Paper-Action-
Plans.pdf, accessed on 30 September 2013. 
655 See UN Doc. A/67/845. 
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Graph I. Former child soldiers experiences on the conflict 
 
 
5.4.5 Summary  
This research sheds light on  how children in eastern DRC are at risk and are currently 
facing mass atrocity crimes. While the fact that the ICC has found Thomas Lubanga 
guilty of the war crime of enlisting and conscripting children under 15 and using them 
in hostilities is a significant step towards ending impunity for such crimes, the lack of 
accountability for political and military leaders responsible for grave violations 
committed against and by the child soldiers under their control remains of concern.  
Since protecting children from the ravages of war is a legal responsibility and a moral 
imperative, it is clear that the DRC government bear the primary duty to protect 
Congolese children not only by affording them adequate security but also to ensure 
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that perpetrators of violation of human rights and humanitarian law are duly 
prosecuted.656 Therefore, implementing  R2P in order to prevent and to address grave 
violations perpetrated against children in DRC requires the Congolese government to 
fulfil its protective duty vis-à-vis its population by addressing the issue of: recruitment 
and use of children as combatants; rape and other forms of  sexual violence against 
them; abduction and killing of children; denial of access to basic needs like shelter, 
food and school. 
Most significantly, this study reveals the challenges that both DRC and the 
international community have to face in order to shape practical responses to 
humanitarian crises in Eastern DRC. While R2P discourses put an emphasis on 
situations where the civilian population are at risk, or are currently facing mass atrocity 
crimes, its positive effects and outcomes for victims appear to be modest in this case. 
Thus, when absorbing the findings of this research, they are simultaneously suprising 
and expected. They are expected because previous studies which have been 
conducted on the impact of armed conflict on civilians in DRC have reached the same 
alarming conclusions that the civilian populations are paying the highest price in the 
conflict.657 However, the results of this study are suprising because in  most of the 
studies on R2P, emphasis was put on the role of states in implementing R2P while 
this research has given voice to those who need protection (victims/survivors) which 
                                                          
656 The legal foundation for protection of children in armed conflict is enshrined in the four Geneva 
Conventions (1949), Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977), Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court(1998), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
and its Optional Protocols (2000), UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966), Regional Human Rights Instruments, International Jurisprudence (Case-law of the ICTY, 
ICTR and Special Court for Sierra Leone, case-law of the ICC and ICJ), and UN Security Council Resolutions on 
children and armed conflict. 
657  See for example Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, ‘Now, The World Is Without Me’: An Investigation of 
Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, April 2010, available at 
http://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/hhi-oxfam%20drc%20gbv%20report.pdf ; IPSOS and 
ICRC, ‘Our World; View From the Field, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Opinion Survey and in-Depth Sexual 
Research’, 2009, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/drc.pdf  
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allowed to gain insight into the impact of R2P on the day-to day lives of the victims. 
This may help to persuade policy makers to take concrete measures that directly affect 
the victims of mass atrocities. 
 
5.5 The DRC government’s responsibility to protect its population 
 
The DRC stands as a good example of a situation where the government has failed to 
give effective protection to its citizens against massive violations of human rights. The 
protection of civilians is one of the fundamentals of international law. As demonstrated 
in part I of this work, protection of civilians is based on the assumption that every state 
has an international obligation to guarantee certain basic rights to their nationals. In 
fact, DRC is party to the main human rights treaties, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),658 the Convention on the Elimination 
of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),659 and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC).660 The Congolese government must therefore comply with 
the requirements set out in those international legal instruments regarding state 
obligation to protect human rights. Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 661 
                                                          
658 Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm, accessed on 03 February 2013. 
659 Available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm, accessed on 03 
February 2013. 
660 Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm, accessed on 03 February 2013. 
661 Article 2(1) of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm, accessed on 03 February 2013. 
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The DRC is also one of the states party to the Geneva Convention and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Pursuant to Article 7 of the Rome 
Statute,662 a crime against humanity means any of the following acts when committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack: 
(a) Murder; 
(b) Extermination; 
(c) Enslavement; 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;  
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamentals rules of international law; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under 
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 
(j) The crime of apartheid; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
Accordingly, rape and other acts of sexual violence committed on women and girls in 
the eastern DRC are sufficiently widespread and systematic, which amount to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity as defined under international humanitarian law 
and the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, the statutes of the 
                                                          
662 Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm, accessed on 03 February 2013. 
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ICTR, ICTY and the SCSL explicitly cite rape and sexual abuse as war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.663 Also in the Akayesu 664and Musema665 cases, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda recognized rape to be a crime against 
humanity.  Moreover, describing the deliberate use of rape as a tactic in war, the  
Security Council in its Resolution 1820 (2008) has emphasized that ‘rape and other 
forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a 
constitutive act with respect to genocide’.666 As demonstrated earlier, the author has 
identified repeated sexual attacks against women and girls as widespread and 
systematic in the region, which are deliberately used by armed groups as weapon of 
war. In this regard it is clear that the eastern DRC case falls within R2P since the norm 
applies to conflict in which mass atrocities are systematic and widespread.  
Furthermore, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention applies to non-international 
conflict and describes minimal protection to persons taking no active part in hostilities. 
The provisions of Common Article 3 provide that: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the 
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de 
combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other 
similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time 
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned 
persons: 
                                                          
663 See Statute of ICTY, art.2 and Art. 5 (g); ICTR art. 4 (e) and art. 3 (g); SCSL art. 3 (e) and art. 2 (g). 
664 Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, case No. ICTR-96-4-T,  2 
September 1998. 
665 Prosecutor v. Musema, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 2000. 
666 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1820, 2008 on acts of sexual violence against civilians in 
armed conflict, 19 June 2008, S/RES/1820, 2008,  available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement, accessed 02 September 2013. 
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(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, 
cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording 
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by 
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the 
present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status 
of the Parties to the conflict.667 
As previously mentioned, the principle of discrimination has frequently been violated 
by both Congolese forces and their allies who did not consider it their obligation to 
distinguish between civilians and combatants. Several reports668 have shown that all 
warring parties to the conflict in the DRC had violated their obligation under 
international humanitarian law. In the interviews with the author, FDLR and Mai-Mai 
were described as the main perpetrators of killings and rape.669 However, the FARDC, 
the Congolese army was also cited as a perpetrator of the more frequent abuses 
including rape, killings and abduction.670 Consequently, the DRC must ensure that all 
individuals within its territory adhere to the provisions of the Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Convention.671 In addition, intentionally directing attacks against the civilian 
                                                          
667 Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. 
668 For more information see 2010 Country reports on Human Rights practice, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160453.pdf, accessed on 07 February 2013. 
669 Interview with survivors, Kabare, 17 October 2012. 
670 Interview with civil society agency, Bukavu, 15 October 2012. 
671 In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down 
their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, 
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population or against persons taking no active part in the hostilities are clearly defined 
as war crimes under Article 8 (2) of the Rome Statute.  
The R2P framework implies that sovereign states and international community share 
the responsibility to protect civilians from war crime, ethnic cleansing, genocide and 
crimes against humanity. Accordingly, individual states should understand that 
sovereignty is not anymore a privilege but a responsibility to protect their population. 
The primary responsibility lies on a state but when a given state fails to do so, the 
international community has to intervene in order to protect the civilian population.  
The situation of civilians in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) highlights the deficiency of the Congolese government in this aspect. As to the 
responsibility to provide security to its population, the Congolese government has 
failed since its security institutions are characterized by a lack of control and 
transparency over weapons, munitions and related equipment. This, in a climate of 
widespread corruption and impunity, makes theft and diversion of weapons and 
ammunition easier. Such a situation results in the persistent misuse of such arms by 
soldiers, police and armed groups to commit and facilitate serious violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law. Lack of political will to challenge 
                                                          
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with 
respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a 
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples. 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
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those senior army officers and to reform the security sector institutions is a key 
obstacle to progress, particularly in the field of security sector reform.672 
Lack of accountability extends to the lack of information about the identity of individual 
soldiers. In eastern DRC, militias operate with scant resources, low-tech weaponry 
and limited access to arms. In this setting, rape is an ideal weapon and one that is 
difficult to match. Additionally, many armed combatants in Eastern DRC are unpaid 
and poorly supplied with food and clothing. As a result, they reply on pillaging on local 
villages to meet these material demands. Rape is also used as a weapon of war 
because commanders and combatants are poorly trained and have little exposure to 
or knowledge of international humanitarian law.  
Indeed, the links with R2P are clear as the Congolese government has failed to protect 
its population. Therefore, the international community should intervene under the 
framework of R2P to stop mass killing and abuses against civilians, particularly the 
widespread sexual violence against women and young girls and the use of children as 
child soldiers.  
The UN Secretary-General in his 2009 Report on Implementing R2P emphasises that 
state responsibility to prevent mass atrocities constitutes the bedrock of the 
doctrine.673 In order to facilitate the protection, the report states that international legal 
standards of protection of human rights must be embodied in national legislation; 
consequently, states must ensure that the four specified crimes – crimes against 
humanity, war crime, genocide and ethnic cleansing – are criminalized under domestic 
                                                          
672 See Amnesty International ‘If You resist We’ll Shoot You’ The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
Case for an Effective Arms Trade Treaty, Amnesty International 2012, available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR62/007/2012/en/cdd8cdd9-913f-4dc5-8418-
71deedbdde0/afr620072012en.pdf,  accessed 31 August 2012. 
673 UN Doc. A/63/677, 12 January 2009. 
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law.674 The report further highlights that particular attention should be given to prevent 
sexual and gender-based violence, prosecuting perpetrators and implementing 
gender-responsive justice and security-sector reform measures.675 
It is clear that some positive steps were taken by the Congolese government to 
address the issue of massive human rights violations.676  It is in this context that a law 
which criminalized sexual mutilation and sexual slavery was passed by the parliament 
in 2006.677 In addition, the fight against all forms of violence against women and 
children, including sexual violence, was explicitly incorporated into the constitution.678 
It should be noted however that, due to the lack of a strong judiciary system and the 
culture of corruption, the law did not have the expected effect.679 For example, 
perpetrators of rape who belong to police, army or other armed groups are not 
prosecuted,680 and when they are arrested, they provide bribes and are then 
released.681 A coalition of women’s organizations in Eastern DRC, in an interview with 
this author, has revealed that there is a remarkable lack of confidence by victims in 
the judiciary  due to corruption. As an example they explained that some women have 
had their mouths cut as punishment after having had the courage to publically identify 
their aggressors who were released.682 Notwithstanding some notable efforts made by 
the Congolese government in taking measures regarding mass violations of human 
                                                          
674 ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’, Report of the Secretary-General UN Doc. A/63/677, 12 
January 2009.  
675 Ibid. 
676 UN; Doc S/RES/2053, 2013, 27 June 2012. 
677 Law number 06/018 passed on 20 July 2006. 
678 See Constitution de La République Démocratique du Congo, 18 Février 2006.  
679 As UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women comments: ‘Due to political interference and 
corruption, perpetrators, especially those who belong to the state security forces, go unpunished. The limited 
support made available to the overburdened justice system raises questions as to whether there is political will 
to end impunity’. See also Schranck, op. cit., p. 333. 
680 Interview with Civil Society staff, Bukavu, 28 November 2013. 
681 Ibid. 
682 Interview with Coalition of Women’s Organizations in the eastern DRC. 
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rights as enumerated above, DRC remains the place where civilians are  the main 
target of armed groups and daily exposed to mass atrocities.  
As demonstrated earlier, this is due to the weakness of the Congolese state which is 
openly reflected by the predatory nature of its armed forces coupled with the general 
state of impunity. Nevertheless, one of the significant efforts made by the Congolese 
government was the referral of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo683 to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) pursuant to Article 14 of the Rome Statute.684  
In summation, the vast majority of barbarities against civilians listed above may 
constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Convention and their additional protocols, a 
violation of customary rules of international law, a violation of international and regional 
human rights treaties and may constitute war crimes or crimes against humanity under 
the Rome Statute. Given that, it is clear that the role of the international community is 
crucial in assisting the DRC government to comply with its responsibilities under 
international law and to mitigate the risk of mass atrocities in conflict environment. 
5.6 Chapter conclusions 
 
The main finding of this chapter is that the vast majority of atrocities committed against 
the civilian population in eastern DRC fall within the scope of widespread or systematic 
attacks on a large-scale. From the victims’ and survivors’ perspective it appears that 
these inhuman acts of extreme violence directed primarily at women and children are 
carried out in an organised way by all parties to the conflict including the DRC 
                                                          
683 Thomas Lubanga was the Chief of the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) which was fighting in Ituri. As 
chief-Commander he was said to be aware of the enlisting of young children under age of fifteen and their 
active participation in the hostilities. UPC was also accused of the massacre of civilians in Ituri. Lendu tribe 
were said to be particularly targeted in the conflict. 
684 Article 14 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm, accessed on 03 February 2013. 
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government forces.  The analysis of the legal framework applicable to protection of 
civilians from mass atrocities shows that the DRC is party to the vast majority of 
conventions in respect to human right and humanitarian law. However, there is a lack 
of implementation of these rules. As consequence, a series of widespread and 
systematic attacks against the civilian population continue and the inability of the DRC 
government to deal adequately with continual mass atrocities committed on its territory 
is obvious.  
The R2P framework implies that sovereign states and the international community 
share the responsibility to protect civilians from war crime, ethnic cleansing, genocide 
and crimes against humanity. Accordingly, the primary responsibility lies with a state 
but when a given state fails to act, the international community has to intervene in 
order to protect the civilian population. In this context, the links with R2P are clear as 
the Congolese government has failed to protect its population. Therefore, considering 
the DRC government’s inability to protect its population from mass atrocities, the 
international community should intervene under the framework of R2P to stop mass 
killing and abuses against civilians, particularly the widespread sexual violence against 
women and young girls and the use of children as child soldiers. However, R2P 
doctrine has yet to be openly invoked in the DRC crisis despite numerous Security 
Council resolutions to increase UN troops, diplomatic efforts, sanctions and 
unanimous condemnation of the mass atrocity crimes which are committed on the 
civilian population. Thus, one can argue that while R2P was conceived to address 
conflicts characterized by the commission of mass atrocities, it remains unclear when 
and how it should apply to such conflicts. This affirmation will be seen from the analysis 
of the international responses to the DRC crisis in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6.  Applying R2P to the Crisis: International Responses 
 
6.0 Introduction  
 
While the international community has been actively involved in the DRC since the 
beginning of the conflict, the security situation in the eastern provinces, including 
attacks carried out by armed groups against the civilian population which could 
constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes, remain a serious challenge.685 In 
fact, since the beginning of the conflict, the international community had responded 
and continue to respond to the violence in Eastern DRC by taking diplomatic, political 
and military measures to address mass atrocities against the civilian population. 
Indeed, the mandate of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in DRC has moved 
from monitoring a ceasefire agreement to providing direct protection to civilian 
population under imminent physical threat.686  
The aim of this chapter is to assess if and how the R2P framework was applied to the 
conflict. The international community’s response to the DRC crisis will be particularly 
analysed focusing on its efforts to address the conflict by different means, including 
peacekeeping operations and mediation through the United Nations, European Union, 
African Union, United States, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and 
the International Criminal Court.  
 
                                                          
685 For the nature of serious acts of violence committed by armed groups against the civilians population, see 
for example The Final Report of the Fact-Findings of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office on the Mass 
Rapes and Other Human Rights Violations Committed By a Coalition of Armed Groups along the Kibua-Mpofi 
Axis in Walikale territory, North Kivu, From 30 July to 2 August 2010, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/BCNUDHRapportViolsMassifsKibuaMpofi_en.pdf, accessed 
on 18 February 2013. 
686 UN.Doc S/RES/2053, 2012, adopted on 27 June 2012. 
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6.1 United Nations peacekeeping operation in DRC 
(MONUC/MONUSCO) 
 
Following the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreement in 1999, the Security Council 
authorized the deployment of 90 UN military liaison personnel along with necessary 
civilian, political and administrative staff in the DRC.687 However, the complexity of the 
situation on the ground including the challenges related to the security environment 
and the aggravation of widespread human rights violations by all protagonists in the 
conflict led to the deployment of a robust peacekeeping force.688 On 1 November 1999, 
the Secretary-General recommended an extension of the UN mandate and sought 
authorization for the establishment of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the deployment of 500 military 
observers.689 In response, the Council extended MONUC’s mandate and capacity and 
the operation was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows 
peacekeepers to use force, if necessary, to carry out their mandate.690 While the 
mission and mandate of the MONUC forces has been considerably strengthened by 
the Security Council over the years,691 their failure to protect civilians under the threat 
                                                          
687 UNSC Resolution 1258, 1999, 6 August 1999, UN Doc. S/RES/1258 1999. 
688 MONUC background is available at 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml accessed on 17 October 2013. 
689 Report of the Secretary-general on the UN Preliminary Deployment in the DRC, UN Doc. S/1999/1116, 1 
November 1999, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1116, accessed on 
06/02/2013. 
690 UNSC Resolution 1291, 24 February 2000; UNSC Resolution 1445, 4 December 2002; UNSC Resolution 
1493, 28 July 2003; UNSC Resolution 1565, 1 October 2004, available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/resolutions/index.shtml. 
691 In August 1999, the United Nations Security Council authorized the deployment of 90 United Nations 
personnel under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In December 2002, the Security Council authorised a size 
increase of up to 8,700 military personnel, principally comprised of two task forces to be deployed in 
succession, when the caseload of the first task force could no longer be met by its capacity. MONUC also 
included up to 700 military observers supported by specialists in human rights, humanitarian affairs, public 
information, political affairs, child protection and medical and administrative support. In addition to other 
duties, MONUC is mandated to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with attention 
to vulnerable groups including women and children. This includes special attention to demobilised child 
soldiers. UN Security Council Res. 1291/ 2000 which authorizes MONUC to carry out a number of important 
tasks, including implementation of the cease-fire and support for humanitarian work and human rights 
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of physical violence especially in North and South Kivus has raised criticisms over 
their capacity to provide sufficient protection.692 In fact, on numerous occasions, 
MONUC troops have been unable to defend Congolese civilians who were under 
imminent physical threat. For example, the failure to stop the massacre in Kisangani 
in 2002, the killings in Ituri in 2003, the inability to protect civilians in the Bukavu 
offensive in 2004693 and during the Goma crisis in 2008694 and 2012.695 This was the 
case in Kiwanja town where an estimated 150 people were massacred near a MONUC 
compound.696 In fact, despite their mandate to use force to defend civilians who were 
under imminent threat of armed groups at the Bunia Aiport in Ituri district,697 they did 
not stop  the killings. As Human Rights Watch observes:  
At the time of the killing spree at the Kiwanja, the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Mission in Congo, MONUC, had 120 peacekeepers in 
Kiwanja, one of its largest field bases in the area. Due to the importance of 
these two towns as centers for humanitarian assistance, MONUC consider 
them a priority protection zone. Yet the peacekeepers did not protect the 
towns from a rebel takeover or halt the destruction of displacement camps. 
                                                          
monitoring. The resolution also provides MONUC the mandate, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to protect 
its personnel, facilities, and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; UN Security Council 
Resolution  1565/ 2004 which increased MONUC personnel, with a primary objective of ensure civilian 
protection and seize arms, as called in Res. 1493. 
692 ‘This time, the mission was heavily criticized by the international media voicing concerns of the local 
population about MONUC failure to protect civilians under the threat of physical violence. The lack of a 
common interpretation of the mandate with regard to the use of force, differences of opinion on the Rules of 
Engagement (ROE) between contingents and the Mission, internally in the Military Component and the lack of 
political/military will to take strong action were at the basis of the problems’, Major-General Patrick 
Cammaert, Former UN Military Adviser and Former Division Commander of MONUC in MONUC as a Case 
Study in Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Complex Emergencies. 
693 See International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 91, The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, 30 
March 2005. 
694 See Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Killing in Kiwanja’: UN’s inability to protect civilians’, December 2008. 
695 See Amnesty International, ‘DR Congo: Civilian Protection urged as tens of thousands flee escalation in 
fighting’, 12 Nov. 2012. 
696 More than 400 people were murdered in two weeks. According to a report, UN forces who were deployed 
in Bunia had no experience in protecting civilians. 
697 Following the withdrawal of the Ugandan troops in Bunia, fighting broke out between Lendu based militias 
and Hema Union of Congolese Patriotes for the control of the town. Atrocities were committed against 
civilians and there was an outcry about a risk of a new genocide in the region. 
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Nor did they stop the mass killing of civilians in Kiwanja. MONUC relied on 
cooperation from the Congolese army. However, Congolese forces proved 
incapable of protecting the towns and failed to assist MONUC in providing 
security for the civilian population. 698 
Apparently, the inadequate equipment coupled with the lack of training of 
peacekeepers strongly contributed to the MONUC inability to respond promptly to 
protect civilians. According to an internal MONUC report,  peacekeepers did not 
succeed in preventing the killings of Kiwanja as the Uruguayan battalion deployed 
there had no idea about how to perform their duty to protect civilians, neither  were 
they are aware about the authorisation to use force under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.699 This highlights the fact that peacekeepers are not adequately trained to 
their new role to protect civilians. Indeed, protection of civilians is a relatively new role 
for the UN peacekeepers.700 In addition, there was a huge communication gap 
between the peacekeepers and the local populations and also the local military 
officers.701 According to one Congolese official, language is a significant problem since 
peacekeepers cannot communicate with the population that they are supposed to 
protect. For him, this has severely undermined the credibility of the mission and 
explains why the population is so hostile to them.702 In fact, in addition to the language 
and cultural barriers, peacekeepers are also confronted with the lack of 
                                                          
698 Human Rights Watch, Killing in Kiwanja: The UN’s inability to protect civilians, December 2008, available 
athttp://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc1208web.pdf, accessed on 07 February 2013. 
699 MONUC Internal report: ‘The Uruguayan peacekeepers were convinced that they were not operating 
under Chapter VII and therefore assumed they were not allowed to use force. Instead of undertaking action 
the peacekeepers waited for authorisation from the Uruguayan parliament.’   
700 Interview with a UN official, Geneva, 23 March 1010. 
701 A large proportion of the UN Peacekeepers in the DRC are non-francophone from India, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, etc. 
702 Interview with a Congolese army official, Goma, November 2012. 
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implementation of methods and mechanisms of protection of civilians on the ground.703  
As highlighted in the MONUC Joint Human Rights Office report:  
It remains unclear whether the military personnel in Kiwanja had the 
understanding/knowledge or capacity to stop the arbitrary executions: Due 
to language/cultural barriers and a lack of effective communication with the 
population, the information flow between peacekeepers and civilians 
remained limited. Consequently, peacekeepers would not have been aware 
of the nature and scope of the events taking place in their proximity, making 
a prompt response to the CNDP attack impossible.704 
It should however be noted that while MONUC had been severely criticized for its 
inability to protect civilians from mass atrocities, its action has contributed to a certain 
level of political stability and improvement of security processes. According to the 
Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, MONUC and it successor MONUSCO had 
facilitated a significant reduction in membership of various armed groups in eastern 
DRC through its Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and 
Resettlement (DDRRR) framework.705 According to one official, without this UN 
engagement, the political stability that prevailed in the DRC today could not be 
possible. Recognizing that MONUC has failed to adequately address the protection of 
civilians faced with mass atrocities in Eastern DRC, he argued that it is illusory to think 
that MONUC can succeed to protect every civilian in danger in the DRC given  the 
size of the territory affected by the conflict, coupled with the lack of infrastructure and 
security challenges.706 It is sad to say it, but that is the reality as he saw it. 
                                                          
703 Ibid.  
704 See Julie Reynaert, ‘MONUC/MONUSCO and Civilian Protection in the Kivus’ International Peace 
Information Service, 2011.  
705 See Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect at 
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p_monitor_sept2013.pdf, accessed on 12 October 2013. 
706 Interview with the author. 
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MONUC has also been involved in many other activities with regard to protection of 
civilians. This includes investigations on human rights violation allegations, 
stabilisation strategies and military operations against armed groups. Indeed, different 
FARDC/MONUC joint military operations were established since 2008 to eliminate the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the demobilisation of all militias 
operating in the eastern region.707 However, human rights activists and some 
international organizations have severely criticized this operation arguing that the UN 
forces were cooperating with the Congolese army which is also involved in massive 
human rights violations.708 Another issue raised was that these military operations 
have caused an additional humanitarian crisis and the killing of many civilians as a 
reprisal for the attacks.709 One may also argue that the integration of former militias 
into the national army continue to threaten the security of the civilian population given 
the lack of discipline and training in law of armed conflict. 
In response to the issues raised above, noting the deterioration of the situation, on 23 
December 2009 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1906 underlining the support 
of the peacekeeping mission to the DRC government in protecting civilians. In this 
resolution, the council clearly demands that: 
The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in furtherance 
of resolution 1888 (2009)710, immediately take appropriate measures to 
protect civilians, including women and children, from violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including all forms 
of sexual violence; urges the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo to ensure the full implementation of its ‘zero-tolerance policy 
                                                          
707 The Amani peace process. 
708 Interview with human rights activists in Bukavu, October 2012. 
709 Interview with a UNICEF staff member in Bukavu, October 2012. 
710 See UN Security Council, Security CouncilRresolution 1888 (2009) [on acts of sexual violence against 
civilians in armed conflicts], 30 September 2009, S/RES/1888, 2009, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ac9aa152.html, accessed 2 October 2013. 
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‘with respect to discipline and human rights violations, including sexual and 
gender-based violence, committed by elements of the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and further urges that all 
reports of such violations be thoroughly investigated, with the support of 
MONUC, and that all those responsible be brought to justice through a 
robust and independent process711  
Unfortunately, due to the lack of progress in security process and  difficulties in 
integrating former rebels into the Congolese army, the civilian population continued to 
be targeted, as pointed out in the Security Council Resolution 1925 adopted in May 
2010. This  states: 
Stressing the primary responsibility of the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its 
civilians with respect for the rule of law, human rights and international 
humanitarian law, stressing the urgency of implementing comprehensive 
security sector reform and of achieving as appropriate the disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration (DDR) of Congolese armed groups, and the 
disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration 
(DDRRR) of foreign armed groups for the long-term stabilization of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, considering the need to create the 
security conditions for ensuring sustainable economic development, and 
stressing the importance of the contribution made by international partners 
in these fields,  
Remaining greatly concerned by the humanitarian and human rights 
situation in areas affected by armed conflicts, condemning in particular the 
targeted attacks against the civilian population, widespread sexual 
violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers and extrajudicial executions, 
and stressing the urgent need for the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, in cooperation with the United Nations and other 
                                                          
711 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1906 (2009) [on extension of the deployment of the 
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)], 23 December 2009, S/RES/1906, 
2009, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b66c06c0.html, accessed 2 October 2013. 
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relevant actors, to end violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, fight impunity and bring the perpetrators to justice and 
provide medical, humanitarian and other assistance to victims.712 
It has to be pointed out that while the Security Council had adopted several resolutions 
in connection with the situation in the DRC in particular with regard to the protection 
of civilians from mass atrocities,713 there was no mention of the R2P. However, it is 
obvious that the Security Council has recognized that mass atrocities against the 
civilian population continue in Eastern DRC and that the government has failed to 
protect its population. It is therefore uncertain as to whether the Security Council 
considers the DRC crisis as an R2P situation, as there have been numerous 
opportunities to undertake actions under the R2P framework, particularly in its 
enforcement aspect. Nevertheless, in extreme crisis when the UN forces were unable 
to provide security to the civilian population in the eastern Congolese province of Ituri, 
the UN called upon the EU to address the situation. In fact, the EU has been active 
with regard to the situation in the DRC since the beginning of the conflict.714 However, 
while its action in the crisis involve humanitarian, political and diplomatic actions, its 
two military operations, ARTEMIS in 2003 and EUFOR RDC in 2006, need to be 
underlined. It is in this context that it has succeeded to halt mass atrocities in 2003 in 
the Ituri province. 
                                                          
712 See UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) [on extension of the mandate of the UN 
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)], 28 May 2010, S/RES/1925, 
2010, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c174e522.html, accessed 2 October 2013. 
713 For more information on UN documents on the DRC conflicts see International Coalition for Responsibility 
to protect, available at  http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc, accessed on 02 
October 2013. 
714 See for example Hans Hoebeke, Stéphanie Carette and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘EU Support to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo’, Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, 2007. 
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6.3 European Union Operation Artemis to halt mass atrocities in Ituri 
Following the UN forces’ inability to halt violence and the killing of civilians in the Ituri 
province in 2003, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for ‘a rapid deployment 
of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force under the lead of a member 
State, to protect the civilian population and to provide security to vital installations in 
Bunia’.715 In fact, there was an urgent need to address humanitarian conditions and 
the ethnic violence between Lendu and Hema which could result in genocide.716  On 
30 May 2003, by Resolution 1484, the Security Council717 authorized under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational force led 
by France to enforce peace in Bunia. Called ARTEMIS, the operation mandate was to 
put an end to the killing of civilians, to prevent widely mass atrocities in Bunia, to 
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, to restore security to the 
town and to increase humanitarian conditions.718 However, the operation was limited 
in time and space; it was authorized for three months until 1 September 2003 and the 
rest of the Ituri district was not covered. Nevertheless, the operation was a success. 
As Aldo Ajello commented:  
The recent EU-led multinational peace enforcement mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Opération Artemis was a big 
humanitarian, military and political success, the force fulfilled its mission by 
                                                          
715 A letter of the UN Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council on the situation in 
Bunia, 15 May 2003, UN Doc. S/2003/574. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan specifically appealed to Javier 
Solana to build support to promote collective values and shared norms regarding African strategic interests for 
the EU. At a meeting of the EU defence ministers in May 2003, Solana presented Annan’s request on May 19 to 
the meeting of EU defence ministers and drafted a reaction to Annan from the EU, while he sent his assistant, 
Aldo Ajello, to initiate diplomatic overtures with Uganda, Rwanda, and the DRC to withdraw, while briefing the 
UN Security Council.  See Hendrickson et al, ‘Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for a Stronger 
Common Foreign and Security Policy’, Canadian Military Journal, 2007. 
716 Carla Delponte, the ICC Chief Prosecutor at that time maintained that ‘the violence could be a genocide’. 
See Hendrickson et al, ‘Operation Artemis and Javier Solana: EU Prospects for a Stronger Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’, Canadian Military Journal, 2007. 
717 UNSC Resolution 1484 of 30 May 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1484, 2003, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/377/68/PDF/N0337768.pdf?OpenElement, accessed on 06 February 2013. 
718 Ibid. 
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restoring security, helping people to return home and restart economic 
activity in Bunia…the determined attitude of the multinational force enable 
a rapid elimination of the threat posed by aggressive armed groups in 
Bunia, as well as in the surrounding area.719 
 
It is clear that the success of the operation was mostly due to the fact that the mission 
was narrowly defined and the troops were highly skilled and well trained.720 The 
operation was composed of 1,500 well trained and equipped soldiers but their robust 
mandate was limited to Bunia.721 The Artemis Operation constitutes one of the positive 
experiences of solidarity and cooperation between the United Nations and the EU in 
addressing mass atrocities. Indeed, the mission prevented ethnic cleansing in Bunia 
and stopped the ethnic violence which could have amounted to genocide. However, 
some commentators consider that the crucial factor which helped in shaping the EU 
decision to intervene in the DRC was to send a signal to the United States of America 
after the differences about Iraq. In other words, the political motivation behind the 
intervention was to show that the EU was united after the debacles of  Iraq. As 
Hendrickson et al. note:  ‘France’s willingness to deploy troops came only two months 
after Operation Iraqi Freedom, which France, Germany, and a number of other EU 
member states had opposed vehemently. Such a show of EU cooperation in Operation 
Artemis may have resulted, in part, as a demonstration of European solidarity after 
intense differences it has experienced earlier with the United States’.722 Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that this intervention occurred before the World Summit adoption of 
                                                          
719 Statement by Aldo Ajello, the EU Special representative for Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Brussels, 17 
September 2003, available at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/46206/DRC-EU-calls-Artemis-operation-a-big-
success. 
720 The Forces deployed included French, Swedish, Canadian, Belgian, South African and British. 
721 See UN peacekeeping in the Service of peace, ‘Operation ARTEMIS: The Lesson on the Interim Emergency 
Multinational Force’, Peacekeeping, Military Division, October 2004. 
722 Hendrickson et al., op.cit. 
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R2P, it can be argued that this was a strong signal with regard to R2P since at this 
time the principle was at its early stage and the Iraqi war could undermine its meaning 
since the invaders were also invoking the emerging norm.723   
 
The EU’s rapid response to halt mass atrocities in Bunia also shows the extent to 
which an adequately trained and well-equipped force ready to be deployed can save 
the lives of thousands of people. However, since Artemis was limited in time, there 
was a risk of escalation of violence and the killing of the civilian population after the 
withdrawal of Artemis Forces. In response, the Security Council by Resolution 1493 
adopted on 28 July 2003 increased the MONUC force to 10,800 personnel and 
authorized the mission to use all necessary means to fulfil its mission in Ituri.724 
However, it is important to note that no EU member state has sent its troops to the 
DRC in the context of UN force. This demonstrates the EU limitation over the  issues 
pertaining to intervention in the face of serious humanitarian crisis. With regard to the 
European states’ limited willingness to  engage their troops in a UN mission, some 
commentators point out the fact that EU humanitarian protection operations are 
usually short-term with a clear exit-option involving only limited resources and risks.725  
There is no doubt that a well equipped and professional Western army could perhaps 
help in empowering and strengthening the UN force in eastern DRC. As Schrank 
observes: ‘Artemis was equipped with surveillance devices, air support, an intelligence 
apparatus, including soldiers who could communicate with the Congolese (in French), 
a field doctor, a liaison with the civilian aid effort, all organized by a professional 
                                                          
723  The US and the UK invoked R2P to justify the invasion of Iraq. See Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris, 
‘Justifying Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention: The Cure is Worse than the Disease’ in W.P.S Sidhu and 
Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Structural and Normative Challenges, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007. 
724 S/RES/1493, 2003, 28 July 2003. 
725 See Mattias Denibinski and Theresa Runold, ‘Libya and the Future of the Responsibility to Protect- African 
and European perspective’ PRIF, 2011. 
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Western army. These ingredients have been noted as critical to operational success 
but MONUC, and MONUSCO, have always lacked them’.726 It can therefore be argued 
that, while the Bunia crisis has demonstrated the EU’s capabilities in challenging the 
crisis, specifically civilian protection from mass atrocities, there is a lack of willingness 
and interest on behalf of the EU to continue to address the ongoing crisis. Unfortunatly, 
as a former French Minister comments: ‘this is certainly due to the tensions which 
exists between the strategic interests of states and the needs of the populations facing 
mass atrocities. The Challenge is therefore to gain required commitment and capacity 
to respond effectively to mass atrocities .’ 727 In other words, it can be argued that 
capacity and willingness are the key factors for the implementation of R2P in 
addressing mass atrocities. In this regard, as R2P seeks to reinforce global 
responsibility to respond to crises characterized by mass atrocities, further 
developments are needed to make states feel morally if not legally compelled to the 
extraterritorial protection of civilians. As previously mentioned, military intervention to 
protect civilians is likely to only happen if states which possess the capacity are willing 
to act. It is important however to note that there is strong support for R2P among the 
EU states. In fact, all EU officials interviewed by this author underlined that R2P has 
become an integral part of international protection norms. However, some expressed 
concerns about the enforcement aspects of the new norm.728 
 
It is in this context that, in view of the continuing instability in the lead-up to the 2006 
elections in DRC, the UN once again called upon the EU to support MONUC in 
ensuring security during the elections. Thus, by Resolution 1671 adopted on 25 April 
                                                          
726 See Delphine Schrank ‘Democratic Republic in Congo’ in Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler, The Responsibility 
to Protect: The Promise of Ending Mass Atrocities in Our Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 340. 
727 Interview with a former French Minister of Defence, Paris, December. 
728 Interview in Paris and Brussels. 
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2006, the Security Council authorised the deployment of a second European Union 
Force (EUFOR) in support of the UN mission in the Congo.729 This led to the 
successful and peaceful presidential and parliamentary election on 30 June 2006. 
Certainly, protection of civilians is not limited to the use of force; however the 
mechanisms used by the European Union can serve as a model by the international 
community in order to take necessary action when a rapid response to stop mass 
atrocities is needed. This highlights once again the need for a UN rapid reaction force 
which can be deployed for timely interventions to halt mass atrocities. 
6. 4 Diplomatic initiatives to respond to the crisis  
 
6.4.1 Response to the 2008 crisis  
 
In the aftermath of the Kiwanja killings,730 noting the rapid deterioration of the situation, 
the UN Secretary-General, on 4 November 2008, appointed the former President of 
Nigeria, Mr Olusegun Obasanjo, his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region.731 The 
mission given to Special Envoy Obasanjo included assisting the governments of the 
Great Lakes region to address the challenges to peace and security posed by the 
presence and activities of armed groups in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. The UN Secretary-General further requested him to work closely with all 
protagonists in the sub region in order to reach a comprehensive and durable solution 
to the crisis and in particular the governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and Rwanda.   
                                                          
729 UNSC Resolution 1671 adopted on 25 April 2006, UN.Doc S/RES/1671, 2006. 
730 Although MONUC had around 120 peacekeepers stationed in a military camp at approximately three 
kilometres from the attacks, they did not manage to protect the local population. According to the UN joint 
Human Rights Office at least 67 persons were killed. See MONUC UNJHRO, September 2009. 
731 See UN.Doc SG/A/1166, 9 December 2008. 
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On 7 November, the UN Secretary-General and his Special Advisor attended a summit 
in Nairobi with key regional actors including Kabila, President of DRC, Kagame, 
President of Rwanda and Kikwete, President of AU. The UN Secretary-General 
highlighted the need for political will among the leaders of the region to deal with the 
challenge posed by the armed groups. He also expressed the determination of the 
United Nations to end the crisis in the DRC stating that: 
 […] we have had many meetings, we have adopted many communiqués 
and statements and declarations and based on the will and wishes of the 
whole international community, not necessarily only the African people, this 
is the wish of the whole international community to see peace and stability 
in this region… During the last one decade, in Congo only, five million 
people have died either from war, hunger, disease and displacement. 
Therefore, they must think about their own future. Now MONUC has a 
mandate to keep peace there. They knew that MONUC’s mandate has 
limitations. In fact MONUC has over-stretched. We are now talking about 
17,000 people in a land that is almost the size of the whole European 
continent. In this vast country, we have serious limitations in our resources, 
in our capacities. Considering this, African leaders have expressed their 
strong commitment that after such frustrations and appeals, and urged if 
they are not able to resolve this issue, they expressed their firm 
determination that they will be ready when and if necessary to resolve this 
issue once and for all, even through their own peacemaking forces. This is 
not a threat for the purpose of threat. This time, all these militias must hear 
such a strong message.732  
In the same month, the Special Advisor of the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention 
of Genocide, Mr Francis Deng undertook a mission to the Great Lakes region from 23 
November to 4 December 2008. The aim of the mission was to examine whether acts 
                                                          
732 Secretary-General’s Joint Press Conference with his Special Envoy to the Eastern DRC Olusengun Obasanjo 
and Special Representative for DRC Alan Doss following the African Union Summit on the DRC, Nairobi, 7 
November 2008. 
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of violence and massive human rights abuses committed on the civilian population in 
North Kivu could be a signal of ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part a nation, ethnical, 
racial or religious group as such’ according to the provisions of the 1948 Convention 
on the prevention and the punishment of the crime of the genocide.733 The conclusions 
of the Special Adviser were that violation of international human rights and 
humanitarian law were being committed on the basis of ethnicity and national origin.734   
It is interesting to note that the international community initiative to address the crisis 
in the DRC comes at a time when the need to find a common solution on how to 
develop the R2P agenda within the United Nations system become crucial.735 In other 
words, there was a need to find a modus operandi for the emerging norm. On 26 
November 2008, the Security Council held a meeting on the situation concering the 
DRC. The President of the Council, the Representative of Costa Rica, sought to 
remind the responsibility of the international community to protect, urguing that: 
The international community, and in particular the Security Council, has the 
responsibility to protect those who are suffering the consequences of 
violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council has the 
responsibility to protect women and girls who are victims of the cruellest 
forms of violence resulting from the climate of impunity that prevails in the 
Kivus. We also have the responsibility to protect boys and girls who are 
being forcibly recruited by militias. Finally, we have the responsibility to 
protect the more than 1.35 million people who have now been displaced. 
The Council, thus, has clear responsibilities, and we must now discuss the 
steps that must be taken to meet those responsibilities.736  
                                                          
733 Statement by the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, on the situation 
in the democratic republic of Congo, 12 December 2008. 
734 Ibid. 
735 Eduard C. Luck, ’From Promise to Practice: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ in Jared Genser and 
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Similarly, the Representative of  Burkina Faso warned that there was a risk of carnage 
and a possibility of expansion of the conflict to the rest of the subregion if nothing was 
done. He then argued that: 
Once again, the human tragedy being played out on the ground calls out to 
the international community to find, without delay, viable solutions that 
would take into account the responsibility to protect civilian populations as 
well as the duty to pursue and punish all those responsible for atrocities 
committed in the framework of this conflict.737  
  
On 22 December 2008, by Resolution 1856 adopted unanimously, the Security 
Council condemned the targeted attacks against the civilian population, sexual 
violence and recruitment of child soldiers and made the protection of civilians the 
priority of the United Nations peacekeeping forces. 738  In this resolution the mandate 
of MONUC was considerably extended and strengthened. The mandate includes the 
protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel, monitoring cross-border 
movements, assisting with protection and promotion of human rights, promoting the 
political process, supporting the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of 
former combatants, coordinating operations with the Congolese Forces against armed 
groups, facilitating humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees, training and 
monitoring the Congolese Forces in human rights and humanitarian law, and 
deploying and maintaining a presence in volatile areas. The adoption of this resolution 
was an important step since it clearly states that the protection of civilians is the priority 
of the peacekeeping mission. However, although R2P was not expressely mentioned, 
it may have begun to have an impact on the international community’s action to this 
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crisis.  Although the Security Council appeared reluctant to make explicit reference to 
R2P in connection to the crisis, the resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council 
was significant in that it underlined both the primary responsibility of the Congolese 
government vis-à-vis its population and the international community’s duty to assist 
the DRC. This resolution stated:  
The Government has the primary responsibility to make every effort to 
strengthen the protection of the civilian population and to investigate and 
bring to justice perpetrators of violations of human rights and of international 
humanitarian law, and calls upon the international community to support the 
endeavours of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 
its efforts to stabilize the situation in the country.739 
 
It is in this context that under the auspices of the UN Secretary General Envoy, 
Obasanjo and Benjamin Mkapa, the former President of Tanzania representing the 
African Union, an agreement on a wide range of issues was concluded between DRC 
and Rwanda. This led to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Kigali 
and Kinshasa.740The improvement of relationships between the two countries was 
materialized by the arrest of the CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda741 and the launch of a 
joint military offensive against the FDLR in January 2009.742 Furthermore, following 
negotiations between the DRC and armed groups operating in Eastern DRC, the 
Goma Agreement of 23 March 2009743 was signed between the Congolese authorities 
                                                          
739 Human Right Council resolution on the Situation of the human Rights in the East of the DRC adopted on 28 
November 2008, A/HRC/RES/S/8/1. 
740 Interview with an AU official, December 2012. 
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and the CNDP. According to the agreement, the CNDP police force and armed units 
were to be integrated into DRC national Police and the FARDC. However, it is 
important to note that while both FARDC and CNDP forces were accused of targeting 
civilians while perpetrating widespread crimes, the agreement included amnesty for 
the perpetrators.  It is clear therefore that while the agreement goal was to bring peace, 
it faced a serious problem of impunity. In relation to amnesty, Article 3 of the 
agreement states: 
3.1 In order to facilitate national reconciliation, the Government undertakes 
to enact a law of amnesty for the period from June 2003 to the date of its 
enactment, in accordance with international law.  
3.2. The Parties agree to strictly observe the independence of the Judiciary 
as entrenched in the Constitution.  
3.3. The CNDP having expressed concerns over certain provisions of the 
bill already enacted by the National Assembly, which it views as restricting 
the grounds for amnesty, it has been agreed that the Government will 
submit these concerns to Parliament for review.744  
 
One of the important outcomes of the Goma Agreement, however, was the underlying 
issue of Congolese refugees in neighbouring countries and IDPs. In fact, the 
agreement provided essential mechanisms to facilitate the return of refugees.  Thus, 
Article 6 of the agreement stated that: 
6.1 Both Parties agree that living in peace in one’s country and fully 
enjoying one’s citizenship are inalienable rights for every Congolese. For 
this reason, the quick return of Congolese refugees and displaced people 
from neighbouring countries to their original environments is a necessity. 
6.2. Consequently, the Government undertakes to re-establish, as soon as 
possible, Tripartite Commissions on Congolese refugees located in 
neighbouring countries and to carry out the rehabilitation actions necessary 
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to their reintegration. The Parties also agree to encourage and facilitate the 
return of internally displaced people.  
  
This was an important step since the issue of refugees can be considered as one of 
the major problems fuelling the conflict in North Kivu. Indeed, the issue of refugees 
serve as a vehicle for CNDP today, M23 claims, and many of their combatants are 
recruited from refugee camps in neighbouring countries.745 Thus, in the aftermath of 
the signing of the agreement, the Congolese government attempted to deal more 
effectively with the return of refugees by establishing Permanent Local Arbitration 
Committees to promote peaceful coexistence between local population and 
repatriated refugees from Rwanda.  However, it can be argued that the operation did 
not succeed as demonstrated by the UNHCR report which points out the fact that, due 
to the continuing insecurity in eastern DRC, there was not a single Congolese refugee 
living in Rwanda who has been repatriated in the DRC since 2009.746  
It  can,  however, be argued that despite the fact that the Goma Agreement was 
defective in a number of ways, it established a few years of relative stability for North 
and South Kivu provinces which saw the integration of thousands of CNDP 
combatants into regular army.747  Unfortunately, there was no amelioration for civilians 
and despite the signing of the peace agreement between the DRC government and 
CNDP, mass atrocities against the population continued to happen throughout the 
eastern region.748 The fact that the agreement was not accompanied by adequate 
post-conflict mechanisms such as governance reforms and political dialogue 
                                                          
745 Government confidential document. 
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illustrates that there was not a strong follow-up on the implementation of the peace 
agreement by the Congolese government. According to International Crisis Group, 
‘rather than effectively implementing the 23 March 2009 peace Agreement, the 
Congolese authorities have instead only feigned the integration of the CNDP into 
political institutions, and likewise the group appears to have only pretended to 
integrate into the Congolese army’. It further observes that ‘in the absence of the 
agreed army reform, military pressure on armed groups had only a temporary 
effect’.749 Indeed, as previous agreements which have been signed and were not 
honoured,750 the implementation of the agreement failed and this led to the resurgence 
of former CNDP into the M23 rebellion movement and recurring episodes of violence. 
 
6.4.2 Response to the 2012 crisis 
 
 A recent episode of conflict in Eastern DRC broke out in April 2012 when a group of 
soldiers who mutinied from the DRC national army created a rebellion movement 
called M23.751 According to one of the M23 leaders, Col. Makenga Sultani, the mutiny 
was due to the failure of the Congolese government to implement the 2009 peace 
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available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/b091-eastern-congo-
why-stabilisation-failed.pdf, accessed on 12 October 2013. 
750 For example The Pact of Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region, signed in Nairobi 
on 15 December  2006; The Nairobi Joint Communiqué of 9 November 2007,  The Peace Agreements signed in 
Goma on 23 January 2008 at the end of the Conference on Peace, Stability and Development in the provinces 
of North Kivu and South Kivu. 
751 M23 refers to the date peace accords were signed 23 March 2009 between the Congolese government 
and the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), a rebel group led by Laurent Nkunda. Under 
the accords, former fighters were supposed to have been integrated into national army, but some of them say 
they were not treated fairly, and that the peace treaty was never fully put into effect. This was apparently the 
reason that pushed them to defect from the government army and to form the M23 movement. According to 
the UN Security Council’s Group of Experts, M23 movement is believed to be supported by Rwanda and 
Uganda by providing it with arms, support and soldiers. However, both countries have strongly denied this 
allegation rejecting the veracity of the report. It should be also noted that Bosco Ntaganda who is now wanted 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) is one of the officials of the M23 movement. 
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agreement and the grievances of former CNDP members and the Tutsi community 
into the Congolese army.752 However, some regional analysts such as Colette 
Braeckman maintained that the former CNDP fighters had created an army within the 
army and that they refused to be ruled as the other regular FARDC soldiers. She 
argued that they did not want to be removed from their eastern provinces to be sent 
to other parts of the country as was normally the case for the other battalions.753 
Furthermore, some of their officers, such as Bosco Ntaganda, were suspected of 
atrocities and mass killings against the civilian populations.754However, some other 
commentators including Congolese government officials who were interviewed by this 
author argued that this rebellion was created when, urged by the international 
community, Joseph Kabila demonstrated his willingness to arrest Bosco Ntaganda, 
who then decided to leave Goma along with his men and mutinied.755 After heavy 
fighting against the Congolese troops the M23 grew in power and seized a part of 
North Kivu’s territory in which it created its own administration and its own financing 
system. Meanwhile Mai-Mai groups were expanding in rural areas where they also 
committed atrocities that exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions.756 In July 2012, in 
accordance with the peace and security architecture, the International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) organised extraordinary meetings  to prevent a 
conflict between Rwanda and the DRC.  The outcome of the talks was the deployment 
of an international neutral force at the border. After his visit to DRC, Mr Hervé Ladsous, 
Under-Secretary General of the United Nations for Peacekeeping Operations, 
                                                          
752 Interview with the author. 
753 Ibid. 
754 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/afrique/region/2012/07/120711_rdc_ntaganda_portrait.shtml, accessed on 23 
January 2013. 
See  Le Carnet de Colette Braeckman, ‘L’Imprudence de Kinshasa, c’est d’avoir voulu démanteler l’armée dans 
l’armée’, 16 July 2012, available at http://blog.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman/2012/07/16/limprudence-de-
kinshasa-cest-davoir-voulu-demanteler-larmee-dans-larmee/, accessed on 23 January 2013. 
756 Ibid. 
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expressed his concern about the extreme fragility of the ceasefire and reported to the 
Security Council on 18 September 2012 that only a political solution could address the 
root causes of the conflict.757 
 
On 15 November 2012, heavy fighting broke out between the M23 rebels and the 
Congolese army which led to the capture of Goma. According to an Amnesty 
International report, human rights abuses committed on civilians by both parties to the 
conflict, FARDC and M23, included violations of the duty to care for the civilian 
population when launching attacks, forced recruitment of children who were either 
trained to take part in hostilities or forced to work to build military positions, unlawful 
killing and acts of sexual violence.758  
Following this, a United Nations group of experts released a report mentioning that 
M23 was backed by both Rwanda and Uganda with recruitment and ammunitions.759 
However, Kigali and Kampala vehemently rejected the accusations arguing that the 
report was one sided and that these experts had no evidence for their claims.760 
According to a Rwandan Diplomat at the UN, ‘UN Experts have been allowed to pursue 
a political agenda that has nothing to do with getting at the true causes of conflict in 
the eastern DRC’.761 However, it should be noted that there was no consensus among 
the Security Council members about the alleged support of Rwanda and Uganda to 
the M23 rebels. Indeed, the council was divided on the issue. According to one French 
government official, this is due to the fact that the international community continues 
                                                          
757 Statement available at  http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/democratic-republic-of-the-
congo.php?page=2, accessed on 12 October 2013. 
758 See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian news and analysis ‘DRC’, 
available at http://www.irinnews.org/report/97779/briefing-m23-one-year-on, accessed on 12 October 2013. 
759 See UN. Doc. S/2012/348, 27 June 2012; UN.Doc. S/2012/843, 15 November 2012. 
760 United Nations Security Council internal documents. 
761 Statement available at http://www.france24.com/en/20121017-un-report-rwanda-uganda-arming-dr-
congo-m23-rebels-insurgency-defence-minister, accessed on 11 October 2013. 
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to pay the price of its inaction in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.762 However, political 
actors in the region believe that competing regional and international interests in this 
area which is very rich in natural resources has a great influence on the council 
members.763 This highilights that the Security Council is struggling to turn the R2P 
framework into reality in this complex conflict.  
On 20 November 2012, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2076 in which it 
determined that the situation in the DRC consistutes a threat to international peace 
and security.  It states:  
[The Security Council] Strongly condemns the M23 and all its attacks on 
the civilian population, MONUSCO peacekeepers and humanitarian actors, 
as well as its abuses of human rights, including summary executions, 
sexual and gender based violence and large scale recruitment and use of 
child soldiers, further condemns the attempts by the M23 to establish an 
illegitimate parallel administration and to undermine State authority of the 
Government of the DRC, and reiteratesthat those responsible for crimes 
and human rights abuses will be held accountable.764 
 
While R2P was not mentioned in the Security Council debate and the issue was 
discussed within the framework of the traditional framework of international peace and 
security, the Representative of France, in remarks to the press, recalled the primary 
responsibility of the Congolese government to protect its population. He argued that: 
La France soutient la République démocratique du Congo dans cette 
entreprise. La restauration de l’autorité de l’Etat congolais est la seule 
manière, finalement, de protéger les civils. Ce ne sont pas les Nations unies 
qui protégeront les civils le plus efficacement mais les autorités légitimes 
de la RDC.765 
                                                          
762 Interview with a French official in Paris, November 2013. 
763 Interview with a government official in the Great Lakes region. 
764 UN.DOC S/RES/2076, 2012, 20 November 2012. 
765 20 November 2012 - Democratic Republic of Congo - Remarks to the press by Mr. Gérard Araud, 
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, available at http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-
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On 28 November 2012, the Security Council met again to debate the situation in 
Eastern DRC and unanimously adopted Resolution 2078 in which it reiterates its call 
on the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to ‘monitor and 
inquire into, including by making active use of the Expanded Joint Verification 
Mechanism (EJVM), reports and allegations of outside support and supply of 
equipment to the M23, and encourages MONUSCO, in coordination with ICGLR 
members, to participate, as appropriate and within the limits of its capacities and 
mandate, in the activities of the EJVM’.766 It is in this context that new peace talks 
between the Congolese government and the M23 was initiated in December 2012 
under the auspice of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region. This is 
important as it is beyond controversy that the DRC conflict demands the involvement 
and the willingness of domestic and regional political actors. This was seen by the 
declaration of a joint delegation of the AU, EU and US led by the UN Secretary-General 
Special Envoy to the Great Lakes, Mary Robinson,767 during its visit to the region 
(DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) as they called for the implementation of peace, security 
and cooperation framework in the DRC and in the Region. 768 Thus, in a briefing to the 
Security Council following the visit to the region, Mary Robinson stated: ‘The regional 
initiatives have helped mitigate the impact of the crisis and it is important that the 
international community, including the Security Council acknoweledges that role, if we 
want to make progress under the renewed parternship to end the crisis in eastern 
                                                          
the-united-nations/press-room/speaking-to-the-media/remarks-to-the-press/article/20-november-2012-
democratic, accessed on 24 October 2013.  
766 UN.DOC S/RES/2078, 2012, 28 November 2012. 
767 Mary Robinson, the former President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was 
appointed Special Envoy to the Great Lakes in March 2013. 
768 IRIN,’Doubts Linger as DRC Peace talks resume’, available at 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/98741/doubts-linger-as-drc-peace-talks-resume, accessed on 20 October 
2013. 
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DRC’.769What this demonstrates is that there is a need  to support political action 
undertaken at the regional level in order to address this conflict. 
 
6.5 The role of regional institutions in the crisis 
 
As demonstrated earlier in this work, the ICISS report emphasizes that the opinion of 
other countries in the region should be taken into account and the extent to which the 
idea of military intervention is supported by people.770 This was an important 
development with regard to the importance of the role of regional organizations in a 
crisis to ease the action of the Security Council. However, it is significant to note that 
a coalition of states can be opposed to a military intervention only by ideology even 
when a state has failed to protect its population or is itself the perpetrator. Conflicts in 
Côte d’Ivoire771 and Libya are good examples of state failure to protect its population 
and a lack of leadership or consensus displayed by regional and sub-regional 
organizations.772 While these crises have revealed the urgent need for regional and 
sub-regional organizations to lead in the implementation of R2P, this has also 
demonstrated the challenges that the doctrine can face at a regional level, given the 
divergent political views which can always tend to impede the decision making 
process. Of course, due to the lack of political will regional factors still prevail. 
                                                          
769 Mary Robinson, Briefing to the Security Council, available at 
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/Great%20Lakes%20Envoy%20Briefing%20to
%20the%20Security%20Council%206%20May%202013.pdf, accessed on 20 October 2013. 
770 See ICISS Report op.cit. 
771 Following the post-election crisis in Ivory Coast, the member states of the Economic Community of 
Western African States (ECOWAS) aligned themselves with the UN position calling for a military option if 
necessary to remove Gbagbo from office.  They were against the idea of power-sharing as it was the case in 
Kenya and Zimbabwe.  The AU position, however, was quite different from the ECOWAS but the latter finally 
made the majority of African leader to take side with Ouattara camp. It is in this context that the Security 
Council was able to adopt unanimously Resolution 1975.771 From this time, Gbagbo realized that the situation 
has changed and that he was losing support. He, for example, multiplies exactions against civilians. 
772 Interview with the Diplomatic Adviser to the French President. 
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Nevertheless, while in both the Côte d’Ivoire and Libya conflicts, the AU’s position was 
not exemplary and was criticized as slow, uncertain, ineffective and lacking courage 
to take timely action, it is clear that it has played an important role in the resolution of 
the crisis.773 Similarly, the role that the Arab League could play in the Syrian crisis is 
not negligible. It is clear that a consensus within the Arab League about the 
seriousness of the situation in Syria could largely contribute to find a solution on how 
to halt the bloodshed.  
 
This illustrates the fact that the lack of consensus and capacity by regional or sub-
regional organizations can be an obstacle to address mass atrocities in member 
states. Unfortunately, opponents to R2P continue to claim that Western leaders and 
Western states would claim intervening in the cause of protecting human rights while 
behind they have strategic interests. Indeed, African government officials interviewed 
by this author, while expressing their deep acknoweldegemnt of the potential of R2P 
to address mass atrocities, had reservations on its operationalization. Part of them 
deplored the fact that R2P was used  by intervening states to pursue their goal to 
change the regime in Libya.774  
 
However, with regard to the DRC conflict, it can be argued that the AU, SADC and 
ICGLR are playing a key role in promoting regional peace and security.  It is important 
to note that among African Leaders, there is a belief that African problems require 
African solutions. As pointed out by the African Union Commission Chairman Jean 
Ping at the opening of the July 2012 AU Peace and Security summit, ‘the solutions to 
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African problems are found on the continent and nowhere else’.775 However, AU has 
shown its own limitations due to lack of capacity and resources. Indeed, the 
organization is far from being able to bear the expenses related to conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding. Given that, it is questionable how the organization can adequately 
deal with security issues on the continent. Furthermore, there has been some criticism 
about AU’s ability to deliver a peaceful conclusion to different conflicts in the continent 
as rivalries and tensions between different members of the organisation exist.776   
 
It should be noted however that, in the Eastern DRC crisis, sub-regional organisations 
had in many instances bypassed the AU role. As previously mentioned, the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region has been actively involved in 
peace negotiations between the DRC government and the M23 rebellion 
movement.777  It is however doubtful whether ICGLR would be successful since the 
relations between its member states remain highly contentious and some of its 
members are accused of being indirectly involved in the crisis. In fact,  the issue of 
exploitation of natural resources has often been cited as one of the major factors 
fuelling the confict. Therefore discussions over the causes of the Eastern DRC crisis 
tend to focus on the issue of natural resources. Thus, the majority of international 
experts agree on the fact that natural resources is the major cause of the conflict and 
that all armed groups operating in the DRC and the FARDC, state officials and even 
                                                          
775 See Jean Ping statement at the opening session of the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis 
Ababa, July 14, 2012, available at  
http://www.voanews.com/content/au_seeks_regional_response_to_conflicts/1405037.html.    
776 See for example,Liisa Laakso, ‘What Role for the African Regional Organization in Peace and Security?’, The 
Round Table, vol.94, no. 381, 2005, pp 489-502. 
777 For more information see The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect ‘DRC’, available at 
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p_monitor_sept2013.pdf, accessed on 11 October 2013.  
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non-state actors are involved in mining exploitation.778 Even some peacekeepers are 
allegedly involved in the trafficking of mineral resources, particularly diamonds, gold, 
copper, cobalt and coltan. In fact, claims have been made that MONUC provides 
strategic information to rebel groups, especially to the FDLR, and in exchange they 
are given natural resources.779 Many reports have also underlined the regional 
dimensions to the exploitation of natural resources and the role of neighbouring 
governments in contributing to the illegal exploitation and its impact to the Eastern 
DRC conflict.  Indeed, almost all UN reports on this conflict maintain that the Eastern 
DRC instability has benefits to those who exploit its natural wealth.780  
 
It should be noted, however, that in order to address the issue mentioned above, a 
peace agreement aimed at ending the Eastern DRC crisis was recently signed 
                                                          
778 See for example Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other 
forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, December 2009, available at  
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/drcongo.htm,  accessed on 21 October 2013; See also Global Policy 
Forum, ‘Understanding Conflict Minerals Provisions in Eastern Congo’, available at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/democratic-
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Democratic Republic of Congo. 2005. New York; Washington; London; Brussels: Human Rights Watch; Kennes, 
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Arnson and I. William Zartman, (eds.), Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and 
Greed Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington, D.C.; The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore; United 
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of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002; United Nations. 
Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2002/565, 22 May 2002; United Nations. 
Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001; United 
Nations. Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2001/357, 12 April 2001; United Nations. Report of the 
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between 11 countries in the region.781 The agreement called Peace, Security and 
Cooperation Framework for the Republic Democratic of the Congo requires regional 
commitment including the prohibition of state parties, that they should ‘neither harbor 
nor provide protection of any kind to persons accused of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, acts of genocide or crimes of aggression, or persons falling under the United 
Nations sanctions regime’.782 The agreement further calls for the establishment of a 
neutral intervention force to address the issue of rebel forces operating in Eastern 
DRC. While the agreement can be considered as an important step in addressing the 
Eastern DRC crisis, some commentators are skeptical since similar regional 
agreements have failed to bring peace to Eastern DRC.783 They also deplore the fact 
that the agreement is long on rhetoric but too short on detail and solid action plans.784 
However, the agreement was described by Mary Robinson, the Special Envoy to the 
Great Lakes, as a framework of hope.  She stated that: ‘ For if this new attempt is to 
succeed where others have fallen short, there must be optimism and courage in place 
of cynicism. The governments and the people of this region, and the international 
community, must believe once again that peace can be achieved and take the 
necessary actions to obtain it. As this process advances, it must bring hope to the 
people who are the victims and who will ultimately be its beneficiaries’.785  
 
                                                          
781 The countries part of the agreement include Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, DRC, Republic of 
Congo, South Africa, South Soudan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
782 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region, 
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785 Mary Robinson, Briefing to the Security Council, available at 
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However, the major cause of the continual conflict in Eastern DRC is not limited to the 
mining issue. Since the DRC is a fragile state, it cannot provide adequate protection 
to its population unless its institutions are strengthened and the problem of ethnicity is 
resolved. This cannot be achieved until the DRC has a strong and unified army 
comprised of individuals from different tribes and excluding those who are guilty of 
massive human rights violations. In fact, the security situation in Eastern DRC is 
marked by the quasi-inexistence of state structures, and the complexity of armed 
groups in rural areas mobilised along ethnic lines. However, the aspect of ethnicity in 
this conflict has been often ignored. In fact, during the field research for this project, 
the ethnic dimension was identified by this author as one of the major conflict drivers 
and one of the aggravation factors of massive human rights violations against the 
civilian population. In this regard, using R2P as a framework can assist in exploring 
the root causes of the conflict in Eastern DRC and therefore the possibility to prevent 
mass atrocities. 
 
6.6 The role of the International Criminal Court   
 
Pursuant to Article 17 of the Rome Statute, if a state fails to genuinely investigate and 
prosecute a situation in which genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes have 
been committed, then ICC can exercise its jurisdiction.786 Thus, according to the 
Complementarity Principle,787 the ICC may take over a case from a national jurisdiction 
if it is manifestly clear that a state is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution. Hence, national courts retain primary competence to exercise 
                                                          
786 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Artilce 17. 
787 See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 342-
43, see also Sharon A. Wiliam and Willaim A. Schabas, ‘Article 17 Issues of Admissibility’ in Otto Trifferer (ed.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 605, 610, 2008. 
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jurisdiction over mass atrocity crimes and the ICC is therefore a mechanism through 
which international responsibility to prevent and to rebuild can be fulfilled. In fact, in 
addition to its deterrent effect on potential perpetrators, it fills the impunity gap in cases 
of states’ failure to fulfil its responsibility.  
As mentioned earlier in chapter 5,  in the DRC, a profound culture of impunity  prevails 
in the country even in the face of  grave humanitarian and human rights violations and 
this has led to the lack of confidence in the judicial systems to defend  the civilian 
population.788 The Congolese justice system has certainly prosecuted some of the 
perpetrators, however, the lack of political will to prosecute serious violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law committed in the DRC is obvious. 
The majority of interviewed human rights activists and local NGOs have clearly 
confirmed this.  Thus, despite pressure from different NGOs, the Congolese Justice 
System failure in handling war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated on the 
DRC territory continue to be apparent.  The weakness of the Congolese justice system 
is well summarized in a 2010 report issued by the UN Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner. This states: 
To sum up, the following elements lead to the conclusion that the capacity 
of the Congolese justice system to bring an end to impunity for crimes under 
international law are severely limited: (i) the limited engagement of the 
Congolese authorities in strengthening the justice sector, (ii) the very limited 
resources allocated to the judicial system for tackling impunity, (iii) the 
acceptance and tolerance of multiple incidents of interference by the 
political and military authorities in court cases that confirm the system’s lack 
of independence, (iv) the inadequacy of the military justice system, which 
has sole jurisdiction for dealing with the numerous crimes under 
international law often committed by the security forces, (v) inadequate 
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judicial practice and jurisprudence in this area, (vi) and non-compliance with 
international principles in relation to minors and the inadequacy of the 
judicial system for cases of rape. Given the multitude of possible crimes 
under international law committed, the effectiveness and independence of 
the judicial system is crucial in light of the large number of senior figures in 
the armed groups involved in various alleged violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law.789 
 
In this context the referral of Thomas Lubanga to the ICC was a significant step in the 
history of combating impunity for grave violations of humanitarian law and human 
rights law. In fact, Thomas Lubanga was accused of widespread recruitment of 
children under the age of 15 years into the armed group of the Union des Patriotes 
Congolais (UPC) and the Front pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) and using them 
to participate actively in hostilities between September 2002 and August 2003. On 14 
March 2012, pursuant to Article 74 of the Rome Statute, Thomas Lubanga was found 
guilty for the war crimes of conscripting, enlisting and using children under the age of 
15 to participate actively in hostilities from 1 September 2002 to 13 August 2003. A 
few months later, on 10 July 2012 he was sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment.790 
However, the case is currently under appeal as Thomas Lubanga appealed both the 
guilty verdict and the sentence.  
The sentence was welcomed by human rights activists as the beginning of a new era 
in prosecution before the ICC, as Brigid Inder791 comments: ‘the ICC has reached the 
stage of sentencing in its first case is an important milestone’. However, there was 
                                                          
789 See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Report of the Mapping Exercise 
documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed 
within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 
2010. 
790 See ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012. 
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disappointment in the fact that the widespread commission of sexual violence had not 
been recognised as an aggravating factor in the sentencing decision.792 On this issue, 
the chamber found that ‘the link between sexual violence in the context of the charges 
was not established beyond a reasonable doubt and thus could not form part of the 
assessment of culpability for sentencing’.793 However, taking into account how women 
and girls are victims of rape and sexual violence of extreme gravity which may 
constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, one can legitimately question how 
R2P benefits the victims of such violations in Eastern DRC. As previously mentioned, 
the DRC government has failed in its duty to investigate these crimes and to bring the 
perpetrators to justice. While these crimes should be prosecuted, it is important to 
recall that the ICC can prosecute only a limited number of the perpetrators as is. In 
this regard, applying R2P framework can help in clarifying the responsibility  of the 
Congolese government and to ensure that concrete measures are taken to prevent 
and to address such atrocities. In this respect, the victims’ perspective is that  the 
government did not take any measure to support them and that the crimes committed 
against them have gone unpunished.794 Nevertheless, this first and historic judgment 
of the ICC is particularly significant for the development of jurisprudence regarding the 
use of child soldiers.  
Despite these criticisms, this case and sentence constitutes a strong message to 
warlords and commanders of armed groups. This can be illustrated by the fact that, 
while a recent Human Rights Watch report held that M23 had committed human rights 
                                                          
792 Ibid. 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Para. 75. See also Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice’s observations on reparations 
and gender justice, available at http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Observations-on-reparations.pdf. 
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violations which may amount to war crimes and  crimes against humanity,795 in the 
interview with this author, the M23 officials manifested their adherence to international 
humanitarian law, particularly their commitment to minimize civilian casualties. They 
further underlined the fact that they were not supporting  Bosco Ntaganda796 who 
voluntarily surrendered to the ICC custody and was charged for war crimes and crime 
against humanity.797 In this respect,  one can argue that the ICC at this point is an 
operational tool of R2P that can generate multiple responses in preventing atrocity 
crimes against the civilian population. Tools such as statements of the ICC prosecutor 
threatening the belligerents that investigations will be conducted into atrocity crimes 
that have been perpetrated on civilians may help in preventing such atrocities.  
 Nevertheless, given the situation on the ground regarding the commission of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, one can argue that this represents only  ‘a drop 
in the ocean’. Yet, the ICC has been an important alternative to failure of the national 
tribunals to address impunity. However, there is also the issue of reparation and 
compensantion. In fact, a vast majority of interviewed victims of mass atrocities have 
raised the issue of reparation arguing that they are losing interest in international 
justice quite simply because they are not being compensated as they should be.798 
Nonetheless, the possibility given to victims in terms of reparation under the Rome 
Statute of the ICC was a considerable innovation in the history of international justice. 
In this regard, Cassese believes that in comparison to ICTY and ICTR statutes, the 
                                                          
795 See Human Rights Watch ‘DRC: M23 Kill, Rape Civilians’ 22 July 2013, available at 
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798 Interview with an ICC staff member working with victims and witnesses. 
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Rome Statute is more favourable in terms of reparation and compensation for 
victims.799 
Pursuant to Article 75 to the Rome Statute of the ICC, the court should establish 
principles relating to the reparation of victims. Accordingly, the court may order the 
convicted person to make reparation for the victim which may include restitution, 
compensation and rehabilitation.800 The court may also decide to request assistance 
from state parties to implement reparation order. Similarly, according to Article 79 of 
the Rome Statute, a trust fund shall be established by the Assembly of States Parties 
for the benefit of the victims and their families.801Article 75 the Rome Statute states 
that: 
1.The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect 
of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this 
basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own motion 
in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any 
damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the 
principles on which it is acting.  
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person 
specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. Where appropriate, the Court 
may order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund 
provided for in article 79.  
   
3. Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall 
take account of representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, 
victims, other interested persons or interested States.  
4. In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a person is 
convicted of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, determine whether, 
in order to give effect to an order which it may make under this article, it is 
necessary to seek measures under article 93, paragraph 1.  
                                                          
799 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 422-423. 
800 Article 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
801 Article 79 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
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5. A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this article as if the 
provisions of article 109 were applicable to this article.  
6. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims 
under national or international law. 
While this provision was intended to provide an adequate assistance for victims, given 
the insolvency of the perpetrators, if convicted, and the lack of resources on behalf of 
the government, the question remains whether this provision is relevant in assisting 
victims of mass atrocities. It is clear therefore that under the R2P framework, the 
responsibility of the international community is to address this issue more seriously. 
Different options could be considered, including the establishment of clearer 
mechanisms to evaluate the DRC government support to the victims of mass 
atrocities, particularly rape and sexual violence and what measures are necessary to 
achieve that goal. 
 
6.7 Chapter conclusions 
 
It has been established that the key driver of conflict in the Eastern DRC is the 
weakness of the state and its inability to provide basic human rights protection to its 
population and that the control of natural resources continues to fuel the conflict and 
the lack of discipline in army, police and justice also increase the risk of abuse against 
civilians.802 It has also been illustrated that the international community has been 
actively involved in addressing the conflict, particularly by making the protection of 
civilians the top priority of the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC.  The discussion 
was however focussed on the fact that while both international and regional responses 
                                                          
802 2010 Human Rights Report ‘DRC’, available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154340.htm, 
accessed on 07 February 2013. 
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to the crisis seem to be under the R2P threshold, the principle has never been 
mentioned. 
This leads to the conclusion that while the situation in the Eastern DRC calls for R2P 
to be applied, the principle has not been openly invoked and that the complexities of 
the conflict as well as many other factors did not allow this. Thus, one can argue that 
R2P is an adequate tool to address conflicts characterized by the commission of mass 
atrocities against the civilian population but only when the state in which atrocity 
crimes are happening is itself the perpetrator. This affirmation was highlighted in the 
case of Libya, Ivory Coast, Syria, and Sudan. In these four cases the state was the 
perpetrator of atrocity crimes.  In  the DRC where R2P has not been actively applied, 
the state is not itself the perpetrator of the crimes. Here there is an inability of state to 
address massive human rights violations against its population by both state and non 
state actors. Given the international community response one may question whether 
a state’s inability to protect its population is not sufficient for the application or even 
invocation of R2P. Yet the conflict in Eastern DRC does not only require military 
intervention supported by the international community but also sustained support to 
build the state capacity to protect its people as the DRC state has proved itself  willing 
but completely incapable of ending mass atrocities against the civilian population. 
Nevertheless, this chapter takes the position that the eradication of militia groups 
operating in Eastern DRC as well as mechanisms of ammunition control are essential  
for security and the future stability of the region. As long as the DRC continues to allow 
its territory to be used as a training and coordination stronghold for various rebel 
factions, which some have the mission to overthrow the legitimate regimes in 
neighbouring countries of the Great Lakes region will not achieve peace. The 
international community should help DRC to eliminate all these rebel factions if it is 
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really committed to building a peaceful environment in the sub region. However, the 
recent deployment of an intervention brigade803 to take offensive measures against 
the so-called negative force coupled with the use of drones to provide information 
about the operations of militia groups in eastern DRC can be considered as an 
important advancement in addressing this conflict.804 
Despite the fact that a UN arms embargo has been active in the DRC since 2003, 
arms continue to flow in the country. However, statements made by some officials of 
the rebellion movement interviewed by this author in 2012 shows that there is a lack 
of control of ammunitions in the region. M23 rebels for example claimed that their 
military capacity stem mainly from the FARDC equipment that are captured after the 
Congolese army was defeated in the fighting.805 This standpoint is also confirmed by 
the Amnesty International Report on the DRC which pointed out that  ‘A major 
weakness of the current framework for management of weapons, ammunitions and 
related equipment in the DRC is the lack of institutional controls especially on FARDC 
military equipment- a problem reported in a number of public documents, including UN 
reports’.    
This highlights once again the fact that regional security, economic and governance 
issues need to be addressed. There is no doubt that a transparent and credible political 
commitment among the key regional countries including DRC, Rwanda and Uganda 
is needed. Thus, the international community should continue to use all the tools at its 
disposal in order to put pressure on all the protagonists in the Eastern DRC conflict. 
                                                          
803  UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013) [on extension of the mandate of the UN 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) until 31 Mar. 2014], 
28 March 2013, S/RES/2098, 2013, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/519dfcfc4.html, accessed  on 
25 October 2013. 
804 See http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-2013/intervention-brigade-end-game-congo, 
accessed on 25/10/2013. 
805 Interview with M23 Movement officials. 
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However, while economic sanctions to put pressure on those who are allegedly 
providing support to armed groups, both the effectiveness and scope of this measure 
can be questionable since the punishment has repercussions on the civilian 
population.806 
Neverthless, there is  an urgent need to move from rhetoric to action on the part of the 
international community. As stated by the Ambassador Suzan Rice with regard to the 
Eastern DRC crisis: ‘The United States and our partners in the international community 
will continue to use every tool at our disposal to maintain the pressure on those 
responsible for the violence in the Eastern DRC and to advance ongoing efforts toward 
a political settlement to the crisis, including additional action by the security Council, if 
necessary, against those who persist in providing external regime and arms 
embargo.’807 
It can also be argued that the situation in Eastern DRC necessitates more international 
news coverage and political action. Headlines and extensive press coverage over the 
atrocities are urgently required. People rarely hear about the scope of the use of rape 
in this part of the world as a weapon of war. People interviewed808 in the DRC have 
questioned why the killing and raping there do not deserve media coverage as is the 
case for Syria. This is certainly due to the fact that the conflict is long lasting and the 
media are looking for new stories. Nevertheless, civilians in the Eastern DRC continue 
to face mass atrocities while the implementation of R2P could fill the gap left by non-
                                                          
806 For example following the allegations of Rwandan involvement with M23 rebels, several donor countries 
have decided to withdraw the development aid from Rwanda. See Global Center for the responsibility to 
protect report at http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/democratic_republic_of_the_congo_drc, accessed on 07 
February 2013. 
807 Statement by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council’s DRC 
Sanctions Committee Designations, available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/202425.htm, last 
accessed 11 January 2013.   
808 Interview with the Author, in South and North Kivu, DRC. 
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respect of humanitarian and human rights rules, the principle has not been invoked 
and fully applied in the DRC with international community to end the conflicts and 
atrocity crimes definitively.  
In sum, while in political and popular discourse there is a consensus that R2P should 
be applied to the eastern DRC crisis, no such mention appears in the Security Council 
resolutions on the DRC. Instead, the issue continues to be considered under the 
traditional framework of international peace and security and  protection of civilians in 
accordance with the UN Charter. Given that, it can therefore be argued that at this 
point of time there is a hesitation on behalf of the Security Council to openly apply R2P 
framework in the Eastern DRC conflict. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
This thesis has analyzed the existing normative framework and legal framework of the 
R2P doctrine in relation to the protection of civilians against atrocity crimes. The thesis 
has applied the R2P framework to the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s conflict. 
The overriding purpose was to assess the effectiveness of the R2P as an international 
norm to address atrocity crimes.  It sought to ascertain whether the doctrine was 
applied or should apply in practice in the DRC’s conflict and its impact to guarantee 
security of the civilian population.   
To arrive at the conclusion the dissertation established first an analysis of the historical 
development of protection of non-combatants in general. Here it highlighted that the 
principle of non-combatant immunity has both religious and secular roots.  
Secondly, the thesis examined and analyzed the United Nations strategies in face of 
massive violations of human rights. The key finding here is that despite controversy 
surrounding the use of force for humanitarian purposes, since the emergence of R2P 
there is an international consensus that never again should the international 
community stand by in the face of mass violation of human rights and that sovereignty 
cannot be used as a shield behind which abuse could be inflicted on populations. 
There is a significant move on behalf of the international community towards the 
evolution of both protection by legal standards and political imperatives.  
Thirdly the thesis synthesized the legal framework for the protection of civilians from 
mass atrocities as enshrined in international law. This analysis established the rules 
laid down by International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Criminal Law to 
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protect civilians against the effect of hostilities;  thousands of civilians are nevertheless 
deliberately targeted by armed groups. The main obstacle seen here to the application 
of a legal framework is the lack of adequate infrastructures coupled with the lack of 
political will to implement humanitarian and human rights rules which provide 
extensive protection to civilians against atrocity crimes. 
Fourthly, the study analyzed the R2P framework and its acceptance as a new 
international norm within the United Nations system and state practice. The study 
established one important finding here that while R2P remains a political norm, it has 
a significant impact on Security Council debate and state practice, particularly in 
Western political discourse. 
Finally, in chapters 5 and 6, the thesis examined the case of the DRC and dynamics 
of applying the R2P doctrine by the international community. The legal framework 
established in the thesis was then applied to the DRC’s conflict.  Firstly, the effect of 
the conflict on the populations in Eastern regions of the country and the Congolese 
government’s response were explored and analyzed to assess whether the R2P 
framework should apply to the crisis. The thesis found that the DRC conflict stands out 
as one of the most complex and difficult situations in which R2P should be 
implemented in practice. The international community has attempted to fulfill its 
obligation derived from the R2P framework by using different means including 
peacekeeping operations and mediation through the United Nations, European Union, 
Africa Union and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. While the 
United Nations troops have been in the DRC for more than a decade and their 
mandate has moved from monitoring the ceasefire agreement to providing direct 
protection to civilians under imminent physical violence threat, it is obvious that the 
UN’s traditional way of dealing with this conflict is ineffective.  
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7.1 Conclusions 
 
Based on the analysis in the key areas and issues presented above, this study has 
come to the following main conclusions: 
1. The R2P doctrine provides an adequate and workable framework for 
governments and international communities as a whole when responding to 
atrocity crimes. However, while there is an international consensus that never 
again should the international community standby in the face of mass atrocity 
crimes, the reality on the ground has shown that the applicability of R2P 
remains uncertain and that states do not feel legally compelled to secure the 
extraterritorial protection of civilians. Thus, there exists a gap between the 
theory and the reality. The fact that R2P is not openly invoked or applied in 
some conflicts characterized by atrocity crimes such as the DRC conflict, 
despite the fact that this conflict is one of the situations this doctrine was 
conceived to address, demonstrates that there is a need to develop new 
strategies for the implementation of R2P as an international norm to protect 
civilians against atrocity crimes. The major defects in the R2P framework can 
be summarized as follow: 
 
a. Despite the recognition and acceptance of R2P by states as a new global 
norm to address atrocity crimes, R2P is a political rather than a legal 
doctrine. Consequently, it does not have a binding character and its 
application relies heavily on the political will of state members of the United 
Nations, particularly the Security Council. However, although R2P has not 
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yet been proclaimed as a legal binding norm, the adoption of Security 
Council resolutions based on Responsibility to Protect809 is a significant step 
on the way to recognizing R2P as a legal norm.  
b. The focus on prevention as the principle dimension of R2P takes the 
emphasis away from long-term armed conflict. The challenge is that the 
norm was framed to respond to conflicts which just break out where mass 
violation of human rights and atrocity crimes are taking place. In the DRC 
the conflict has lasted more than a decade and the international community 
had framed its response in the traditional way of addressing the threat to 
international peace and security. In addition, it appears that R2P was framed 
to address a humanitarian crisis in which a state is itself the perpetrator of 
mass atrocities. In this context, addressing situations where a state has 
shown itself to be unable or unwilling to stop mass atrocities which are 
committed by non state actors, as is the case in the Eastern DRC crisis, 
became more complex. There is a need to seriously investigate this issue.  
c. The main challenge of the R2P doctrine is that there remains a common 
perception in southern countries particularly in Africa, that the application of 
R2P is mostly driven by geopolitical interests instead of by the humanitarian 
objective of protecting civilians from atrocities crimes. Consequently, the 
international community is deeply divided when it has to respond to 
emerging crises characterized by atrocity crimes. 
 
                                                          
809 The adoption of the 1973 Security Council Resolution authorizing intervention in Libya to protect the 
civilian population as well as the 1975 Resolution in connection with the situation in Ivory Coast. 
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2. Even if the R2P norm has been and is often invoked as a key tool to be used 
when the global community is facing an imminent humanitarian crisis in which 
civilians are at risk of mass atrocity crimes, its operationalization is still unclear. 
This was the case in the Eastern DRC crises in 2008 and 2012. Although R2P 
is not just about military intervention, it might have been an opportunity to 
openly apply the principle in its enforcement aspects.  However, as evidenced 
in the case study, the international community response to the 2008 Goma 
crisis was marked by significant diplomatic efforts and the adoption of Security 
Council resolutions which made protection of civilians the priority of the United 
Nations peacekeeping forces in the DRC. Nevertheless, only the traditional UN 
peace and security agenda was applied to address the crisis. This strategy was 
successful in stopping the crisis only temporarily as the Congolese government 
has failed to provide effective protection to its population in the eastern part of 
the country and there still a litany of rebel groups operating in the region. 
 
3. Whereas the R2P norm was designed to remedy to the international failure to 
address mass atrocity crimes, in the case of Eastern DRC its impact to the 
conflict is not visible.  It appears that the United Nations’ response to atrocity 
crimes committed in Eastern DRC was not based on the Responsibility to 
Protect norm. The language of the Security Council in resolutions on the DRC 
had never referred to the Responsibility to Protect framework, but indeed 
referred to the traditional Protection of Civilians (PoC) concept.  The Security 
Council consistently affirmed that the primary responsibility for protection of 
civilians rests on the Congolese government but no mention was made of the 
R2P norm. The council stresses  that ‘the primary responsibility of the 
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Government of the DRC for ensuring security in its territory and protecting its 
civilians with respect for the rule of law, human rights, and international 
humanitarian law’. It continues by stating ‘the Council encourages the 
Government of the DRC to remain fully committed to protecting the civilian 
population’. This language demonstrates that the R2P norm did not have any 
impact on the international community’s response to the conflict as was the 
case in Libya and Ivory Coast where R2P seems to have been applied. In the 
resolutions authorizing the use of force to protect civilians in Benghazi, the 
language of the Security Council was clearer despite the fact that the norm was 
not openly mentioned in the text of the resolutions. For example, in Resolution 
1970 it was stated that ‘recalling the Libyan authorities responsibility to protect 
its population’ and in Resolution 1975 ‘reaffirming the primary responsibility of 
each state to protect civilians’. 
4. The situation of the civilian population on the ground as demonstrated in the 
case study highlights the fact that the international community still struggle to 
turn the R2P framework into a reality on the ground.  It is important to policy 
makers to carefully consider the day-to-day life of the population at risk when 
responding to conflicts characterized by atrocity crimes.   
7.2 Recommendations  
 
1. The Security Council should put a strong emphasis on implementing R2P as an 
international norm that in future would legally compel states to meet their ‘responsibility 
to protect’ obligations. Around the world, there are many ongoing conflicts in which 
civilians are facing mass atrocity crimes and governments have shown unwillingness 
or inability to protect their population or are themselves the perpetrator and the R2P 
do not apply while they fit within its scope.  As can be seen from the case of the Eastern 
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DRC conflict, civilians continue to suffer persistent violence by armed groups 
characterized by mass atrocities such as sexual violence and gender-based violence 
as well as mass killing and abduction and recruitment of children into armed forces 
when the application of R2P could have helped to adequately respond to this situation. 
The role of R2P within the Protection of Civilians (PoC) concept needs to be clarified. 
The ambiguities surrounding the two concepts in face of mass atrocity crimes must be 
elucidated.  
2. The way to deal with governments who are not perpetrators but who failed to protect 
their population should be reviewed. The Security Council should avoid using 
ambiguous and opaque language when it is urging concerned states to fulfil their 
primary obligation to protect civilians under R2P framework. As to the case of the DRC, 
the Security Council should be more severe with the Congolese government as to its 
obligation to put an end to the continual cycle of violence in eastern provinces, 
particularly to reform its armed forces which are also involved in commission of mass 
atrocity crimes against the civilian population.  
3. A more expansive interpretation of victim reparations under Article 75 of the Rome 
Statute of International Criminal Court should be taken into account in order to allow 
victims of mass atrocity crimes for which the prosecutor has failed to prove to be 
provided assistance to receive reparation and compensation. For example, when there 
exists sufficient evidence that a person is a victim or a survivor of mass atrocity crimes 
of which the perpetrator is accused before the court,  reparation should be awarded 
regardless of whether the accused has been convicted or not. This would allow victims 
of mass atrocity crimes to rebuild their lives and dignity. 
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4. As many victims of atrocity crimes are not considered in the Rome Statute 
framework, states should be encouraged to set up mechanisms to ensure that the 
harm that victims of mass atrocity crimes have suffered will be recognized and that 
they will be granted reparations to rebuild their lives. In this context, states should be 
compelled to fulfill their responsibility to rebuild when they have failed to protect their 
population from mass atrocities. 
5. Since R2P was designed to reinforce the existing legal and normative framework to 
protect civilians from mass atrocities, human rights and humanitarian principles should 
be promoted in states affected by armed conflicts. Both state and non-state armed 
forces should be aware of their obligations to protect civilians and be trained using 
basic language in the legal regime applicable to armed conflict. As in the case of the 
DRC, where many combatants have never been to school, it would be difficult even 
impossible for them to adequately understand the complexities of the legal regime 
applicable to armed conflict. Even some high-ranking commanders have only a 
rudimentary knowledge of the laws of armed conflict. 
This research leads to the conclusion that the Responsibility to Protect, despite its 
acceptance as an adequate norm to address mass atrocity crimes, leaves some 
aspects of the doctrine unclear. This would include the point at which it is required to 
move from the traditional Protection of Civilians (PoCs) framework, when addressing 
long-term conflicts characterized by atrocity crimes, to the application of R2P to protect 
civilians from these crimes. It is obvious that a clear, precise and realistic roadmap for 
the application of R2P is necessary in order to allow the norm to generate a legal 
binding law in future. Only then will it be possible to achieve the objective R2P was 
framed for, the protection of civilians from atrocity crimes. 
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5. The current legal framework in relation to the protection of civilians from atrocity crimes 
is insufficient and inadequate to modern conflicts. Consequently, thousands of civilians 
continue to be the primary victims of mass atrocity crimes committed by both state and 
non-state armed groups. In situations of armed conflict, belligerents do not take all 
feasible measures to protect civilians both in military operations and against the effects 
of hostilities as required by international humanitarian law. As previously mentioned, 
the lack of adequate infrastructures to implement humanitarian principles and political 
will are the main cause of serious suffering of civilians affected by armed conflict. As 
the ICRC observes: 
The adequacy of International Humanitarian law has on occasion been 
challenged not only in terms of its ability to encompass new realities of 
organized armed violence within existing classifications, but also in terms 
of the existence of a sufficient body of substantive norms and its 
applicability in a given situation.810 
While states have a duty to implement international humanitarian law and to 
ensure that its principles are respected, there is a lack of awareness of the law 
of armed conflict on behalf of armed and fighting forces. As Pfanner comments: 
The implementing measures required in peacetime to back up the 
obligation to spread knowledge of the Geneva Conventions and the 
Protocols thereto ‘as widely as possible’ are the training of qualified staff, 
the deployment of legal advisers in armed forces, emphasis on the duty of 
commanders and special instruction for the military and authorities who 
may be called upon to assume relevant responsibilities.811 
                                                          
810 ‘International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts’, Document prepared 
by the international Committee of the Red Cross for the 3Oth International Conference of the Red Cross and 
Red Crescent, Geneva, Switzerland, 26-30 November 2007, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 89, no. 
867, September 2007. 
811 Tony Pfanner, ‘Various Mechanisms and Approaches for Implementing International Humanitarian Law 
and Protecting and Assisting War Victims’, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 91, no. 874, June 2009, 
p. 283. 
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Therefore, new strategies should be developed to ensure that people affected by 
armed conflict are protected by the laws. It is clear that the current legal framework on 
protection of civilians in armed conflict has proven itself to be inadequate. As 
mentioned above, without concrete measures for implementation of the International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, fighting forces cannot be 
expected to fully comply with the rules protecting people affected by armed conflict.  
This leads to the conclusion that while it is clear that R2P has reinforced the current 
legal framework with regard to the protection of civilians from mass atrocities and that 
the new norm has become an integral part of the global security agenda, there must 
be a move from traditional mechanisms to practicable and workable strategies to 
address any humanitarian crisis.  
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Annex I. Questionnaire for interviewing Survivors of 
Sexual Violence in the DRC 
 
 
1. How old are you? 15-25  26- 45  more than 45 
2. What were you doing before the attack? Schooling  Cultivating    Other  
3. Where were you living? Village  Town/ City  
4. Where did attack happened? Village  Market Schools  
5. Do you want to tell me what happened to you? Yes  No  
6. What do you remember about the attack? 
7. Do you think you could talk about what really happened to you during the 
attack? Yes  No  
8. Can you tell me what happened…………………………. 
9.  Did it happen many times? Yes No  
10. Can you identify the people who did this to you? Yes  No  
11. How many were there? ………………….. 
12. Were they armed Yes   No 
13. Were those people in  
 Uniform  Yes  No  
 Civilian clothes Yes  No  
 Language ………………… 
14. Were there many other people there? Yes  No  
15. Were your children/relativesalso attacked? Yes  No  
16. What happened after the attack? ..................................... 
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17. Did you receive any support from  
 The government? Yes  No  
 NGOs? Yes    No  Don’t know  
 MONUC/ MONUSCO? Yes   No  
18. Is there anything else you can tell me about the attack…………….. 
19. Do you feel ashamed? Yes  No  
20. What do you believe can be done to prevent that in the future? ...................... 
21. Are you optimistic about the future? Yes  No  
22. What about your life today? ………………………………. 
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Annex II. Questionnaire for interviewing Former Child 
Soldiers in the DRC 
 
1. How old are you? ………………. 
2. What were you doing before the war? Schooling Dwelling  Other  
3. Where were you living? Village  Town/ City 
4. Do you have family?  Yes   No  
5. Were you abducted? Yes  No  
6. How old were you by time of abduction..................... 
7. Where were you taken? …………………… 
8. How were you treated? ................................... 
9. What were you doing during the war? ……….… 
10. Did you fight? Yes   No  
11. Can you tell me about your most memorable experiences during the 
war..........................? 
12. What motivated you to join if you were not abducted? ............................. 
13. Did any friends or relatives enlist with you? Yes  No  
14. What do you remember about your first days in armed forces or armed 
groups? 
15. Do you know where your family is today? Yes  No  
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Annex III. Questions for interviewing officials and policy 
makers  
 
1. What is your opinion on ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)? 
2.  How do you think R2P can be implemented? 
3.  What are the practical implications of the R2P doctrine? 
4.  Is there a common understanding of R2P? 
5.  What is your government/organization position on R2P? 
6.  Can R2P only be implemented if the big powers agree? 
7.  Is this a legal or political doctrine? 
8. In the case of the Eastern Congo do or should be R2P applied?  
9. What can we learn from the Eastern DRC conflict regarding R2P? 
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Annex IV: Informed Consent Form 
 
I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by Françoise Joly from Dublin 
City University. I understand that the project form part of a PhD thesis and that I will 
be one of people being interviewed for this academic work. My participation in this 
project is voluntary, I understand that I will not be paid for my participation and I may 
withdraw from the study at any time.  
 
I understand that participation involves being interviewed by Françoise Joly. The 
interview will last approximately 45 minutes. Notes will be taken during the interview. 
An audio tape of the interview will be made.  
 
I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any report and that 
my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. Subsequent use of 
records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect the 
anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
 
I have read and understand the explanation provided to me.  I freely give my consent 
to participate to participate in this study.  
 
I have been given a copy of this consent form. 
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Table I. The responses on the experiences during the attack (Total 
number = 80) 
 
 
Experiences during 
the attack 
Number of responses 
(nb) 
Percentages 
(%) 
Beaten 78,0 97.5 
Raped 79,0 98.7 
Witness Killings 23,0 28.8 
Raped many times 51,0 63.7 
Gang group 64,0 80.0 
Military Uniform 80,0 100.0 
Civilian clothes 4,0 5.0 
Swahili/Lingala 65,0 81.3 
Kinyarwanda 69 86.4 
Attacked with the relatives 70,0 87.5 
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Graph I. Presentation of responses from the interview on 
the memory during the attack 
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Pie chart: Available support after the attack 
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Graph I. Former child soldiers experiences on the conflict 
 
 
